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Thesis Abstract 
 
 This study looks at Lord Aberdeen’s second tenure as Foreign Secretary, in 
Robert Peel’s government of 1841-46.  The tenure is first contextualised by an 
analysis of Aberdeen’s ‘mental map’, in order to reconstruct the personal influences 
and reasoning behind Conservative foreign policy.  The study then engages with 
Aberdeen’s dealings in Europe, where it provides an alternative interpretation of 
the Anglo-French entente.  It considers Aberdeen and the Conservatives’ approach 
to Russia and the ‘Eastern Question’ which, along with Chapter Two, treads 
historiographical terra incognita.  Britain’s engagement with America is then 
analysed; the discord of preceding years, various festering diplomatic sores, and 
America’s growing influence had combined to throw relations into sharp focus. 
 This study re-examines archives that have, for the most part, been long 
neglected or examined in the light of historiographical debates long superseded by 
new developments.  Where the present methodology varies from previous works is 
that different questions are being asked of the material in accordance with the new 
contexts in which Aberdeen and Conservative foreign policy are considered: these 
relate to conclusions drawn from the analysis of Aberdeen’s ‘mental map’ and to 
the wider objectives of the Conservative government. 
 This approach facilitates a study in which Aberdeen’s foreign policy is 
analysed on its own terms.  The historiography has hitherto largely used 
Palmerstonian and/or liberal contexts as the parameters of debate about the 
foreign policy of the Peel administration, which only served to distort conclusions.  
This study’s approach leads it to consider a rational and competent Foreign 
Secretary whose policy dovetailed with the objectives of the Conservative 
government and was crucial in helping Peel to deliver them.  A consistent set of 
principles ran through foreign policy dealings – albeit with a flexibility reserved for 
the means by which they were applied – not least a focus on the maintenance and 
extension of mercantile intercourse as a means by which to consolidate and protect 
British power.  These observations help lead the study to consider a 
reinterpretation of Aberdeen and the Peel government, and to ask new questions 
about mid nineteenth-century Conservatism. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The period between 1841 and 1846 was an eventful one in British politics.  
Sir Robert Peel’s Conservative government came to power seeking to improve 
Britain’s economic and social health.  The world trade slump of the late 1830s and 
early 1840s was exacerbated by the profligacy of the preceding Whig government; 
Britain was left with a huge budget deficit and a discontented population.1  The 
dual objectives of improving the condition of the nation whilst reducing Britain’s 
debt placed pressure on the Conservatives who faced all the normal challenges of 
nineteenth-century government.  Simmering Irish discontent boiled over during the 
potato famine in 1845, which coincided with Peel’s growing belief that Britain’s 
tariff system was holding back economic development, leading the government to 
repeal the Corn Laws, which had hitherto placed prohibitive duties on the import of 
foreign corn and protected prices for British farmers.  Repeal was a divisive 
measure that alienated much of the Conservative party faithful and precipitated the 
demise of the Peel administration.  Many historians have been drawn to study 
these domestic aspects of Peel’s government, especially given that this was a 
pivotal phase in British politics, when an era dominated by Conservative 
governments gave way to the largely liberal age of the mid-nineteenth century.2  
The conduct of foreign policy has not always attracted the same level of 
historiographical attention, which is surprising given that 1841-1846 was also a 
significant period in Britain’s international relations.  The Conservative government 
oversaw the initiation of the first Anglo-French entente, at a time when a pro-
French policy was identified more with the Whig Party.  In the United States, the 
emergent doctrine of ‘Manifest Destiny’ helped exacerbate boundary disputes with 
British North America.  British policy makers were also challenged by tensions with 
Russia relating to the fate of the Ottoman Empire. 
                                                          
1
 A famous summary of Britain’s social ills, originally published in 1843, was T. Carlyle, Past and 
Present (New York, Gotham Library edition, 1965).  
2
 See, for example, T. Crosby, Sir Robert Peel’s Administration (London, 1976); P. Adelman, Peel and 
the Conservative Party 1830-1850 (London, 1989); A. Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England 1846-
1946 (Oxford, 1997); C. Schonhardt-Bailey, From the Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas and 
Institutions in Historical Perspective (Massachusetts, 2006); J. Charmley, A History of Conservative 
Politics since 1830 (London, 2
nd
 edition, 2008). 
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The foremost sources of interest in the study of nineteenth-century foreign 
policy remain practitioners such as Lord Palmerston, William Gladstone, Benjamin 
Disraeli and Lord Salisbury, all of whom attract significant attention.3  Whilst the 
subjects of study have remained largely the same, however, there have been recent 
works that point towards a historiographical shift in the way that foreign policy is 
approached by historians.  David Brown’s work on Palmerston has explored the 
relationship between foreign and domestic policy in the 1840s and 1850s, as well as 
the connection between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics, and he recently extended his 
analysis in a full biography.4  Brown’s approach to Palmerstonian policy pieced 
together the multifarious influences upon it, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic 
portrayal of politicians that often results from a focus upon diplomatic minutiae.  
Widening the scope to contextualise Palmerstonism within the wider political 
world, and to consider Palmerston’s symbiotic relationship with public opinion, 
further represented a move away from the traditional accounts of diplomatic 
intercourse. 
                                                          
3
 Post-1980 publications relating to Palmerston include, in chronological order, K. Bourne, 
Palmerston: The Early Years, 1784-1841 (London, 1982); M. Chamberlain, Lord Palmerston (Cardiff, 
1987); E. Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 1855-1865 (Cambridge, 1991); G. Billy, Palmerston’s 
Foreign Policy: 1848 (New York, 1993); D. Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846-
55 (Manchester, 2002); P. Ziegler, Palmerston (London, 2003); J. Chambers, Palmerston: ‘The 
People’s Darling’ (London, 2004); Brown, Palmerston: A Biography (London, 2010); L. Fenton, 
Palmerston and The Times: Foreign Policy, the Press and Public Opinion in Mid-Victorian Britain 
(London, 2013).  For Gladstone see, for example, P. Butler, Gladstone, Church, State and 
Tractarianism: A Study of his Religious Ideas and Attitudes, 1809-1859 (Oxford, 1982); R. Shannon, 
Gladstone, in 2 volumes (London, 1982-1999); H. Matthew, Gladstone, in 2 volumes (Oxford, 1986-
1997); E. Feuchtwanger, Gladstone (London, 1988); T. Jenkins, Gladstone, Whiggery, and the Liberal 
Party, 1874-1886 (Oxford, 1988); A. Ramm, William Ewart Gladstone (Cardiff, 1989); M. Winstanley, 
Gladstone and the Liberal Party (London, 1990); E. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform: 
Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860-1880 (Cambridge, 1992); D. Bebbington, William 
Ewart Gladstone: Faith and Politics in Victorian Britain (Michigan, 1993); R. Jenkins, Gladstone 
(London, 1995); Biagini, Gladstone (London, 2000); M. Partridge, Gladstone (London, 2003); R. 
Shannon, Gladstone: God and Politics (London, 2007).  For Disraeli see, for example, T. Braun, 
Disraeli the Novelist (London, 1981); R. Blake, Disraeli’s Grand Tour: Benjamin Disraeli and the Holy 
Land, 1830-31 (London, 1982); J. Vincent, Disraeli (Oxford, 1990); R. Shannon, The Age of Disraeli, 
1868-1881: The Rise of Tory Democracy (London, 1992); S. Weintraub, Disraeli: A Biography (London, 
1993); J. Ridley, The Young Disraeli (London, 1995); C. Eldridge, Disraeli and the Rise of a New 
Imperialism (Cardiff, 1996); T. Jenkins, Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism (London, 1996); E. 
Feuchtwanger, Disraeli (London, 2000); C. Hibbert, Disraeli: A Personal History (London, 2004); D. 
Hurd and E. Young, Disraeli: Or, The Two Lives (London, 2013).  For Salisbury see, for example, Lord 
Blake and H. Cecil, Salisbury: The Man and his Policies (London, 1987); A. Roberts, Salisbury: 
Victorian Titan (London, 1999); M. Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World: Conservative Environments in 
Late-Victorian Britain (Cambridge, 2001); D. Steele, Lord Salisbury: A Political Biography (London, 
2001); E. Midwinter, Salisbury (London, 2006).    
4
 Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846-55; Palmerston: A Biography.  
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Jonathan Parry’s work epitomised the changing approach to foreign policy 
demonstrated by Brown.5  Parry’s account of English Liberalism and Europe 
examined the practical and philosophical grounding of Victorian liberal policy and, 
in doing so, demonstrated how liberals’ interpretations of morality and patriotism 
led them to try and impose British values upon the international system.  Parry’s 
objective was ‘to show that domestic, foreign, imperial and Irish issues all involved 
similar underlying themes – of the responsibility of political leaders and the political 
nation to form a strong and beneficent national community on healthy principles.’6  
This extract reflected a further historiographical shift, by which foreign and 
domestic policy – and other aspects of an administration’s responsibility – were 
treated as part of the overarching and interrelated approach of a government, 
rather than being considered as separate entities. 
There has also been a recent resurgence of interest in the foreign policy of 
later Conservative governments of the nineteenth century, led by both Angus 
Hawkins and what one might call the ‘Norwich School’ of historians.7  These authors 
have taken a similarly panoramic approach to that of Brown and Parry, turning the 
spotlight on the Conservative Party after its split over the Corn Laws.  Until recently, 
that era had lived out its historiographical afterlife in the shadow of Disraeli, but 
thorough studies of other key Conservative players, such as the fourteenth and 
fifteenth Earls of Derby, have helped to show the existence and execution of 
coherent Conservative policies based around a restraint that Disraeli never 
exhibited, nor wished to exhibit: foreign governments were not to be provoked in 
the name of prestige through interference in their internal affairs or by geopolitical 
brinksmanship.  In pursuing such a policy – although never to the extent that British 
interests were consciously compromised – money might be saved, and the 
                                                          
5
 J. Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886 
(Cambridge, 2006). 
6
 Ibid, p. 2. 
7
 J. Vincent (ed.), A Selection from the Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15
th
 Earl of Derby (1826-
1893): between September 1869 and March 1878 (London, 1994); J. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?  
Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-1914 (London, 1999); A. Hawkins, The Forgotten Prime 
Minister: The Fourteenth Earl of Derby, in 2 volumes (Oxford, 2007-8); G. Hicks, Peace, War and 
Party Politics: The Conservatives and Europe 1846-1859 (Manchester, 2007); G. Hicks (ed.), 
Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, 1820-1920: The Derbys and their World (London, 2011); G. 
Hicks, J. Charmley and B. Grosvenor (eds.), Documents on Conservative Foreign Policy, 1852-1878 
(Cambridge, 2012). 
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international system that protected British security and pre-eminence might be 
preserved.8  John Charmley’s 1999 work looked at these themes in relation to the 
fifteenth Earl.9  In his two-volume biography of the fourteenth Earl, Angus Hawkins 
explored this restrained variety of Conservatism.10  Geoffrey Hicks developed this 
theme in his work, examining Conservative foreign policy in the years after the Peel 
government, in part by considering its close relationship to domestic affairs, as 
Brown and Parry had done regarding liberal subjects. 
There have been recent publications that explored the politics of the Peel 
government: Richard Gaunt has authored a biography of Peel, Edward McNeilly has 
written a PhD thesis on the Conservatives and France and, in a short analysis, 
Laurence Guymer has explored British foreign policy-making towards Spain.11  
Whilst these works demonstrate a renewed interest in the period of Aberdeen’s 
second tenure at the Foreign Office, that tenure receives limited coverage, and it 
remains to be re-examined in light of the historiographical shift exemplified by 
historians such as Brown, Parry and Hicks. 
The object of this study is to use Lord Aberdeen’s tenure at the Foreign 
Office as a prism through which to examine the nature of Conservative foreign 
policy during the Peel administration.  This endeavour inevitably involves analysis of 
the role of the individual, but contextualised within the domestic and international 
objectives of the Conservative government.  The observations of recent historians 
about the coherence of an alternative Conservative approach to foreign policy – 
neither the Conservatism of Disraeli, nor the liberalism of Palmerston – can thus be 
considered in relation to the Peel government.  This study will, therefore, re-
examine the world of ‘high’ politics in an attempt to piece together the raison 
d’être of Conservative foreign policy.  ‘High’ political history is no longer the 
ubiquitous historiographical feature that it once was but, as a survey of the 
historiography demonstrates, such a study is needed. 
                                                          
8
 See, for example, Hicks, ‘The Struggle for Stability: The Fourteenth Earl and Europe, 1852-1868’, in 
Hicks (ed.), The Derbys and Their World, p. 82. 
9
 Charmley, Splendid Isolation? 
10
 Hawkins’ challenge to the Disraelian narrative of contemporary Conservatism was partly informed 
by use of the hitherto neglected papers at the Liverpool Record Office.  
11
 R. Gaunt, Sir Robert Peel: The Life and Legacy (New York, 2010); E. McNeilly, ‘The Conservatives 
and France, 1827-1846’ (Cambridge, PhD, 2011); L. Guymer, ‘The Wedding Planners: Lord Aberdeen, 
Henry Bulwer, and the Spanish Marriages, 1841-1846’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, xxi, 2010. 
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Aberdeen and Conservatism: A Historiographical Overview 
 
 George Hamilton-Gordon, the fourth Earl of Aberdeen, was Foreign 
Secretary under the Duke of Wellington from May 1828 to November 1830 and 
under Robert Peel from September 1841 to July 1846.  He also undertook a 
diplomatic mission to Napoleonic Europe, 1813-1814, and sat in the Cabinet as 
Peel’s Colonial Secretary in the short-lived Conservative government of December 
1834-April 1835.  It is for his spell as Prime Minister of a divided coalition 
government (December 1852-January 1855) and that government’s responsibility 
for the unpopular Crimean War, however, that Aberdeen is primarily remembered.  
He went to the grave fearful that his hitherto sound and respected political 
reputation had fallen alongside the ill-equipped and badly led troops in the Crimea 
and, perhaps inevitably by virtue of his ultimate accountability for Crimean 
shortcomings, his fears would come to be realised. 
The historiographical developments of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries helped to marginalise the study of Lord Aberdeen and to hinder 
understanding of wider Conservatism thereby.  Initial studies were penned by his 
political rivals, and this phenomenon gradually fused with the work of generations 
of historians whose interests and sympathies lay with liberal policy.  The Second 
World War marked something of a shift as it helped to precipitate the contraction 
of the Empire and of national self-confidence, which contributed to a climate in 
which those with more conciliatory methods, such as Aberdeen, were seen to offer 
lessons in a world increasingly focused upon international cooperation.  
Nevertheless, Aberdeen still received only a fraction of the attention afforded to his 
contemporaries. 
In the decades following disaster in the Crimea and Aberdeen’s death in 
1860, his reputation descended, in no small part due to the authors of such history 
as there was and where they focused their attentions.  Stratford Canning, who 
frequently clashed with Aberdeen over the Eastern Question and also criticised his 
policy in Western Europe, benefited from Stanley Lane-Poole’s admiring two-
11 
 
volume Life of Stratford Canning.12  Orientalist Lane-Poole cast Aberdeen as the 
villain for his clashes with Stratford, perhaps unsurprisingly given the romanticism 
with which Lane-Poole viewed the subjects of his study.13  Stratford’s future 
biographers would continue Lane-Poole’s criticism of Aberdeen: Elizabeth Malcolm-
Smith described Aberdeen as ‘timid and hesitating’, particularly so in comparison 
with Stratford; Leo Byrne argued much the same.14 
Shortly after Lane-Poole’s biography followed the publication of the political 
diary of Lord Ellenborough.15  Lord Privy Seal at the beginning of Wellington’s 
government in January 1828, Ellenborough coveted the Foreign Office in the 
government reshuffle that followed the resignation of many so-called ‘liberal 
Conservatives’ that June.  Annoyed at Wellington’s selection of Aberdeen and 
intolerant of Aberdeen’s conciliatory nature – Ellenborough was far more 
confrontational and nationalistic – the diary portrayed Aberdeen as weak and 
incompetent.  These charges, reinforcing those made by Lane-Poole, have stuck: 
the diary was uncritically proclaimed as an accurate and reliable indicator of 
contemporary political life as recently as 1998.16 
Lane-Poole and Ellenborough’s works were significant, but it was Lord 
Palmerston and his biographers who cast the longest historiographical shadow over 
Aberdeen’s career.  Palmerston, three times Foreign Secretary (1830-4, 1835-1841 
and 1846-1852) and twice Prime Minister (1855-8 and 1859-1865), attracted 
numerous studies by virtue of his extended centrality in British politics, the popular 
perception of his being John Bull incarnate and his overall association with mid-
Victorian success (some, including Henry Lytton Bulwer, were also attracted by 
personal association).17  The prevailing liberal values of the British intelligentsia 
                                                          
12
 S. Lane-Poole, Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, in 2 
volumes (London, 1888). 
13
 See also Lane-Poole, ‘Sir Richard Church’, The English Historical Review, v, 1890, pp. 7-30, 293-305 
and 497-522. 
14
 E. Malcolm-Smith, The Life of Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) (London, 1933), p. 
123; L. Byrne, The Great Ambassador (Ohio, 1964). 
15
 Lord Ellenborough, Political Diary 1828-1830, in 2 volumes (London, 1881). 
16
 P. Jupp, British Politics on the Eve of Reform: The Duke of Wellington’s Administration, 1828-30 
(London, 1998).  Ellenborough’s diary was cited throughout. 
17
 H. Lytton Bulwer, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, in 3 volumes (London, 
1869-1874); E. Ashley, The Life  and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston 
12 
 
assisted with a sympathetic view of Palmerston’s policy, for this was associated in 
part with a proselytising liberal benevolence that ostensibly spread British values 
and influence around the world.  This resulted in accounts of Palmerston’s career 
that, in accordance with the political proclivities of their authors, often bordered on 
hagiography.  Aberdeen was either by implication or outright criticism portrayed as 
the opposite of Palmerston: unpopular, unpatriotic, unsuccessful and illiberal.  It did 
not help that Aberdeen’s second tenure at the Foreign Office fell between two 
periods of Palmerstonian foreign policy, which reinforced the notion that Aberdeen 
was an aberration in a Palmerstonian and liberal age. 
A fixation with Palmerston and its concomitant effect of a reduced interest 
in contemporary Conservatism can, with some inevitable degree of theoretical 
generalisation, be incorporated into what has been described as the Whig 
interpretation of history.  Writing in the early twentieth century with a domestic 
focus, Herbert Butterfield argued that many historians conformed to this Whig 
interpretation of history, by which they sought to ‘emphasise certain principles of 
progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification and glorification 
of the present’.18  This narrative was written and celebrated by pitting ‘progressive’ 
values against those of the ‘tyrants and the Tories’.19  Butterfield did not consider 
the historiography of foreign affairs, but his ideas can be applied to that area 
without any great modification.   
Among early chroniclers of the nineteenth century, concentration upon 
liberal foreign policy and favour for Palmerston’s methods seemed to derive from 
historians’ national pride in the history of British constitutionalism, belief in the 
benevolence of British influence abroad, commendation of the liberal Whig values 
of British history that its great men extolled and exported, and celebration of British 
supremacy and power.  Those seen to contradict this self-confident liberalism were 
pilloried.  Within this model, Palmerston became a great progressive liberal and 
Aberdeen an obstruction to the march of British and human progress.20 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(London, 1879); A. Trollope, Lord Palmerston (London, 1882); Marquis of Lorne, The Queen’s Prime 
Ministers: Lord Palmerston (London, 1892). 
18
 H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London, 1931), p. v. 
19
 Ibid., p. 41. 
20
 C. E. G. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, ii (London, 1951), p. 785. 
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Whiggish approval of Palmerston continued to overshadow Aberdeen’s 
career well into the twentieth century.  Frederick Stanley Rodkey, for example, 
produced a number of articles on Palmerston’s Eastern policy that largely 
overlooked his geostrategic and practical concerns in a narrative of benevolent 
liberalism.21 That Palmerston’s ‘liberal’ cause changed from the rebellious vassal 
Mehmet Ali to the Ottoman Empire when it became politically expedient was 
overlooked.22  That neither Mehmet Ali nor the Ottoman Empire could be 
considered particularly liberal did not matter to Rodkey either.  The intricacies of 
the policies of those who did not fit such authors’ views got lost in the opposite 
reductive labels: they were the ‘tyrants and Tories’. 
Whilst Rodkey was an American who subscribed to Whiggish historical ideas 
that were also prevalent in the United States, the English nationalist element in 
Whiggish history gathered momentum as the twentieth century brought war: 
historians looked back to and revered leaders perceived as active, confrontational 
and patriotic.  This excluded Aberdeen and fused with continuing liberal sympathies 
to elevate Palmerston, often at Aberdeen’s expense.  Some of those who had 
presided over the peace processes at the end of the first and second World Wars 
began turning to history to offer precedent and justification for the enlightened 
liberalism with which they believed they were concluding treaties, and for which 
they had an inherent taste.  This created a romantic narrative of nineteenth century 
foreign policy in which the dominance of liberalism was overstated and endorsed 
on nationalist terms, whilst the ascendancy of liberal ideas was treated as 
inevitable. 
The work of Harold Temperley – student of Lord Acton, who was a friend of 
and sympathiser with Liberal politician Lord Granville – is a good example of this 
phenomenon.  In his seminal study of the Near East, he wrote that Palmerston’s 
                                                          
21
 F. Stanley Rodkey, ‘Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41’, The Journal of 
Modern History, i, 1929, pp. 570-593; ‘Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey: Part II, 
1839-41’, The Journal of Modern History, ii, 1930, pp. 193-225; ‘The Attempts of Briggs and Company 
to Guide British Policy in the Levant in the Interest of Mehmet Ali Pasha, 1821-41’, The Journal of 
Modern History, v, 1933, pp. 324-351.  
22
 For detail on the Mehmet Ali crises see, for example, A. Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 
(London, 2
nd
 edition, 1996), pp. 20-26; M. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in 
International Relations (London, 1966), pp. 53-109.  
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policy exhibited a ‘stiff upper lip’ and that through him the British ‘lion roared’.23  
Aberdeen and his Conservative contemporaries, meanwhile, were described as 
‘struggling to swallow constitutionalism’ in the 1830s and 1840s.24  At once, they 
were anachronistic and reactionary in their doubts about what Temperley 
described as an inevitable and universally desirable concept: the liberal spread of 
constitutionalism.  His student and former underling at the War Office during World 
War I, Charles Webster, continued with this theme in 1951, writing that 
Palmerston’s role in the ‘British Liberal Movement’ was so great that ‘any criticism 
of him is one of the whole method by which Western civilisation spread over the 
world’.25  With AJP Taylor’s 1954 masterpiece The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 
concentrating on the mechanics of confrontation between the great powers, the 
heavyweights of historical endeavour were building up a narrative of history into 
which the Conservatives did not fit.26  
The middle decades of the twentieth century saw a wave of liberally inclined 
authors whose studies perpetuated ideas of Conservative irrelevance and made 
debatable assertions about Aberdeen’s personality, which distracted from analysis 
of Conservative policy.  Another of Charles Webster’s notable works looked at 
Aberdeen’s ambassadorship to Austria during the Napoleonic wars.27  Webster 
concluded that Aberdeen was ‘too young for his job’ and given that the operation 
was ‘a delicate one […] in the hands of men like Aberdeen […] it could hardly fail to 
bring confusion and uncertainty.’28  The idea that Aberdeen was ‘too young’ is 
belied by consideration that this was an era in which Lord Liverpool became Prime 
                                                          
23
 H. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London, 1936), p. 109; p. 92. 
24
 Temperley, ‘British Foreign Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey 
(1830-1914)’, The Cambridge Historical Journal, iv, 1933, p. 157. 
25
 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, ii, p. 785.  
26
 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (London, 1954) (Taylor was not 
involved in either peace process). The concept of the Whig Interpretation of History is only a broad 
framework in which to consider the work of these historians and convenient shorthand for liberal 
favour in this period.  For exploration of its difficulties, other influences on liberal favour, and the 
idiosyncrasies of the historians mentioned, see A. Wilson and T. Ashplant, ‘Whig History and 
Present-Centred History’, The Historical Journal, xxxi, 1998, pp. 1-16; M. Bentley, Modernising 
England’s Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism 1870-1970 (Cambridge, 2005); J. 
Fair, Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm (London, 1922); P. Reynolds and 
E. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the United Nations 1939-1946 
(London, 1976); K, Burk, Troublemaker: The Life and History of AJP Taylor (London, 2000).     
27
 C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812-1815: Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe 
(London, 1931). 
28
 Ibid, ps. 47 and 152. 
15 
 
Minister in 1812 when only a few years older than Aberdeen was upon taking his 
ambassadorship.  Harold Nicolson nonetheless continued the themes of Webster’s 
work and asserted that Aberdeen’s ‘ignorance of continental conditions’ 
engendered further muddle.29  Nicolson was from a similarly Whiggish background, 
including a university education in the liberal environment of Oxford’s Balliol 
College and spells working at the Foreign Office during the governments of both 
Herbert Asquith and David Lloyd George.  
Henry Kissinger in 1957 continued criticism of Aberdeen’s role during his 
embassy, branding him a ‘gullible’ politician whose political naivety imperilled 
Britain’s continental interests.30  As Kissinger ignored the complex situation within 
which Aberdeen was working, the context in which he was writing seemed to 
explain his critique.  Kissinger published his work at a time when the Cold War was 
heating up, and he subsequently regarded Aberdeen’s openness with the 
continental powers as leaving hostages to fortune.  Elsewhere Kissinger wrote that 
‘no power can stake its survival entirely on the good faith of another; this would be 
an abdication of the responsibility of statesmanship.’31  This was how he looked 
upon Aberdeen’s diplomatic mission.   
There were early historians with a direct interest in nineteenth-century 
Conservatism, but these authors mostly confined their attention to Benjamin 
Disraeli and the Prime Ministers under whom Aberdeen served: the Duke of 
Wellington and Robert Peel.  Wellington’s biographers paid little attention to 
Aberdeen, perhaps necessarily in covering a momentous career in which Aberdeen 
played only a small part.  It remains that there was nothing said about the role or 
ideas of the Foreign Secretary.32  More recent biographers have also ignored 
Aberdeen, even those that discuss foreign policy in detail.33 
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Peel cast something of a shadow over Aberdeen in the early historiography, 
as biographers queued up to dissect the life of that controversial and divisive Prime 
Minister.34  Most concentrated on domestic issues but those who looked at foreign 
policy simply ignored Aberdeen’s role within it.  In 1928, Anna Ramsay was the only 
historian to acknowledge Aberdeen and this in a rather disparaging fashion: ‘He had 
a great ideal, that of international peace: but he was not a strong man.  Left alone, 
he had not the resolution to steer the country through dangerous waters.’35  The 
charge that Aberdeen was well-meaning, but lacking in enthusiasm, would be 
repeated by his own biographers later in the twentieth-century.  The idea that Peel 
was to Aberdeen a Victorian paterfamilias, keeping an eye on his less able colleague 
and intervening to toughen his policy and stiffen his resolve, persisted in future 
works using Peel’s political life as the thread of their analysis.36   
In 1986, Norman Gash noted that Peel and Aberdeen exhibited ‘differences 
of emphasis rather than objective’ but concluded that the Prime Minister exercised 
‘almost excessive influence’ over his Foreign Secretary.37  Donald Read wrote that 
‘Peel saw to it that British policy was quietly purposeful’ and Terry Jenkins argued 
that Peel needed to make Aberdeen’s policy more ‘robust’.38  In 2007, Douglas 
Hurd, despite identifying the strong ‘trust’ between the two men, asserted that 
Peel had to ‘keep a close watch’ on Aberdeen.  Hurd also suggested that he lacked 
both ‘the necessary harsh grasp of the reality of politics’ and ‘backbone’ and 
expressed an almost mock-sympathy for ‘poor Lord Aberdeen’.39  By contrast, Eric 
Evans noted that to Aberdeen, Peel was ‘happier to delegate responsibility than in 
any other aspect of government.’40  The brevity of Evans’ analysis, however, did 
little to illuminate Aberdeen’s role in the Conservative government. 
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There were some early works that swam against this tide and took a direct 
look at Aberdeen’s implementation of Conservative policy.  Thomas MacKnight’s 
Thirty Years of Foreign Policy in 1855 was the first such work and it provided an 
early defence of the policies of Aberdeen and Palmerston in the years leading up to 
the Crimean war.41  MacKnight’s was a rather glossy account of Aberdeen that 
defended his policy without any substantial analysis of its origins, but it offered 
observations with which most have differed.  It was argued that ‘while Lord 
Aberdeen was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Government was not 
influenced by that preposterous love of peace at any price with which this minister 
has been reproached.’42  Building on this point, the assumption that Aberdeen and 
Palmerston were polar opposites was questioned.43  The argument that Aberdeen 
and Palmerston’s objectives were in some ways the same is important to bear in 
mind given the subsequent historiographical polarisation of the two ministers’ 
politics.  The prevailing idea of Palmerston as the great liberal patriot and Aberdeen 
as the arch-reactionary Tory had at least one early dissentient. 
There followed a brief and previously unknown journal article in Leisure 
Hour three years after Aberdeen’s death, which argued that he was unjustly made 
scapegoat for the horror of the Crimean War.44  The author’s assertion that ‘I do 
not meddle with politics in these personal recollections’ underlined the limitations 
of an article that already suffered from its brevity and publication in an obscure 
journal with a low circulation.45  The claim that ‘history will do [Aberdeen] justice’ 
also proved to be rather overoptimistic.46  
Aberdeen’s first significant biography was written thirty years (and four 
major Palmerston biographies) later by Arthur Gordon, his son and Private 
Secretary in the 1850s.47  Aware that his filial relationship to Aberdeen was a 
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double-edged sword (familial connections can offer closer insights, but these can be 
distorted by affection), Gordon nonetheless raised some important issues.  He 
argued that Aberdeen exercised a degree of influence over Wellington, albeit a 
small one: ‘I doubt whether their intercourse in politics much altered [Wellington’s] 
opinions, it certainly restrained their expression.’48  Further to this, it was 
speculated that Aberdeen’s influence encouraged Wellington to recognise the 
French Revolution of July 1830 that brought the Orleans Monarchy to power.49  
That Aberdeen had any influence on the Duke was a noteworthy observation, but 
one weakened by a lack of evidence.   
With regard to the Anglo-French entente of 1841-1846, Gordon noted that 
cross-Channel relations were hindered by the problem of diplomats ‘who evaded 
their orders’ and highlighted the personal nature of the arrangement between 
Aberdeen and his French counterpart François Guizot.50  A lack of critical analysis 
nonetheless undermined the value of Gordon’s work – relations between Britain 
and France were far from ‘perfect’ – as did, by editorial admission, a lack of access 
to private correspondence.51  This had much to do with Gordon’s political patron 
Gladstone who, as a practising Liberal politician, wanted to keep embarrassing 
evidence of his early opposition to parliamentary reform out of the spotlight.   
When further private correspondence between Aberdeen and Princess 
Lieven appeared in the 1923 biography written by Lady Frances Balfour, it was in 
places simply inserted into re-issued sections of Gordon’s text.  Balfour’s account 
was disorganised and offered few narrative additions to Gordon’s biography, in 
what amounted to a confused and perfunctory work.52  The hurried efforts of an 
author in urgent need of a financial boost following the death of her husband did 
little to increase understanding of Aberdeen and Conservative policy.  Indeed, to 
read the relationship that Lord Aberdeen built up between Britain and France as an 
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‘alliance’ was clearly a misunderstanding and is representative of the flaws in 
Balfour’s analysis.53 
There were some notable early twentieth-century non-biographical works 
also to examine Aberdeen’s policy, including Major John Hall’s on the Orleans 
Monarchy and J. R. Baldwin’s article on the Tahiti affair (in which France annexed 
that island despite a tradition of British influence).54  Baldwin added to Gordon’s 
identification of intransigent diplomats by noting that George Pritchard, British 
consul in Tahiti, ‘read between the lines of his dispatches and kept secret those 
which restrained him.’55  On the impact of the Tahitian crisis on Anglo-French 
relations, Baldwin echoed existing criticism: ‘peace was obtained, but the entente, 
never very strong, was badly shaken’.56  Hall revisited MacKnight’s idea that 
‘Aberdeen was in substantial agreement with Palmerston’ on many points but, as 
with Baldwin, Aberdeen was not the primary focus of his study and this resulted in 
little addition to existing material on Conservative foreign policy.  
In the 1930s, E. Jones Parry reviewed the relationship between Aberdeen 
and Guizot and, although not wholly dismissive of the former, came to some 
damning conclusions.57  The Anglo-French entente, contested Jones Parry, was a 
‘failure…there never existed an entente cordiale between the two peoples’, adding 
that ‘rose-tinted optimism [led] to woeful indecision.’58  This verdict, overlooking or 
dissenting from Gordon’s observation that the entente was only intended to be a 
personal arrangement, was maintained by others for some time.  Jones Parry also 
wrote the only major English work on the disputed succession to the throne of 
Spain during Aberdeen’s tenure.59  No-one has yet challenged his conclusion that 
Aberdeen’s failure to resolve or at least attempt to resolve the succession crisis 
represented ‘a failure to face responsibilities’.60  Jones Parry’s work is a valuable 
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resource for the student of this area of history but, as will be considered in Chapter 
Four, its conclusions about Conservative policy in Spain were made on the basis of a 
number of questionable assumptions. 
By the middle of the twentieth-century, then, there had been no significant 
analysis of Conservative foreign policy in the 1840s, while Aberdeen was still yet to 
be the subject of a substantial biography.  Neither had he been examined in the 
context of a thorough study of his private and political papers, whilst his adversaries 
and detractors had benefited from having the ‘first word’.  The mid-twentieth 
century ushered in a period of increased interest in Anglo-American relations and 
diplomatic history in general: these trends, the former developing because of 
events in the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War, combined to 
stimulate an increased interest from which the history of Lord Aberdeen’s American 
policy between 1841 and 1846 received indirect benefit.  The earlier literature was 
largely American in origin, however, so a focus on American considerations 
prevented thorough examination of Aberdeen and British Conservative foreign 
policy. 
The two major works to emerge on Anglo-American relations were H. C. 
Allen’s Great Britain and the United States and volume four of Winston Churchill’s A 
History of the English-Speaking Peoples.61  Both portrayed the nineteenth-century 
as a period of inevitable and inexorable assimilation of English and American values 
that ultimately led to what became known as the ‘special relationship’.  Allen wrote 
that ‘this ripening of friendship […] appears in the growing similarity of political 
ideals and practices which accompanied the development of democracy in both 
countries’.62  Churchill saw that ‘the nineteenth century was a period of purposeful, 
progressive, enlightened, tolerant civilisation.  The stir in the world arising from the 
French Revolution, added to the Industrial Revolution unleashed by the steam-
engine and many key inventions, led inexorably to the democratic age.’63  Such 
teleological accounts have found some modern adherents, but the most recent 
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studies have argued that rapprochement was far from inevitable or smooth.64  The 
nuances of international relations and the understanding of the role of politicians 
such as Aberdeen in Anglo-American relations are obscured when history is painted 
with such broad brushstrokes.  
There were earlier works that concentrated on the specific issues affecting 
the Peel government, such as that on the Northeastern Boundary dispute, over 
which, in 1842, Aberdeen sent Lord Ashburton to negotiate with American 
representative Daniel Webster and thereby determine the dividing line between 
Maine and New Brunswick (and, in doing so, to protect local British interests).  This 
work had, however, been mostly confined to journals.  Ephraim Douglass Adams 
noted that the resulting treaty, which Palmerston branded the ‘Ashburton 
capitulation’, came to be known throughout much of America as the ‘Webster 
capitulation’, which suggested that it was a fair settlement for both parties.65  This 
observation proposed that Aberdeen’s instructions were not as excessively 
conciliatory as was traditionally thought. 
Thomas Le Duc argued that Britain’s only real interest in the area was 
defence of the Canadas: the squabbles over land of negligible practical utility were 
superfluous.66  William Lucey held the opinion that by 1942, ‘nearly every angle of 
the dispute has been discussed by partisans and scholars, so that today little 
remains to be said about it’.67  Those contributing to the New England Quarterly 
who continue to investigate the minutiae of the disputes into the twenty-first 
century do not seem to think so.68  By the end of the 1940s, there had still been no 
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substantial overview or analysis regarding the British side of negotiations and, more 
specifically, Aberdeen’s policy. 
Early work on the Northwestern Boundary dispute, where the geographical 
limitations of the state of Oregon came under scrutiny, especially after President 
James Polk was elected, also made some progress.  In the twentieth-century, 
Robert Schuyler looked at Polk’s role in the crisis.69  Frederick Merk published a 
series of informative articles in the 1920s and 1930s.70  He raised important issues 
such as the way in which Aberdeen used The Times to leak information and 
influence negotiations; an idea contrary to the narrative of Aberdonian naivety and 
simplicity appearing elsewhere in the historiography.71  Merk did, however, hold 
the opinion that Aberdeen had a ‘dread of war’ that resulted in ‘surrender’ on the 
part of the British.72  In arguing this point, Merk avoided the narrow self-
justification and romanticism that permeated many other earlier American works, 
which combined with religious interpretations of Manifest Destiny to produce a 
distorted view of the past.  If the historian believes that ‘as the history of nations 
runs…our record of expansion is one singularly free from violence and fraud’, they 
are unlikely to produce accurate accounts of American or British policy in this 
period.73  
Beginning in the 1950s, Wilbur Devereux Jones published research that 
recalibrated the historiographical view of Lord Aberdeen’s American policy.74  The 
idea that lessons might be learned to strengthen the relationship with America in 
the age of Soviet rivalry coincided with this renewed interest in Aberdeen’s 
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methods.  Devereux Jones re-examined the circumstances of the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty, suggesting that the Duke of Wellington’s hard line approach over 
the issue created many of his difficulties and resulted in contradictory instructions 
to Ashburton for which Aberdeen’s vacillation had previously been blamed.75  It was 
also noted that in 1842 it was ‘practically impossible’ to resolve every issue on the 
table due to the scope and complexity of the problems that Palmerston had left 
unresolved.76  Indeed, Palmerston’s criticisms of the treaty and of Aberdeen had 
long masked his own lack of progress in American affairs.   
Devereux Jones also challenged the idea that the entente was a failure, 
suggesting that even if attempts to cooperate with France over various affairs 
proved abortive, the fact that efforts were made at all signalled the value of the 
Anglo-French arrangement.77  A ‘lack of planning’ was, nonetheless, often blamed 
for British failure to seize the initiative in negotiations.78  Extensive coverage was 
also given to Aberdeen’s role in the La Plata conflict between Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo, where it had not been before.79  Devereux Jones’s 1974 work built on 
that of 1958 and emphasised the underlying importance of American trade to the 
British (and vice versa); a phenomenon elsewhere labelled the ‘Atlantic economy’.80  
Devereux Jones made a career out of expanding the understanding of unpopular or 
unfamiliar British political figures.81  As regards Aberdeen, this task was performed 
well.  Nonetheless, limited consideration of the impact of American politics on 
British policy, and only infrequent references to France and British politics, left 
much room for further study. 
In the 1960s, the work of Kenneth Bourne and Frederick Merk added to the 
weight of material on Aberdeen and Anglo-American relations, but without adding 
                                                          
75
 Devereux Jones, ‘Maine Boundary Negotiations’, p. 479.  See also H. Jones, To the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1843 (North Carolina, 1977). 
76
 Devereux Jones, ‘The Influence of Slavery’, p. 53.  See also H. Soulsby (ed.), The Right of Search 
and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American Relations 1814-1862 (Baltimore, 1933). 
77
 For background see D. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican 
War (Missouri, 1973); N. Tutorow, Texan Annexation and the Mexican War (London, 1978). 
78
 Devereux Jones, Aberdeen and the Americas, p. 24. 
79
 See also H. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1960). 
80
 Devereux Jones, The American Problem. 
81
 See also Devereux Jones, Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism (Georgia, 1956); ‘Prosperity 
Robinson’: The Life of Viscount Goderich, 1782-1859 (New York, 1967). 
24 
 
to the diversity of opinion.82  Bourne was critical of Aberdeen’s ‘ham-fisted 
diplomacy’ and the ‘missed opportunity’ to take California when it was offered by 
Mexico in return for support against impending American encroachment upon 
Texas and the looming threat of war.83  Perhaps his focus upon imperial defence 
and research in predominantly military archives predisposed Bourne to endorse 
active and enthusiastic military policies, therefore pitting him against Aberdeen’s 
desire for consensus.  That his book ends in 1908, the date when British strategic 
planning for war with America was terminated, appears to add weight to this 
suggestion.  That Bourne lived through the Second World War and wrote during the 
Cold War might also explain his being more sympathetic to such proactive strategic 
considerations.  Either way, Aberdeen was given little agency in policy making and 
Conservative policy was dismissed as a series of unthinking and incoherent 
measures.  Merk’s latest work was essentially a collection of previous articles, 
although a new conclusion stressed that both governments desired an equitable 
solution to the Oregon boundary dispute but that this was made difficult by excited 
opposition on both sides of the Atlantic.  If accepted, this idea that Aberdeen’s 
pursuit of a diplomatic solution was reciprocated by the American government 
would seem to justify his policy, although one relies on inference to draw this 
conclusion.84   
The study of Conservative policy regarding France and Europe also made 
some headway in post-war decades: with the work of Andrew Cunningham, 
Douglas Johnson, Roger Bullen and Lawrence Jennings, Palmerston’s 
historiographical hegemony was challenged and the Conservatives began to attract 
more balanced analysis.85  Cunningham and Bullen argued that Palmerston’s policy 
between 1830 and 1841, and from 1846 onwards, was in some ways 
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counterproductive to British interests, the former citing the ‘pyrotechnics of 
Palmerston’ as casting a shadow over Aberdeen’s tenure and restricting his 
options.86  Bullen argued that Palmerston exhibited a ‘total lack of understanding’ 
of the intricacies of the Spanish Marriage Question.87  Both, however, portrayed an 
entente with France that crumbled and fell towards the end of Aberdeen’s tenure 
over the question of Spanish succession, with Cunningham describing it as ‘that 
ulcer of the entente’.88   
Johnson compared the criticisms of Aberdeen being ‘un-English’ to those of 
Guizot, who received Genevan training and was Protestant, being ‘un-French’.  Both 
were internationalists, he argued, trying to pursue a peaceful policy against a 
hostile political backdrop, which was in no small way exacerbated by Palmerston’s 
penchant for ‘needlessly offending France’.89  Johnson’s work remained primarily 
concerned with France, as did that of Jennings, whose work on the slave trade was 
rich in detail but, necessarily, limited in analysis of Aberdeen’s policy. 
General foreign policy surveys of this period, however, perpetuated 
orthodox views of Aberdonian policy that had been in place since the nineteenth-
century.  Donald Southgate, later a biographer of Palmerston, wrote of ‘arrogant 
insularity’ that Tories ‘could appreciate’ and in 1970 Kenneth Bourne continued 
criticisms developed in earlier works, although proposing that Aberdeen showed a 
‘more realistic’ attitude than Palmerston in his reading of the danger that France 
posed.90  Paul Hayes delivered the greatest criticism in his influential work of 
1975.91  Aberdeen was labelled an ‘undiscriminating appeaser’ who in 1828 brought 
‘ignorance, stupidity and muddle’ to the Foreign Office and warranted little greater 
intellectual credit than his much ridiculed predecessor, Lord Dudley.92  Hayes also 
argued that ‘it was under Aberdeen that the fatal policy of blind British support for 
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the Turks was given official approval.  It was a legacy which was to encumber 
diplomats and politicians for half a century.’93 
 
The Major Biographies: Iremonger and Chamberlain 
 
The first substantial biography of Lord Aberdeen was authored by Lucille 
Iremonger in 1978 – a full one hundred and eighteen years after his death – and the 
second and more comprehensive followed in 1983, written by Muriel 
Chamberlain.94  It was with these works that the historiographical direction began 
to shift.  The length and detail of the studies, and the fact that they were 
undertaken at all, was due in part to the emergence in the 1970s and 1980s of the 
mature reflections of those who had first studied amid the renewal of interest in 
diplomatic history in the 1960s.  The British Empire and all that it stood for had 
faded and, in doing so, its gradual dissolution complicated perceptions of British 
identity.  The financial fallout and physical devastation of the Second World War 
had ushered in a period of decreased nationalism and increased attempts at 
international cooperation, the number of which rose as the economic decay of the 
late 1960s led to further recalibration of Britain’s persona on the international 
stage.  The lineage of Whig historians had also been diluted and liberal politics were 
no longer in vogue.  Aberdeen’s restrained internationalist Conservatism generated 
greater interest in this political climate.   
Iremonger’s work was the first to consult papers at Haddo House and this 
research helped to yield some revised conclusions.  Rather than accepting the Tahiti 
affair as one in which Aberdeen sacrificed honour for peace, Iremonger argued that 
the nationalistic fervour on both sides of the Channel escalated out of ‘the 
melodrama and posturings of self-important individuals’ who created a quarrel of 
‘ridiculous’ disproportion to reality.95  Of Tahiti and other crises, it was added that 
Aberdeen approached the entente ‘without sentimentality…with no illusions about 
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the French.’96  This idea went some way to dispelling the idea of ‘rose-tinted 
optimism’ put forward by historians such as Jones Parry but Iremonger concluded 
that Aberdeen’s conciliatory methods were transparent and that the Conservatives 
conceded too much as a result.97  These methods were seen to originate partly in a 
lack of political enthusiasm, the genesis of which was traced to the death of 
Aberdeen’s beloved wife Catherine in 1812: Iremonger wrote that Aberdeen was 
‘haunted’ forever thereafter.98  His supposed fear of war – he was described as 
‘tender as a girl to human suffering’ – was also seen as a weakness on which others 
preyed.99  These considerations led Iremonger to the conclusion of the earlier 
historiography: Aberdeen was the ‘complete antithesis’ of Palmerston. 100 
Chamberlain’s biography, despite tangible sympathy for her subject, was in 
places more critical than that of Iremonger.  Chamberlain also portrayed Aberdeen 
as having a lack of political enthusiasm that impacted on his policy.101  In a much 
more detailed section on America, it was contested that the attention Aberdeen 
paid to strategic concerns was negligible, particularly during the Ashburton-
Webster negotiations.102  In the dispute over the Oregon border it was claimed that 
Aberdeen ‘sacrificed so much’.103  Regarding Anglo-French relations, Chamberlain 
suggested Aberdeen’s Greek policy was flawed (although not to the extent that the 
entente collapsed there, as David McLean has argued).104   
More favourable analysis was delivered in coverage of the Tahiti affair, 
where Chamberlain suggested that Aberdeen and Guizot suppressed and edited 
inflammatory material so as not to aggravate popular and parliamentary disquiet, 
thus indicating the value of their relationship.105  Regarding the Anglo-French 
entente more generally, Chamberlain echoed the conclusion of Iremonger that 
relations took the form of a ‘modus vivendi’ rather than an entente, adding that ‘as 
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such [the relationship] had considerable success.’106  As in her other works on 
British foreign policy, this was a case of damning Aberdeen with faint praise: 
Chamberlain considered that Aberdeen’s interpretation of relations with France 
originated in wishful thinking and represented aspiration rather than reality.107  
Chamberlain concluded that it was a ‘real tragedy’ that Aberdeen ‘became 
convinced that his destiny lay in foreign affairs’, adding that he ‘was often at his 
weakest in the confrontational atmosphere of foreign policy’: he was, as suggested 
earlier in the historiography, portrayed as well-meaning but out of his depth.108   
In recent years, Aberdeen has received less attention.  The publications of 
Bridge and Bullen and that edited by T. G. Otte touched on his policy but, by 
editorial admission, it received little coverage.109  David Brown has looked at Anglo-
French relations and considered foreign policy in a domestic political context, but 
his work was necessarily concerned with Palmerston and the period after 
Aberdeen’s second tenure.110  His recent biography of Palmerston mentions 
Aberdeen at various points but, naturally, the Conservative party is not his central 
concern.111    
So it is that Aberdeen’s reputation and that of Conservative foreign policy in 
the 1840s currently stands upon the work of Iremonger and Chamberlain: the 
discussion of his foreign policy has essentially fallen silent for the past three 
decades.  Whilst historians continue to be attracted to the study of Peel and a 
hectic domestic agenda that culminated with the repeal of the Corn Laws, the 
foreign policy of his government remains an unfashionable topic of study.  
Restrained and prudent Conservatives have generally been unfashionable topics of 
study.  In previous pages we considered the emergent historiographical interest in 
traditionally neglected Conservatives, but this renewed interest in Conservatism 
has not yet yielded any published research on Aberdeen.  Aberdeen’s views on 
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European constitutionalism were examined in Edward McNeilly’s PhD thesis on the 
Conservatives and France, 1827-1846, but the majority of the thesis is concerned 
with Peel.112  Whilst there is evidence of continuing interest in and re-examination 
of nineteenth-century Conservatism, Aberdeen’s foreign policy remains on the 
periphery.113 
 
A New Study 
 
This thesis seeks to address the lack of research by focusing on the specific 
period of Aberdeen’s second tenure as Foreign Secretary.  His foreign policy in the 
Wellington administration will not be examined in detail (although not ignored), 
because the domineering style of a Prime Minister at the height of his political 
power limited Aberdeen’s influence on policy making.  There is little reason to 
dissent from Philip Guedalla’s suggestion that Aberdeen ‘worked under his 
[Wellington’s] direction.’114  Even Aberdeen’s most sympathetic biographer 
concluded that Aberdeen exercised little influence on foreign policy under 
Wellington.115  Without his having a free hand in policy construction, it is difficult to 
assess Aberdeen’s opinions and legacy in this period.  In any case, much valuable 
research has been undertaken on the foreign policy of the Wellington government; 
the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, for example, has attracted 
significant scholarly attention.116   
The government of 1852-1855 might be thought to provide the historian 
with a greater opportunity to study Aberdeen, and this holds true in some respects.  
As Prime Minister Aberdeen revealed a reforming streak that far surpassed his 
earlier career, and his being leader of the government provides obvious 
opportunities for study.117  Such circumstances provide for an interesting case study 
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of coalition government, but there existed a maelstrom of competing approaches 
and individual agendas out of which it is difficult to extract a clear view of 
Aberdeen’s policy.  Foreign affairs engendered particular divisions in the 
government and Aberdeen’s own opinions were often obscured as a result of his 
quest to reconcile the competing viewpoints of his colleagues with placatory 
sentiment.  Alienating any of the political ‘heavyweights’ in the coalition might 
instigate a disastrous chain reaction.  A re-examination of Aberdeen’s role in foreign 
affairs in this period would require its own separate study, beyond the scope of this 
one. 
The present study will focus upon Aberdeen’s foreign policy in the Peel 
government because this enables, first, a reassessment of the internal dynamics of 
Conservative leadership, in light of the challenge Gaunt has posed to the 
historiographical assumption that Peel’s was an autocratic leadership style by which 
his colleagues were directed and controlled.118  The historiographical consensus still 
rests on the assumption that Peel exercised an almost paternal influence over his 
Foreign Secretary.  It is the contention of this study that Peel was in fact content to 
leave Aberdeen to proceed with the running of foreign affairs, therefore enabling 
Peel’s energies to be concentrated on dealing with the domestic agenda.  The 
conduct of foreign policy was thus critical to Peel’s government, though Paul 
Adelman has argued that for Aberdeen’s foreign policy to have had ‘little 
impact…on the Conservative Party’, that policy must have been insignificant.119  
This thesis proposes something different.  The distraction and expense of 
international conflict would have placed huge pressure on an administration trying 
to recover from recession whilst addressing the need for social change and 
improvement: keeping foreign policy quiet in a volatile age was a difficult yet 
essential objective to achieve.  Foreign and domestic policy were inextricably 
connected in the objectives of the Peel government. 
This study of Conservative foreign policy will thus be conducted in the 
context of the Peel government’s domestic objectives.  In so doing, it will develop a 
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theme explored by both Brown and Hicks in their work on the mid-nineteenth 
century, in which domestic and foreign policy are treated as a unified whole.  
Chamberlain and Iremonger’s biographies by no means ignored the world in which 
Aberdeen was operating, but foreign policy and domestic policy tended to be 
treated separately.  David Brown’s work has reconsidered Palmerstonism in the 
context of domestic politics and in that of his popular support.120  Despite works 
that have assimilated domestic concerns into analysis of foreign policy, such 
accounts have not considered the foreign policy of the Peel government.121  The 
cradle-to-the-grave approach of Chamberlain and Iremonger certainly has its place, 
but it provided for a predominantly narrative approach in which the Conservatives’ 
modus operandi was often lost.  An appreciation of how Aberdeen balanced 
Conservative domestic considerations with his own approach to foreign policy, and 
with the international political climate, is crucial to understanding his policy and its 
place in nineteenth-century Conservatism. 
The overall nature of Conservative foreign policy in this era also needs 
reinvestigating.  Recent studies of the mechanics and nature of Conservative 
foreign policy later in the nineteenth-century have suggested the existence of a 
consistent set of objectives and principles, albeit delivered with the inevitable 
variations of different individuals.  Whereas pre-Disraelian Conservative foreign 
policy used to be presented as a series of ad hoc measures with their ideological 
roots in isolationism, the work of those such as Angus Hawkins and the Norwich 
School has shown that the mid-nineteenth century Conservatism of the Derbys was 
in fact founded upon a rational set of principles and objectives (which will be 
considered in further detail in Chapter Two).  This study will examine whether their 
observations might also apply to the foreign policy of the Peel government and, in 
doing so, will explore the possibility of a broader Conservative consensus on the 
making of foreign policy, which connected with domestic goals in a coherent and 
consistent manner.     
Such an approach will help to avoid considering Conservative policy on 
Palmerstonian terms, a phenomenon that has affected previous accounts of 
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Aberdeen’s policy-making.  A tendency to overlook the financial and international 
consequences of Palmerston’s policy of confrontation – not least the deterioration 
of Anglo-French and Anglo-American relations, the commencement of wars with 
China and Afghanistan, and the contribution to a massive excess of expenditure 
over revenue – hinders understanding of the pressures on Aberdeen’s policy and 
Peel’s government.122   
A portrayal of Aberdeen and Palmerston as absolute opposites would be 
misleading, however, for despite their different methods and world views, an 
underlying level of consensus on certain issues between 1841 and 1846 is clearly 
identifiable.  In the 1840s both Aberdeen and Palmerston advocated the 
maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, partly because both pursued a 
balance of power, to which the stability of south-eastern Europe contributed.123  
They agreed on other matters too.  For example, when French agents seized Tahiti 
in defiance of existing British influence, Aberdeen and Palmerston both thought 
that French annexation could not be opposed on legal grounds and because the 
region was strategically indefensible.124   
There were wider themes in British foreign policy upon which the two men 
concurred.  These included the necessity of maintaining British pre-eminence; the 
balance of power served this and other British interests.  This is perhaps 
unremarkable; most British politicians believed the same. 
One might nevertheless draw parallels between Palmerston’s famous 
speech regarding the ‘eternal and perpetual’ interests of British foreign policy to an 
oration of Aberdeen’s, made at the beginning of his spell as Prime Minister in the 
1850s coalition government: 
 
The truth is, that for the last thirty years the principles of the foreign policy of 
the country have never varied.  There may have been differences in the 
execution, according to the different hands entrusted with the direction of 
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that policy: but the foundation of the foreign policy of this country has been, I 
repeat, for the last thirty years the same.125 
 
Whilst there were undoubtedly elements of continuity in British policy, a 
degree of disingenuousness may nonetheless be perceived in the two men’s 
pronouncements.  In both 1848 and 1852, they were speaking during politically 
tumultuous times, in which it served their interests to highlight (and, indeed, 
exaggerate) areas of concord with their peers, and to gloss over the differences.  In 
Aberdeen’s case, besides needing to unite previous holders of the highest offices in 
the land in what appeared to be a fragile coalition, and to accommodate their 
personal and political differences, he also sought to undermine the suspicion that 
surrounded his ability to work with Palmerston.  It is hardly surprising that he made 
such a statement in December 1852, and one needs to be cautious about accepting 
it at face value.  A healthy dose of scepticism about the professed level of 
consensus seems wise. 
 The evidence points to variations between Aberdeen and Palmerston that 
underline their political differences, which were frequently on display.  On a basic 
level, there were regular divergences of opinion such as that concerning the issue 
of the Spanish succession in the 1840s.126  Often, policies on which Aberdeen and 
Palmerston ostensibly agreed were also often reached by different intellectual 
pathways and pursued with different ends in mind.  Their support of the integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire, for example, demonstrated the differing political colours and 
objectives of their foreign policies.  Aberdeen’s and Palmerston’s proposals for the 
terms on which Ottoman integrity should be maintained were vastly different – 
Aberdeen did not share the idea that Turkey might be reconstructed on British 
liberal foundations – but they both agreed on the immediate necessity of Turkish 
dominion.  The methods of the two men were also utterly different, with Aberdeen 
preferring candid and personal diplomatic intercourse with his European 
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colleagues, and Palmerston preferring to browbeat and bluff his way to the 
attainment of political objectives.  
One final aspect that drew the different strands of government together in 
the Peel government – and in others – was trade.  The importance of trade to the 
Peel government has been touched upon by others, but beyond the function of 
supplying the British economy with money that was desperately needed in 1840s, 
trade also performed a wider geopolitical function for Aberdeen.127  He saw trading 
preponderance as the principal means by which to preserve Britain’s international 
pre-eminence and power, valuing it above territorial aggrandisement and the idea 
that interventionism was the best way to pursue British interests. 
This thesis will follow the way in which commercial concerns influenced 
foreign policy during the Peel government, often driving responses to particular 
events, as happened over the collapse of the Mavrocordato ministry in Greece and 
in relation to French encroachment on Tahiti.128  Aberdeen saw that where British 
trade flourished, so too did British influence, whilst trading agreements with other 
countries encouraged international stability and helped to preserve the balance of 
power.  This was a view that was supported by the Board of Trade, with Gladstone 
exhibiting particular enthusiasm.129 
Over the course of the Peel government the debate over free trade in the 
domestic and international arenas gathered momentum, and its relation to 
Aberdeen’s foreign policy and his conceptualisation of the international function of 
trade helps to define the world view that drove his policy.  Aberdeen’s was not the 
view of Radicals such as Richard Cobden who, in the 1840s at least, envisaged a tide 
of free trade and democratisation sweeping away international rivalries and leaving 
a lasting legacy of peace and cooperation.  Anthony Howe has commented on the 
extent of this theory: ‘Pressing his vision to its utopian or quasi-anarchist limits, 
Cobden foresaw a Europe without states, not so much a federation, as a Europe of 
municipalities within an international division of labour.  In this vision, the 
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democracy that would liberate the peoples of Europe was integrally linked to free 
trade.’130 
Neither was Aberdeen’s view of international commerce that of Palmerston, 
whose views lay well to the political right of Cobden’s, but were still located to the 
left of Aberdeen’s.  The explanation for this lies in the motives with which 
Palmerston approached the extension of Britain’s commercial interests.  The 
principal motive was, of course, to make Britain more prosperous and powerful.  
Behind this basic stimulus lay the belief that it was part of Britain’s international 
role to liberalise and therefore civilise the world, with trade forming part of Britain’s 
mission alongside the promotion and encouragement of liberal constitutional 
values.  Palmerston’s commitment to the spread of liberal values has been 
questioned on the grounds that it was an artifice constructed for domestic 
consumption, but whilst he would have relished domestic approval, his approach to 
Turkey (and other diplomatic affairs) suggested his commitment was genuine.131 
Aberdeen saw fruitful trading relationships as a means by which to establish 
and maintain pacific international relations, but did not share the desire to 
liberalise more generally.  The examination of Anglo-Ottoman affairs provides an 
opportunity to contrast Aberdonian and Palmerstonian policy in this context, 
although the difference is made clear in additional theatres such as Spain.132 
Aberdeen’s position on the free trade issue, meanwhile, demonstrated that 
whilst his conceptualisation of the international role of commerce was neither 
Cobdenite nor Palmerstonian, neither could it be associated with those elements of 
the Conservative Party that lay farthest to the right.  Protectionists believed that 
trade could be safely and beneficially conducted within the British Empire, free 
from the dangers of international economic interdependence, which a war could all 
too easily expose.  Aberdeen thought that free trade and the Empire were 
compatible in a way that, for different reasons, Radicals and Protectionists did not.  
He also regarded any measure that reduced the chance of a war happening in the 
first place as a cause worth pursuing, and in the 1840s he came to see international 
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free trade as such a measure.  It was a diplomatic tool to be used alongside others 
in the maintenance of a European status quo that benefited Britain.  A cautious 
approach to affairs in Spain, for example, was in part justified on the grounds that 
an increasing degree of commercial reciprocity might help Spain to see itself in an 
international context, rather than maintaining the inward focus that inevitably 
results from civil conflict.  In such calmer circumstances were lasting solutions to 
Anglo-Spanish problems thought to be found, rather than in the midst of Spanish 
upheaval. 
Before turning to specific foreign policy cases, it remains to attempt to 
recreate the intellectual and contextual matrices of Aberdonian Conservatism.  This 
will both address a gap in the historiography and assess the idiosyncratic 
intellectual backdrop against which Aberdeen’s policy must be viewed.  His 
individual outlook and the influences upon it are crucial to understanding a policy 
that has hitherto been dismissed.  In this manner we can dispense with the 
Palmerstonian and liberal contexts of previous studies and build upon the efforts of 
Aberdeen’s biographers.  In order to achieve this objective, an assessment of 
‘Aberdeen and His World’ will attempt to reconstruct the Foreign Secretary’s 
‘mental map’, and place it within the context of Conservative objectives between 
1841 and 1846.  
Having considered that broader background, there follows a re-examination 
of Aberdeen’s engagement with Europe.  Anglo-French relations formed the 
cornerstone of Conservative foreign policy as they did for any government of that 
era, with Napoleonic expansionism still fresh in the collective memory.  The 
historiography currently portrays Anglo-French relations in this period as either an 
alliance, an all-encompassing entente or as thinly veiled hostility, but the evidence 
points to an alternative conclusion.  The civil strife in Spain, given France’s penchant 
for intervening there, was of central importance in the geopolitics of Western 
Europe.  Spanish affairs will, therefore, be considered in a separate chapter.  Here 
too, traditional historiographical preoccupations are ripe for challenge.  Rather than 
directing all attention to Aberdeen’s supposed hypocrisy in policy-making, 
Conservative policy will be considered in light of its objectives. 
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Anglo-Austrian relations were largely uncontroversial, and require comment 
only in relation to certain areas of policy, but Anglo-Russian engagement warrants 
closer investigation.  It is an aspect of the 1840s that has been neglected by 
historians, yet episodes such as the civil discontent in Serbia shed light on the 
Conservative approach to the East and to foreign policy in general.  In a broader 
sense, an understanding of Conservative policy towards Russia in the 1840s affords 
a further resource to those concerned with Britain’s policy during the Crimean war. 
Although America was not yet a great power it was very much in the 
ascendant and a number of inherited disputes threatened Aberdeen’s peaceable 
objectives; failure to keep Anglo-American relations quiescent could impact on 
European affairs, particularly if America and France found reason to resurrect the 
coalition of 1812.  Relations with America will therefore be considered in the final 
chapters.  Aberdeen’s early views on the American people and nation were 
uncompromising: he wrote that ‘[America] is certainly in her childhood, but she has 
nothing of infancy but its forwardness, and instead of strength and vigour of youth 
she has nothing but its insolence and ignorance’, later adding that Americans were 
‘peevish children.’133  By the 1840s condescension had given way to considered 
policy, and the manner in which Aberdeen dealt with boundary disputes between 
America and British Canada captured the essence of Aberdonian policy-making and 
of the Conservative government. 
From this study emerges an account of Aberdonian Conservatism which 
suggests alternative conclusions on the foreign policy of the Peel government.  
Rooting foreign policy firmly in the context of its international objectives, and how 
these related to the domestic priorities of the government, paints a different 
picture from that offered in previous studies.  Aberdeen appears as a much more 
rational politician with a clear set of objectives (albeit whilst maintaining flexibility 
in the methods used to achieve them) than the well-meaning but naïve minister of 
historiographical tradition.  A solid relationship with Peel points to a consensus in 
the Conservative leadership, and we find that the Peel government’s foreign policy 
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has much in common with the pre-Disraelian tradition identified by authors such as 
Hicks and Hawkins.  This era of nineteenth-century Conservatism thus becomes one 
in which a competent Foreign Secretary worked within the governmental and wider 
political parameters of his party to achieve his objectives.  The ubiquity and 
influence of Palmerston are plainly discernible in mid-nineteenth century history, 
but Aberdeen exemplified an alternative, Conservative approach to foreign policy. 
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Chapter Two: Aberdeen and his World 
 
Lord Aberdeen’s life prior to the inception of the Peel government is not an 
area of complete historiographical darkness.  Biographies and diplomatic histories 
have looked at Aberdeen’s ambassadorship during the Napoleonic wars and his 
tenure as Foreign Secretary in the Wellington government of 1828-30.134  Narrative 
details of Aberdeen’s earlier political engagements and his formative years are also 
documented in such studies, but there has as yet been no developed attempt to try 
and piece together the intellectual impulses behind Aberdeen’s policies.  Part of 
this endeavour must inevitably look at the man, but we must also consider the 
world in which Aberdeen was operating.  In doing so, we can better understand the 
man charged with delivering Conservative foreign policy and, therefore, the foreign 
policy itself.  
Trying to understand a politician’s thinking is an inexact science and 
presents no small amount of methodological difficulty but, with care, one can glean 
an overall sense of the workings of political minds.  As T. G. Otte remarked in his 
recent study of the ‘Foreign Office mind’, ‘by its very nature, the mind is an elusive 
phenomenon.  For the historian there is no corpse upon which a scholarly post-
mortem can be performed.  But there are traces and footprints, sometimes even 
only the merest whiff of suggestion.’135  Jeremy Black, in his study of British foreign 
policy in the late eighteenth century, considered the additional difficulties of 
relating personal observations to wider domestic and international concerns: ‘It is 
not easy to offer a coherent account of foreign policy that relates domestic 
circumstances to diplomatic developments, in part because of lacunae and 
ambiguities in the sources, and also because there was no neat pattern of 
influences and policies.’136 
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The endeavour to recreate Aberdeen’s political outlook is also affected by a 
number of individual circumstances that make him a difficult politician to analyse.  
In the public sphere, Aberdeen was an infrequent and reserved speaker in the 
House of Lords for whom detailed statements of policy intention were rare, 
perhaps inevitably for a pragmatic politician without a doctrinaire philosophy.  A 
general disinclination to engage with the political world beyond Westminster 
removes a further potential source of information that studies of figures such as 
Disraeli and Gladstone have been able to utilise: their need to engage with an 
expanding electorate also encouraged greater engagement with the public later in 
the nineteenth-century.  Disraeli’s speeches at Crystal Palace and the Free Trade 
Hall in Manchester in 1872 helped to convey his message of ‘One Nation’ 
Conservatism to the public and to posterity, whilst Gladstone’s Midlothian 
campaign later that decade articulated his ideas on foreign policy to a wider 
audience.  Aberdeen eschewed such populist measures in favour of sober political 
engagement with his peers. 
 In the private sphere, Aberdeen presents similar challenges.  He did not 
keep a diary with the exception of a short period during his travels: there is no 
treasure trove comparable to the Derby diaries, which illuminated the Conservative 
politics of the 1850s onwards.137  Aberdeen also declined to write the grand 
historical works penned by those such as Churchill, which have provided historians 
with a mine of material from which to draw their conclusions.138 
 Aberdeen’s communication with contemporaries also presents problems.  
His moods could be dark to the extent of apparent neurasthenia and this 
temperament often resulted in brief and unrevealing exchanges.139  This was not 
helped by the incessant tragedies in Aberdeen’s life: his first wife, whom he 
described as ‘the most perfect creature ever formed by the power and wisdom of 
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God’, died in 1812 and death also claimed many of his children at a premature 
age.140 
 Aberdeen’s apparent detachment might also be partly explained by his 
scholarly pursuits.  These began with the study of Classics and the Renaissance at 
Cambridge and continued on his tour of Europe in the early 1800s.  In 1805 
Aberdeen was elected to the Society of Dilettanti, an important group of cultural 
patrons, and he also became a member of the Society of Antiquaries, for which he 
was president between 1811 and 1846.  Early academic studies that cemented this 
respected position in the scholarly world included An Inquiry into the Principles and 
Beauty in Grecian Architecture and an introduction to his friend Guy Whittington’s 
An Historical Survey of the Ecclesiastical Antiquities of France.141  Aberdeen’s 
scholarly ability to appreciate all sides of an argument could result in circuitous and 
meandering dispatches and correspondence, which can quite easily confuse by 
virtue of their labyrinthine logic.  One diplomat summarised Aberdeen’s inclination 
to lengthy iterations, adding some further interpretations of their origin: 
 
The note is written in a florid style, full of tiresome repetitions and punctilious 
verbosity; the work of a diplomatist who, between the necessity of telling the 
truth and the fear of displeasing, is driven hither and thither, neither able to 
defend his own cause (a bad enough one) nor venturing to attack the 
weakness of his adversaries with vigour; who trembles before the slightest 
criticism and covers over his well-founded fears with trivial compliments.142 
  
Despite the varying challenges of trying to construct a picture of Aberdeen 
and his world, there remain enough ‘traces and footprints’ and ‘whiffs of 
suggestion’ with which to conduct the investigation.  They are mainly found in 
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Aberdeen’s private correspondence, a domain in which the restraint and caution he 
exercised in public were often diluted, and sometimes wholly abandoned.  The 
influences on Aberdeen’s development also provide us with clues to the unspoken 
assumptions with which he approached politics. 
  
The Early Years 
 
William Pitt the Younger was Aberdeen’s mentor in early life and a crucial 
influence.143  The relationship between Pitt and Aberdeen was undoubtedly a 
strong one.  Despite many of Pitt’s letters to Aberdeen disappearing in the 1860s, 
the sizeable corpus of Aberdeen’s letters to Pitt contains many telling references.144  
Aberdeen’s political diary explains the relationship as being ‘on terms of the utmost 
intimacy from my childhood’ and it details his intention ‘never to renounce the 
Principles of Mr. Pitt’.145  It is interesting to note that, as R. W. Liscombe has 
demonstrated, Aberdeen was the prime mover behind a monument to 
commemorate Pitt’s life, despite not being a member of the parliamentary Pitt 
Monument Committee.146 
 Historians have differed in their conclusions regarding the legacy of Pittite 
politics.147  Early criticism of Pitt’s handling of the war against Napoleon faded after 
his death as the 1807 poem ‘Elijah’s Mantle’ ushered in a wave of admiring studies, 
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which continued into the twentieth century.148  The popular chronicler Arthur 
Bryant used Pitt’s story to provide lessons of strong leadership when Britain was 
fighting World War Two, whilst Ehrman and Reilly’s accounts failed to shed the 
generally encomiastic nature of contemporary Pitt studies.149  More recent studies 
have questioned Pitt’s liberal and modernising tendencies on the basis that he was 
a pragmatic politician focusing on his own times rather than a figure looking to 
make any grand ideological impact on his party or posterity.150 
 From this spread of varying interpretations of Pitt’s politics nonetheless 
emerges a broad consensus on Pittite traits.  These include a pragmatic approach to 
policy-making, a business-like and administrative approach to government, a Tory 
sense of duty and loyalty to the Crown, and a willingness to work with Europe in 
order to achieve Britain’s foreign objectives.151  Aberdeen was a pragmatic 
politician who formulated policy according to a given situation rather than on the 
basis of a rigid value system, and Pitt’s approach to politics was a major influence 
on the way he looked at the world: it was something that Aberdeen himself 
stressed throughout his life. 
 Aberdeen’s career echoed that of Pitt in its overriding pragmatism and 
political expediency: both men have frequently been charged with inconsistency.152  
Pitt was not a doctrinaire politician in the way that Tory ‘Ultras’ and – at the other 
end of the political spectrum, Radicals – had a tendency to be.  He employed a 
business-like and administrative approach to his government and to his politics, as 
was perhaps necessitated by his leadership at a time when passions were inflamed 
by war and when the party structure that emerged in the 1830s and 1840s did not 
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yet exist.  Lord Liverpool would employ a similar strategy during his tenure as Prime 
Minister.  A student of political economy, Liverpool rejected grand ideology in 
favour of sound economic policy at a time when war with Napoleon demanded this 
approach: he has been labelled a ‘conscientious administrator.’153  Peel’s 
government would also be one that sought to balance the books and Aberdeen’s 
role within it would be to make foreign policy successful yet inexpensive: he too 
would become a sound administrator in this conservative ‘Pittite’ way.154 
 Aberdeen also admired in and acquired from Pitt a Tory sense of duty and 
loyalty to the Crown and to the nation, which carried quasi-religious overtones by 
which a sense of personal sacrifice underwrote tenure in public office.  As Robin 
Harris has observed of Pitt, he had ‘shown what any Tory, before or later, would 
recognise as a distinctively Tory sense of duty (as well as an entirely human 
opportunism) in answering the King’s summons to serve.  The belief that the King’s 
business must be done, whatever personal or political interest demanded, provided 
one significant mark of continuity between early and later Tories and, indeed, 
between both and the Conservatives.’155  This spirit might be detected in 
Aberdeen’s agreement to lead the coalition government in 1852 when, at sixty-
eight years old, his attentions appeared to have been happily concentrated on 
affairs at Haddo House.  Aberdeen had written to Whittington in the wake of Pitt’s 
death: 
 
The country has lost its only support in this dreadful time of disaster; and I 
have lost the only friend to whom I looked up with unbounded Love and 
admiration […] What will become of the country, torn by differing factions.  
While he lived […] there was at least one object, to which all eyes were 
directed, and which might have united all hearts in the time of danger.  But 
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now, it is all void, a blank; on whom can we put our trust?  Where can the 
mind repose with confidence?156 
 
With some reasonable conjecture it is possible to perceive Aberdeen’s belief in the 
dutiful and unifying spirit of Pitt in his decision to form a coalition government out 
of factions riven with personal ambition and internecine quarrelling. 
 On the international scene Pitt exhibited a willingness to work with Europe 
as a means by which to secure British interests.  In his State Paper of 1805 it was 
outlined that European cooperation represented a more natural and beneficial 
approach than an incessant state of Great Power intrigue and agitation.  This maxim 
fitted with Aberdeen’s perspective on foreign policy, by which cooperation was 
more likely to protect the balance of power and thereby create the pacific 
conditions in which British interests could thrive.  Influence was measured not in 
the currency of temporary successes in local disagreements, or maintained by 
making statements of power through confrontational policies, but was seen in 
Britain’s economic dominance.  The best way to preserve British trading 
preponderance and its concomitant political influence was seen to be maintenance 
of the international stability by which Britain prospered.  Aberdeen wrote to this 
effect when trying to ease the strained relations caused by the power struggle in 
Greece in the 1840s: ‘the superior probity, enterprise and wealth of British 
merchants will always ensure the preservation of British influence.’157 
 Protection of the balance of power was the preoccupation of almost all 
British politicians, with the exception of some Radicals, but what marked out 
Aberdeen’s policy as distinctly conservative was the approach by which he sought 
to protect the balance.  Whilst Aberdeen was not averse to limited changes to the 
Vienna Settlement of 1814-1815 – for example, in 1830 he was content to 
recognise the Orleanist ascendancy in France in the name of European stability – he 
was averse to the proselytising liberal mission to model other European states on 
British constitutional values (Viscount Castlereagh’s influence might also be felt 
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here, as will be discussed below).  This was something that was particularly 
apparent in his policy regarding the civil difficulty in Spain in the 1840s.  
For Aberdeen, Palmerston’s apparent courting of revolutionaries in the late 
1840s and early 1850s seemed to epitomise the dangers of this liberal approach, 
both in its threat to the immediate peace and in the sense of the Northern Courts’ 
inevitable suspicion.  Whilst Palmerston never lost any sleep over causing 
discontent amongst Europe’s crowned autocrats, Aberdeen regarded any 
interaction with revolutionaries in Europe as an unnecessary danger to a peace that 
served Britain’s interests.  This was a view that he articulated in the debate over the 
Eastern crisis in 1828: ‘the general policy of this country was the same now as it had 
been for many years past – namely, an earnest desire to preserve peace, not only to 
England, but to the whole world.’158 
 Aberdeen’s willingness to engage openly with the great powers in the name 
of stability, as well as demonstrating a continuation of Pitt’s intellectual inheritance, 
was also rooted in the experiences of his youth.  The distaste for revolution, which 
became clear later in his search for European stability, was apparent – and perhaps 
acquired – during his travels across Europe at the time of the Napoleonic wars.  
Experiences of the French revolution and its aftermath elicited different responses 
from travelling young aristocrats, but the impact on Aberdeen is clear.159  Arriving in 
Avignon on 19 December 1806, he recorded in his journal that ‘the town was one of 
the first in France which became the prey of revolutionary principles.  The horrors 
perpetrated here almost are inconceivable.’160  Experience of revolution so close to 
home caused palpable alarm.     
  Besides the human cost of the revolution in France, Aberdeen deplored the 
wanton physical destruction of the landscape, especially the religious buildings.  
The ruined palace at Chantilly was described as ‘one of the most distressing scenes I 
have ever witnessed’ whilst elsewhere he lamented that ‘almost all the churches 
are mutilated.’161  Aberdeen’s scholarly interest in architecture combined with his 
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private faith to fuel his contempt for the material cost of revolutionary zeal: 
Aberdeen’s emotional investment in the affairs of the Church was profound, as 
many have noted.162  Casual destruction of the wider material landscape also struck 
Aberdeen as demonstrating the hypocrisy of those he branded ‘Regicidal 
Freebooters’: these were the people who cared not for the principles at stake but 
focused their attention on the theft and subsequent fire sale of a nation’s 
treasures.163 
In his horror, Aberdeen echoed Edmund Burke, whose Reflections on the 
Revolution in France was published in 1790.  Burke was repulsed by the revolution 
and concerned that its values might reach English shores: ‘The spirit of total, radical 
innovation; the overthrow of all prescriptive rights; the confiscation of property; 
destruction of the Church, the nobility, the family, tradition, veneration, the 
ancestors, the nation – this is the catalogue of all that Burke dreaded in his darkest 
moments.’164  Aberdeen’s own fear was clear in his later, staunch support for the 
Vienna Settlement. 
It has been argued that the fluid economic gradations between classes in 
Britain made the chances of revolution in Britain extremely low, which might 
suggest that the fear of revolution in the wake of 1789 and the Napoleonic wars 
was rather irrational.165  Aberdeen’s reluctance to countenance any major changes 
to the status quo remains coherent.  Revolutionary ideology posed a transnational 
challenge through its ingrained universalist rhetoric and, whether Britain was 
resistant to it or not, other countries’ susceptibilities threatened the balance of 
power.  Britain’s relative immunity to revolution could also not be taken for granted 
because, in the words of one study, ‘however unique the British constitution, it was 
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embedded in a larger political, social, and moral order’.166  Aberdeen regarded that 
order as held together by resistance to extensive and/or sudden change.  Richard 
Cobden’s assertion that he was ‘a little too pedantically bent upon keeping things 
on the Continent as he fixed them at the Congress of Vienna’ should, as with other 
references to Aberdonian reaction, be treated with caution.167  Many of them say 
more about their author than Aberdeen and, indeed, many would be considered 
reactionary by Cobden’s Radical standards.    Aberdeen was, however, unashamedly 
‘continental’ in his outlook; European co-operation provided a stable framework for 
geopolitics. 
This continental outlook received affirmation during his ambassadorship to 
Austria later in the Napoleonic wars.  The overriding objective of his mission had 
been to re-establish communication with the armies of Britain’s allies at a time 
when, despite Britain’s vast naval importance, involvement in the land war was 
peripheral.  A number of historiographical assumptions have distracted from 
analysis of Aberdeen’s role, chief among which was that an ostensible inability to 
speak French – the lingua franca of nineteenth-century diplomatic intercourse – 
undermined his ambassadorship and demonstrated an enduring lack of 
commitment to his political assignments.  Depending upon whom one listens to, 
Aberdeen could either ‘not speak French’, was ‘barely able to speak French’, 
exhibited an ‘ignorance of French’ or was ‘not fully master of the French 
language’.168  These conclusions appear to have become part of the 
historiographical consensus as a result of the contemporary remarks of a German in 
the Austrian service, whose comments were almost immediately rescinded.169  
Aberdeen’s communicative endeavours in fact helped to bring Britain back 
to the negotiating table in European affairs and in doing so he learned that 
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cooperation with rival powers could be just as productive as confrontation.  This 
outlook would later see him lampooned by liberals as the ‘friend of Emperors’ or 
the ‘friend of autocracy’ with the implication that abstract ideology drove 
Aberdeen’s policy.  The preparedness to engage with rivals of any political colour 
seemed rather to have stemmed from the belief that this method engendered the 
best chance of a peaceful solution, with peace representing Britain’s best 
interests.170  Indeed, Aberdeen once compared successful negotiation to the ‘most 
glorious conquests in the field.’171  More confrontational politicians might argue 
exactly the same, but with the addendum that threats were a better way to secure 
peace.  
The ambassadorship to Austria also saw Aberdeen become one of only two 
nineteenth-century Prime Ministers to witness the aftermath of battle (Wellington 
being the other) when he arrived at Leipzig to the sight of the dead and dying.  This 
probably enhanced an inherently pacific streak that reinforced Aberdeen’s 
commitment to continental peace, although Webster seems to have been short of 
evidence for his rather bold claim that ‘the ride across the Leipzig battlefield, while 
the screams of the wounded lying amidst the masses of dead fell unheeded on the 
cavalcade, made an indelible impression on the sensitive nature of the young envoy 
and affected all his future life.’172   
Aberdeen certainly sought peace wherever possible but if British interests 
dictated that wars must be fought or should be threatened, pacific inclinations 
were placed to one side.  During the Napoleonic wars Aberdeen wanted vigorous 
prosecution of the war in order to support his moves for an equitable peace.173  
This could be seen in the personal authorisation to provide Dutch resistance to 
French encroachment with twenty-five thousand pounds worth of arms in 
November 1813.174  Aberdeen also showed himself prepared to threaten war 
during the Peel government when he felt that diplomacy needed a boost of 
momentum: war was to be avoided wherever possible, but remained a strategic 
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option as the last resort in a breakdown of diplomacy, and it needed to be 
prosecuted with commitment when undertaken. 
The continental outlook with which Aberdeen emerged from his early life 
was reinforced by Viscount Castlereagh, Britain’s Foreign Secretary from 1812 to 
1822, and Aberdeen’s friend and superior at the Foreign Office in the Napoleonic 
Years.  John Derry wrote of Castlereagh that he ‘was convinced […] that Britain was 
inevitably involved in European questions and that it was better for her to play her 
part in preventing war than in desperately searching for an ally once war had 
broken out.’175  Although historians have questioned Aberdeen’s respect for 
Castlereagh – Henry Kissinger described Aberdeen as exhibiting ‘condescension’ 
towards the Foreign Secretary and Wendy Hinde has concurred with this viewpoint 
– Chamberlain’s more extensive research resulted in a different conclusion: ‘some 
historians have been scandalised by his tendency to discuss matters on equal terms 
with Castlereagh and even at times to lecture his chief, but these were in fact the 
terms which they were on.’176  The esteem in which Aberdeen held Castlereagh was 
made clear in his correspondence and he wrote after the latter’s death that 
‘[Castlereagh’s] coolness and self-possession were most remarkable.’177 
Aberdeen and Castlereagh did not, however, emerge from the Napoleonic 
wars as conservatives in the mould of those of continental Europe.  The Congress 
system that developed after the Vienna Settlement prompted the Northern Courts 
to view the resolution of all European problems, even domestic issues, as subject to 
the discussions of the Great Powers.  Aberdeen and British conservatives in general 
regarded a nation’s internal problems as their own responsibility unless these 
problems threatened to assume international significance and so threaten the 
balance of power as determined at Vienna.  Limited change was acceptable but the 
unpredictability of upheaval was not, a view which could lead to sympathy with the 
autocrats’ sentiments, if not their methods.  In a rare explicit statement of his 
political outlook, after the meeting of the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the 
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Crown Prince of Prussia in 1833, Aberdeen wrote to his continental confidante 
Princess Lieven regarding British and French involvement in Spain: 
 
The meeting of the Emperors gave me more satisfaction than any publick [sic] 
event which has recently taken place, because it held out the prospect of 
arresting the progress of revolution in Europe; and by establishing a perfectly 
good understanding between the two Princes, gave each of them additional 
means of preserving the general peace and safety.  It is on the cordial and 
intimate union of the Northern Powers that the chance is afforded of 
preserving the tranquillity and happiness of Europe against the disorganizing 
and revolutionary policy of the present Governments of England and France.178   
  
Aberdeen did not want British interests to suffer at the expense of France 
(intriguing in Spain at that time) or, for that matter, Spain, but saw a different way 
of pursuing British ends than diving into Spanish affairs.  Conservatives thought that 
the balance of power would be best kept in place by internalising Spanish unrest 
and the threat of revolution.  Britain’s Whig government, however, saw the conflict 
as an opportunity to back the Spanish liberals and spread British values in so doing, 
while the Northern Courts saw an opportunity to crush the forces of Spanish 
liberalism.  Aberdeen regarded either course as dangerous to European stability – 
the umbrella under which wider British interests were assumed to shelter – and 
inherently counterproductive in the sense that the Spanish people would be 
unlikely to accept any governmental changes that were the result of foreign 
interference. 
 Although Aberdeen expressed satisfaction at the Northern Courts’ hostility 
to revolution, he did not think that external forces should interfere in Spain’s 
domestic concerns in order to remove the cause of discontent at its source: great 
powers could do more harm than good by interference, and had no right to 
intervene.  He wanted to ‘arrest the progress of revolution’ on the international 
scene because it was a dangerous and ill-conceived method of bringing about 
change, which was different from many continental conservatives’ desires to put a 
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halt to progress itself.  This viewpoint seemed further to demonstrate the 
intellectual legacy of Castlereagh, who articulated the concept in his State Paper of 
5 May 1820, in relation to an earlier incident in Spain.  Russia, Austria and Prussia 
had formed a ‘Holy Alliance’ in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat, which developed 
into a force for the suppression of not just revolution, but also democracy and 
secularism.  Castlereagh outlined the reluctance to join the Holy Alliance in its 
conception of the Great Powers as a European quasi-police force: 
 
Would it be wise to give advice, wholly unasked, which, is very little likely to 
contain any suggestion for the salutary modification of the Constitution of 
1812 other than such as will readily occur to those publick Men within the 
Country who have good intentions, and whose influence and means of 
effectuating an amelioration of the Constitution are likely to be weakened 
rather than strengthened by an interference from abroad? […] It is not meant 
that in particular and definite Cases, the Alliance may not (and especially when 
invited to do so by the Parties interested) advantageously interpose, with due 
Caution, in matters lying beyond the Boundaries of their immediate and 
particular Connection; but what is intended to be combated as forming any 
part of their Duty as Allies, is the Notion, but too perceptibly prevalent, that 
whenever any great Political Event shall occur, as in Spain, pregnant perhaps 
with future Danger, it is to be regarded almost as a matter of course, that it 
belongs to the Allies to charge themselves collectively with the Responsibility 
of exercising some Jurisdiction concerning such possible eventual Danger.179 
    
If conservatives like Castlereagh and Aberdeen were suspicious of the 
‘Alliance’ aspect of the Northern powers’ union, equal suspicion was reserved for its 
‘Holy’ commitments.  The Holy Alliance still believed its monarchs to be divinely 
ordained, and it pursued antidemocratic policies in accordance with this tenet.  
Aberdeen’s religiosity – private, introspective and tending to Low Church doctrine – 
did not lend itself to the proselytising mentality of European conservatives. 
                                                          
179
 There are several sources that cite Castlereagh’s State Paper.  See, for example, H. Temperley and 
L. Penson (eds.), Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902): 
Documents, Old and New/ Selected and Edited, with Historical Introductions (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 
48-63. 
53 
 
 In the public sphere Aberdeen was a rational and pragmatic man who 
regretted his lack of a ‘lively faith’, despite some historians’ assertions that religion 
was significant in Aberdeen’s political outlook.180  Whilst religious inclinations 
would never lead to the kind of pious politics associated with those such as 
Gladstone, however, one might make a connection between Aberdeen’s 
Presbyterianism and his international outlook: intellectual investment in the rigid 
institutional organisation of the Presbyterian Church may have reinforced the 
notion that large, unifying power structures were a means by which to pursue one’s 
objectives.  The balance of power as set out at Vienna was one such structure to 
which this observation seems to apply. 
The only circumstance in which Aberdeen’s religious persuasions made any 
definite and significant impact on his policy was in dealings with the Islamic 
Ottomans and in the formation of policy towards the East.  He once reflected on 
the performance of the young actor William Beatty by declaring him ‘the greatest 
impostor since the days of Mohammed’.181  Aberdeen saw confirmation of his 
religious contempt for Islam in his practical experience and, while Foreign Secretary 
under Wellington, Aberdeen declared of the Ottoman Empire: ‘I have seen and 
know the effect of the barbarous rule existing there and nobody can be more alive 
to the horrors with which it abounds.’182 
 In such views Aberdeen was very much a man of his times.  Early 
nineteenth-century opinions of the East fused religious and social prejudices and 
crossed party lines, as was indicated by Palmerston’s observation in 1829: 
 
I should not be sorry some day or other to see the Turk kicked out of Europe, 
& compelled to go and sit cross-legged, smoke his pipe, chew his opium, & cut 
off heads on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus; we want civilisation, activity, 
trade, & business in Europe, & your Mustaphas have no idea of any traffic 
beyond rhubarb, figs & red slippers; what energy can be expected from a 
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nation who have no heels to their shoes and pass their whole lives slip 
shod?183 
 
What differentiated Aberdeen and Palmerston in relation to the Islamic Ottomans 
was the way in which they chose to act on their views, as was made clear in the 
1840s.184 
Despite Britain’s lack of affinity with the ideology and religious zeal of 
continental conservatism, Aberdeen was nonetheless prepared to work with the 
Northern powers if it suited British interests.  His approaches to Austria during the 
Napoleonic ambassadorship provided a clear example of this, although historians 
have suggested other reasons for Aberdeen’s willingness to deal with the Austrian 
leader, Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich.  The main historiographical case is 
that Aberdeen’s eagerness to strike up a relationship left him susceptible to the 
flattery of a wilier politician, which echoed historians’ assertions about his 
relationship with Guizot in the 1840s.  Aberdeen was thought ‘gullible’ and 
‘vulnerable to the arts of flattery which the Austrian Chancellor could use with such 
lethal effect.’185  
Aberdeen’s approaches to Metternich, however, derived from the logical 
recognition that Austria was the most realistic power through which Britain could 
regain an influence in the mainland diplomacy of the Napoleonic wars: Britain had 
hitherto been on the periphery of negotiations between the powers fighting 
Bonaparte.  Whilst Metternich needed to be treated with caution, Russia and 
Prussia seemed far less reliable.  They both had disincentives to conclude peace 
swiftly: protracting the conflict could offer Prussia territorial gains at French 
expense; Russia could pursue influence in Europe as it marched westward towards 
France.  Tsar Alexander also dreamed of a triumphal scenario in Paris where he 
would be fêted as the deliverer of Europe.  Metternich was suspicious of Russian 
                                                          
183
 Palmerston to Edward Littleton, 16 September 1829, K. Bourne (ed.), The Letters of the Third 
Viscount Palmerston to Laurence and Elizabeth Sullivan, 1804-1863 (London, 1979), p. 304. 
184
 See chapter 5. 
185
 Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 96; Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 194. Webster argued that ‘so great was 
Aberdeen’s trust in Metternich that he presumed to lecture Castlereagh on his insular suspicions’; 
Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, pp. 173-4.  Nicolson argued that Aberdeen ‘fell an 
immediate victim to [Metternich’s] abundant charm’; Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 58. 
55 
 
intentions and potential aggrandisement, whilst Prussian advances would provide 
immediate danger on his doorstep.  Austria, furthermore, always felt an overriding 
wariness about encouraging nationalism, given that the Habsburg Empire was built 
on enforced multinationalism and cosmopolitanism.  Metternich often found British 
demands irritating and he was no Anglophile, but with more reason to work with 
Britain than Prussia or Russia, during the Napoleonic era Britain was the least of 
three evils for Austria, and vice versa. 
Aberdeen’s views on working with Austria were shaped by a rational 
interpretation of national interests and he was developing a conceptualisation of 
European politics based on cooperation and transparency that would carry through 
into later years.  Historians have suggested that this philosophy bred a weakness at 
the negotiating table, where British interests were deemed to suffer in the name of 
blinkered Europhilia, although John Bew has noted that Aberdeen had ‘some 
success in laying the groundwork for a more constructive relationship between 
Castlereagh and Metternich.’186  There remain, however, those with such a low 
opinion of Aberdeen’s diplomacy that even these advances were attributed to 
luck.187 
Aberdeen’s willingness to work with Russia has also aroused the suspicion of 
historians, not least with regard to his later career when perceived Russophilia was 
seen to contribute to Britain’s muddled Crimean policy.  Whilst Aberdeen needed 
to be extremely cautious with Alexander’s Russia in the Napoleonic wars – few tsars 
have demonstrated a more potent mix of ambition and unpredictability – there 
were intelligible reasons for working with the Russia of Alexander’s younger 
brother, Nicholas I.188  Nicholas was a staunch supporter of established regimes and 
whilst this could result in the brutal suppression of revolutions such as that in 
Poland in 1830, it provided a change from Alexander, who could switch from 
reactionary militarism to ardent liberalism in an instant.  Miroslav Šedivý has shown 
how Nicholas was prepared to pursue a policy of ‘give and take’ with Austria to this 
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end (although naturally preferring to take).  He also took such a line with Britain, 
which will be explored in Chapter Five.189 
Aberdeen summarised his views of Nicholas and Russia, in the wake of his 
Crimean leadership, with reference to the Ottoman Empire, which Britain sought to 
protect, but many perceived Russia to have tried to conquer and dismantle with its 
Crimean policy.  Some in Britain were calling for total victory over Russia and a 
reorganisation of the balance of power in the East, but Aberdeen thought this 
would undermine the principle of stability that Britain was fighting the Crimean war 
to protect: 
 
I have never been an admirer of the Russian government, or its policy; and 
although the Emperor Nicholas was personally very gracious to me of late 
years, I believe that he thought me an enemy at heart; as indeed from former 
experience he had some right to do.  At the same time, should our press prove 
triumphant, and Russia, according to their own phrase, be “finally crushed”, I 
think it would be the greatest possible misfortune for Europe; for I believe that 
England and France, closely united, would then commit more injustice in one 
year than might be expected from Russia in twenty.190 
 
Aberdeen was prepared to work with Russia, as Austria, because doing so 
was a vehicle by which to pursue British interests, not because of an abstract and 
unthinking belief in the ideology of reaction (many liberals also advocated 
cooperation with Russia).  Such an analysis lay at the root of Anglo-Russian 
intercourse over the Ottoman Empire in 1844.  The Ottoman Empire stabilised a 
region in which its dissolution would create a competing mass of nationalist 
sentiments and Great Power ambition, and Russia wanted Ottoman power 
maintained, albeit it weak and subservient, to avoid such a vacuum of power.  
Britain also sought the protection of Ottoman territorial integrity: important trade 
routes to India passed through Turkey.  Aberdeen suggested that following the 
popular calls to bring down the Russian regime would destroy the balance of power 
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as set out at Vienna, engendering an ugly scramble for European ascendancy, 
particularly given the presence of what was perceived as irrational nationalism in 
contemporary British and French politics.    
Aberdeen’s fear about the ‘crushing’ of Russia underlines his view of that 
country as an essential player in the maintenance of the European balance of 
power.  As with his approach to Metternich, a willingness to work with Nicholas did 
not presuppose anything other than a pragmatic assessment of the best way to 
pursue British interests.  He maintained a vigilance and wariness of the Russian 
leadership throughout and after his time in office that belied accusations of 
Russophilia, noting after Alexander II’s accession that ‘The Emperor has contrived to 
make it generally believed that he is pacifically disposed.  This may be the case, and 
I do not wish to express any positive distrust, but I only say that this man is 
unfathomable, and that no one knows his real views and intentions.  He confides in 
none.’191  
Aberdeen also showed a willingness to work with France throughout his 
career that, both intrinsically and as a policy traditionally associated with liberalism, 
belies the connection of Aberdonian policy with unthinking reaction.  He was 
nonetheless as far from an unquestioning Francophile as he was a blinkered 
Russophile.  Aberdeen viewed the French Revolution as symptomatic of Gallic flaws, 
finding it ‘incredible that the national vanity of the Frenchman should have been so 
far overcome’ as to countenance such idealistically motivated violence.192  He had 
previously noted that there was ‘a kind of national vanity so peculiar to a 
Frenchman’ and remarked that ‘we must take care to distinguish properly, between 
national vanity, and national pride; the one springs from a kind of selfishness in the 
individual, and is consequently despicable, the other has nothing of self in it, but is 
a pure patriotic feeling and in consequence highly creditable.’193 
These views of the French ensured that whilst Aberdeen was working with 
France during his career, an underlying watchfulness insured the policy of openness 
with which Aberdeen pursued British interests.  This could be seen in Wellington’s 
                                                          
191
 Aberdeen to William Gladstone, 16 January 1856, Ibid, p. 150.   
192
 The Aberdeen Journal of 1806, Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43336/44. 
193
 Ibid, Add. MS 43335/23-4. 
58 
 
government when French occupation of Algiers elicited a casual public response 
from Aberdeen, but encouraged the Foreign Secretary to initiate close surveillance, 
given that the French ‘could not fail to exercise great influence over the commerce 
and the maritime interests of the Mediterranean powers’ if their perceived vanity 
engendered expansion in the Barbary states.194  The 1850s saw Aberdeen lock 
horns with Louis Napoleon, and ongoing suspicion of France seemed to manifest 
itself in a hesitancy to cooperate over the Eastern crisis. Matters were not helped 
by Aberdeen’s personal dislike of the new Bonaparte emperor, whom he regarded 
as a dangerous militaristic usurper. 
Aberdeen was prepared to work with all the Great Powers on essentially the 
same terms regardless of their ideological underpinnings.  His foreign politics were 
nevertheless unmistakably conservative in that only minor changes to the balance 
of power were considered.  Geoffrey Hicks described the politics of the Derby 
family in a way that also captures the broad nature of Aberdonian Conservatism: 
 
The foreign policy […] was neither Palmerstonian, Disraelian, nor that of the 
radical ‘Troublemakers’ examined by A. J. P. Taylor […] Put very simply, it 
regarded interventionism with distaste, favoured working with the other 
powers whatever their systems of government, opted for negotiation over 
confrontation on almost all occasions and presumed only minimal alteration of 
the status quo was necessary.  It constituted an important phase in a longer 
tradition of Conservative foreign policy.195   
 
 Aberdeen’s place in this longer tradition of Conservative foreign policy can 
be identified partly in terms of what his conservatism was not.  Liberal governments 
of the era came to be associated with swashbuckling foreign politics and the 
tendency to accumulate debt with expensive domestic initiatives.  Anthony Seldon 
has suggested that Conservative governments are often elected on the basis of 
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being ‘safer’ than whatever else might be on offer.196  This certainly seemed to 
apply to Peel’s government of the 1840s and, thus, to Aberdeen.  He was indeed to 
become a ‘safe’ Conservative – in the sense of being non-interventionist and 
prudent – but one with a pragmatic approach to the political world, adaptable to 
the circumstances in which he found himself.  In 1841-6 Whig profligacy 
necessitated a more conservative approach to life at the Foreign Office – the Whigs 
had built up the national debt to almost a billion pounds – whilst in the 1850s, like 
Peel, he called himself a Liberal Conservative, on the grounds of being the Prime 
Minister of a government that was installed with a mandate for extensive domestic 
reform.  William Brock in his seminal work on Lord Liverpool wrote that the subject 
of his study ‘attempted to consider each question on its merits, and the result was 
that he was neither “liberal” nor “ultra”, but remained in an intermediary 
position.’197  This flexibility would also come to define Aberdeen’s politics: he could 
be liberal almost to the point of Radicalism in domestic politics whilst his core 
conservatism usually prevailed abroad. 
 The middle ground that Brock identified between being liberal or Ultra can 
be described as the ‘middle way’ of Conservatism.  Blake portrayed Liverpool as 
representing a ‘middle of the road’ Conservatism, whilst John Charmley has traced 
its existence through Peel and beyond.198  Aberdeen’s politics in the Peel 
government and later can be identified with the precepts of this moderate variety 
of Conservatism.  Aberdeen’s was not the Toryism of the eighteenth-century and 
before in which the Crown, the established Church and the constitution were 
unalterably sacrosanct and mild modifications to law were considered tantamount 
to treason.199  This older brand of Toryism persisted in some circles and was 
personified, argue his biographers, in the form of John Wilson Croker, a friend of 
Aberdeen’s, whose articles in the Quarterly Review and elsewhere captured the 
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Ultras’ concerns.200  One of Croker’s biographers suggested that his interpretation 
of the term ‘conservative’ was ‘an all-or-nothing solidarity characterized by a 
system under siege’, whilst another noted that he thought any change to the 
electoral system would bring a collapse of the propertied social order on which 
Britain’s prosperity was deemed to rest.201 
 Aberdeen generally steered clear of this type of Conservatism in favour of 
the ‘middle way’.  This outlook maintained the support of tradition and English 
exceptionalism inherent in Toryism but without the inflexibility of old Tory loyalties.  
John Ramsden has identified the existence of the ‘middle way’ in the decades 
before Burke’s Reflections was published, but Burke’s work remains the seminal 
articulation of this school of thought.202  Aberdeen’s views were unmistakably 
conservative but should not be placed too far to the political right.  Burke wrote in 
his Reflections that ‘a State without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation’ and this is a sentiment that one can apply to Aberdonian 
policy.203  Aberdeen would at various points in his career support Catholic 
Emancipation and voting reform at home: the state was regarded as an organic 
entity that must evolve in order to survive and thrive.204  As head of a Conservative 
government, Peel’s willingness to embark on a programme of wide-reaching 
reforms suggested that he shared this conceptualisation of the state, which made 
for a productive working relationship between Aberdeen and the Prime Minister in 
the 1840s. 
The same views applied to Aberdeen’s construction of foreign policy.  The 
Vienna settlement was regarded as a safeguard of the balance of power; a glue to 
hold Europe together in a period when nationalism and liberal movements 
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threatened unpredictable consequences, but minor changes were not excluded if 
they were seen to suit Britain and Europe.  Aberdeen was one of the first politicians 
to advocate recognition of the July Revolution of 1830 in France, in which Charles X 
and the Bourbons were overthrown in favour of Louis Philippe and the Orleans line.  
It was not change that worried Aberdeen, but its extent.  The first French 
Revolution evoked fear because its goal was the total overhaul of global politics, 
insofar as there was a shared and consistent objective.  The 1830 revolution, on the 
other hand, sought to replace one monarchical House with the second in the state 
and could therefore be interpreted as a relatively ‘safe’ revolution which, by 
pacifying the French populace, arguably stood a greater chance of maintaining 
continental stability. 
Whilst recognition of the 1830 Revolution did represent a departure from 
Aberdeen’s traditional insistence on adherence to the Vienna settlement, 
consciousness of his conservative, Pittite inheritance stayed with Aberdeen 
throughout his career and helped to inform overall policy construction.  Writing to 
James Graham in 1852, when he and many of Aberdeen’s former Peelite colleagues 
had shifted their political allegiance closer to liberalism, Aberdeen wrote to protest 
at the possibility of a Radical-leaning government led by John Russell: 
 
I am not desirous […] of seeing him at the head of a Whig-Radical Government.  
I hope I am not deficient in liberal views whether at home or abroad, but I 
cannot altogether renounce my Conservative character […] I am thoroughly 
convinced of the necessity of a Government of progress, and am prepared to 
advance more rapidly than probably was ever contemplated by Peel himself.  
But this progress must be Conservative in principle […] I was bred at the feet of 
Gamaliel, and must always regard Mr. Pitt as the first of statesmen.205 
 
Despite looking to lead a reforming ministry containing several liberal politicians, 
Aberdeen still could not break away from the conservatism to which he was 
attached, and which his hero Pitt exuded. 
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 Aberdeen came into the 1840s with, and in that decade retained, a 
pragmatic political approach.  It helped to deliver a pacific foreign policy, designed 
in part to contribute to the inexpensive government that Conservative objectives 
required, and conservative taxpayers in Britain preferred.  This produced a largely 
reactive policy, although not one entirely lacking in independent initiatives.  
Although maintaining a flexible outlook and steering clear of decisions made on the 
grounds of abstract ideology, Aberdeen nonetheless saw the world through the 
prism of his own experiences and assumptions.  His mentalité included an open and 
cooperative approach to Europe that led him to utilise his contacts such as Guizot, 
Metternich and the Lievens.  In this we might detect the influence of Pitt and 
Castlereagh, although Aberdeen never inherited the latter’s taste for congresses, 
preferring bilateral diplomacy as a means of circumventing national suspicions and 
rivalry.   
These elements in his mentalité, together with a suspicion of 
interventionism, a tight (but not rigid) adherence to the balance of power, and a 
willingness to work with powers of all political colours, suited Aberdeen to his role 
in Peel’s government, and provided a level of continuity with the Derbyite 
Conservatism to follow.  This approach to foreign policy remained a point of 
connection between most Conservatives in the mid-nineteenth century, despite the 
divisive domestic issue of protectionism.  Indeed, relative harmony on the topic of 
foreign policy was often utilised as a cause around which to rally and attempt to 
reunite the party after the abolition of the Corn Laws caused it to split.206  
The problem this brand of Conservatism created for Aberdeen was the same 
as most other Conservatives before Benjamin Disraeli’s campaigns of the 1870s: a 
lack of populism.  This difficulty derived for the most part from the majority of 
Conservatives’ view that engaging with public opinion, or trying to win the favour of 
the world beyond Westminster, was somewhat debasing and improper.  There 
were notable pre-Disraelian exceptions, not least George Canning, but most 
Conservatives ‘affected to despise public opinion’, and many, including Aberdeen, 
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genuinely did.207  It was seen to represent the crude and ill-informed voice of 
people who felt primal patriotic impulses but could not appreciate the intricacies 
or, often, the basics of policy.  Thomas MacKnight echoed such views when he 
explored the rationale behind Aberdeen’s position: ‘To be popular with the 
politicians of taverns and vestries has never been the ambition of this statesman.  
He has disdained to flatter the national pride; he has never ministered to the vanity 
at the expense of the interests of Englishmen […] He has the proud consciousness 
of […] never having stooped to buy popularity at the price of his self-respect.’208   
Evidence of Aberdeen’s distaste for public opinion is not hard to find: 
writing in 1853 with the Crimean War looming, Aberdeen remarked of the danger 
that support from the Russophobe public might heap on British policy by pushing it 
towards war: ‘In a case of this kind I dread popular support.  On some occasion, 
when the Athenian assembly vehemently applauded Alcibiades, he asked if he had 
said anything particularly foolish!’209  Aberdeen’s position was that chasing public 
favour could be a dangerous game.  Failure to engage with it at all, however, 
created its own problems, especially in the eyes of posterity.   
Palmerston once told Aberdeen that ‘there are sometimes occasions in 
public affairs when the opinions and wishes of the great bulk of the nation are 
strongly directed to some particular object, and on such occasions it may be wise 
and even necessary for men in public life to surrender their own opinions as 
contrary to the public wish, and to yield in some degree at least to a current which 
they are unable to stem.’210  It is unlikely Aberdeen would ever have heeded this 
advice, and it was an approach that would cause Palmerston problems in his career, 
but Aberdeen’s failure at least to make the public familiar with his position or to 
explain his actions allowed others to garner support for their policies at his 
expense.  A. P. Donajgrodzki has pointed out that failure to engage with 
conservative support beyond Westminster was a common problem for members of 
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Peel’s government.211  Engagement with the public was something that Aberdeen’s 
hero Pitt was able to use to establish a mandate for his policies, but it was one 
Pittite trait that Aberdeen would not emulate. 
Liberal means might also be used in foreign policy, but to conservative ends: 
Aberdeen was prepared to recognise revolution in France in 1830 in the name of 
stability, and he based his foreign policy in the 1840s around France – which was 
traditionally a Whig focus – in order to control its ambition and to protect the 
Vienna settlement.  In the 1850s, however, he resisted the clamour for a war by 
which British liberals wished to teach Russia a lesson as much as to preserve the 
Ottoman Empire.  Aberdeen’s willingness to work with different powers, depending 
on how British interests were deemed to be best served, demonstrated an enduring 
pragmatism and ‘continental’ outlook, which was directed towards peace and its 
concomitant benefit, the preservation and expansion of British mercantile 
dominance.  In this approach we can detect the influences of Castlereagh and Pitt 
and an inbuilt humanitarian desire for peace – but not an unqualified pacifism – 
that derived partly from his early experiences of war in Napoleonic Europe.  It was 
with this mindset that, in 1841, Aberdeen returned for his second tenure at the 
Foreign Office.   
 
Aberdeen in the Peel Administration 
 
The conciliatory policy of openness and transparency Aberdeen adopted in 
this period, and his readiness to make concessions in the name of peace, are seen 
by many as weak methods when compared to the perceived strength and 
masculinity of Palmerstonian conduct.  Given that Britain led the world in naval 
capability, and financed its power with trade across its vast Empire and beyond, 
Conservative policy might indeed appear to have been anachronistic and 
retrogressive.  But Conservative policy should not be considered on these 
Palmerstonian terms, for they create an artificial framework for debate.  The 
objectives of Peel’s government and the role of foreign policy in achieving them 
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predetermined an approach to policy that was deliberately different from that of 
Palmerston. 
Foreign affairs were conducted with the security of domestic objectives 
firmly in mind: Peel’s primary concern was to deal with widespread social 
deprivation.  In 1841, wages were at their lowest level since 1815 and one in 
sixteen people received poor relief, whilst levels of unemployment and poor 
working conditions needed addressing.212  This would cost money, of course, which 
was in short supply.  Peel inherited a massive excess of expenditure over revenue 
owing both to a recession and the spending habits of the previous government, the 
profligacy of which was indicated by the ailing condition of many of its members’ 
personal estates.  Britain would still be 787 million pounds in debt in 1845, whilst 
expensive wars in China and Afghanistan added to the blend of fiscal and social 
pressure.213  In the early stages of the Peel government, Aberdeen wrote of these 
considerations, noting that frugality was unlikely to win the Conservatives many 
friends: 
 
The difficulties of the Government will arise from domestick [sic] causes.  The 
enormous deficiency, equal to the whole revenue of many states, must be 
filled up.  This is the only pledge that Peel has given – he is bound, by some 
means or other, to equalize the revenue and the expenditure.  Any attempt to 
do this, and to abandon the disgraceful practice of the last four or five years, 
will be attached with the utmost difficulty, and will at once unite all the Whigs 
against us.214  
 
Palmerston’s international legacy created further problems for Peel’s 
priority of making England ‘a cheap country for living’.215  Although Palmerston 
prevented France from seizing the initiative and dictating affairs in the Eastern 
Crisis of 1839-41, the tactless language used towards a nation that had until 
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recently been an ally caused Anglo-French relations to disintegrate.216  Several 
points of difference with the United States were also left unresolved and, although 
his remark had been taken out of context, the Americans thought Palmerston had 
called their flag a ‘piece of bunting’ in negotiations over the slave trade.217  French 
and American antipathy raised the prospect of another coalition against Britain at a 
time when it could ill-afford a major war, let alone one against two enemies. 
All of this meant that for strategic, but especially for economic reasons, 
foreign policy was, and had to be, the typical Conservative policy discussed above.  
In short, this was a policy that focused upon consolidation and the protection of 
power.  Any risk of war with France and/or the United States could not be afforded 
with operational capacity reduced by wars in the East, and given the necessity for 
capital to be freed for social regeneration and to reduce the national debt.  Peel 
had long since thought that the best way to deal with the ‘natural jealousies and 
antipathies between England and France’ was to initiate a ‘cordial and good 
understanding’ across the English Channel and this became more important than 
ever upon assuming office.218  It was a tactic deployed in diplomatic intercourse 
with other countries, because international entanglements might derail the whole 
purpose of Conservative government.  Foreign affairs were to be kept peaceful to 
prevent this from happening. 
The avoidance of conflict would allow the Conservatives to pursue another 
means of restoring Britain’s financial health: the generation of wealth by the 
creation of new markets and the development of existing ones.  The importance of 
trade and commerce can be seen in the conduct of foreign policy throughout the 
Peel government.  Aberdeen’s pacific response to France’s annexation of Tahiti was 
dependent on French assurances of uninterrupted mercantile intercourse, whilst 
the economic benefits that came with acquisition of the Sandwich Islands were 
seen to offset any temporary disruptions in Tahiti.  The settlement of disputes with 
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America also enabled trade to flourish in the newly stabilised border regions, 
particularly in the Maine-New Brunswick area, where improvements in the timber 
trade showed the benefits of peace.  The balance-book approach to foreign policy 
came naturally to Aberdeen who had already shown aptitude in restoring the 
Haddo Estate to financial health after it had been bequeathed to him by his 
grandfather, the third Earl, in a state of disrepair. 
The pursuit of financial restraint resulted in an open and pacific policy that 
has been condemned by history for a perceived lack of backbone and a vulnerability 
to international manipulation, but this is a verdict conspicuous by its rarity in the 
political world of the 1840s.  The diarist Charles Greville, a shrewd if not always 
disinterested observer, noted that Palmerston’s professed derision ‘all falls dead 
and flat, and nobody takes the slightest interest in his orations’ as the result of a 
‘revival of Conservative influence’ that Peel’s government engendered.219  There 
was vocal support for Conservative foreign policy: it abounded from The Times 
newspaper (although even The Times abandoned the government over the Tahiti 
crisis in 1844).  The paper’s editor John Delane was a close friend of Aberdeen, but 
this did not subvert editorial neutrality, for Delane was also a close friend of 
Palmerston.220  Conservative policy seemed to access a certain Victorian sensibility, 
a restraint that existed alongside Palmerstonism and Cobdenite Radicalism.  To 
exploit such a sensibility was inherently difficult, however, because it was by its 
nature unexcitable.  Failure to capture the public imagination, and failure to 
attempt to do so, created problems in Aberdeen’s future political life and affected 
his historiographical reputation. 
It is important to reconsider perceptions of Lord Aberdeen’s personality, 
because they have also had an impact on the historiography: perceived personal 
traits of weakness, subservience and invertebracy are transposed on to 
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Conservative policy.  This is perhaps inevitable when a policy becomes personally 
identified with an individual.  There are, however, cases when particular incidents 
in politicians’ lives have influenced their historical reputation, which in turn colours 
interpretations of their whole career.  Winston Churchill’s ambivalent political 
record was for a long time lost in the shadow of his success at war, for example, 
until studies such as that of John Charmley in the second half of the twentieth 
century.221  Conversely, being made scapegoat for military failures in the Crimea has 
coloured a character portrait of Aberdeen by which judgments of failure and 
weakness have been applied further back in his career.  Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the work of Kingsley Martin, who deemed Aberdeen’s supposed 
Crimean shortcomings as proof of a ‘pathetic’ political record.222   
A few observations on Aberdeen’s character must therefore be made before 
re-examining his foreign policy towards France 1841-6: orthodox views have 
affected and, perhaps, predetermined judgments on policy.  A common charge 
levelled at Aberdeen is that of lacking political enthusiasm, which results in the view 
that British interests were not pursued as vigorously as they might have been, or 
that they were abandoned altogether.  Norman Gash blamed ‘an absence of zeal 
and ambition’ for political impotence.223  The idea that Aberdeen saw out his tenure 
by sufferance and with a lack of political interest is not entirely without foundation.  
Numerous references can be made that appear to support the theory, such as this 
from Aberdeen’s letter to Lord Beauvale upon taking Office: ‘When you say that I 
am at last in the Foreign Office it would appear that I had long struggled to arrive 
here, but this I believe you may yourself know is very far from the case’.224  When 
he offered his resignation at the height of the defence debate later in his tenure, 
furthermore, Aberdeen bemoaned that ‘office is irksome to me’.225 
Properly contextualising these and other similar comments produces a 
different conclusion: Aberdeen was one of many who expressed a gentlemanly 
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reluctance at the rigours of government, and these were the typical refrains of 
gentlemen in public office.  His Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
Henry Unwin Addington, requested that Aberdeen should ‘take me on trial’ for 
worry that the ‘labours of Office’ were too great.226  Peel, in letters to his wife Julia, 
wrote that ‘my confinement [in Westminster]’ is ‘still more irksome’ and that life in 
the Commons was ‘far too much […] for any human strength’.227  Only three 
months into the Conservative government, Peel wrote that ‘I cannot tell you how 
lonely this is.  I have sat down after dinner of late and written my letters till twelve, 
but I do not much like writing, and still less reading the detestable scrawls that are 
addressed to me.’228   
Neither were such expressions mere requirements of polite discourse, 
because the pressures of foreign affairs also sent men to their graves.  In an era 
when the workload of the Foreign Secretary was practically the entire workload 
generated for London by foreign affairs, the suicide of Viscount Castlereagh and 
early death of Canning were unlikely to have been coincidental.  Expressions of 
reluctance upon taking office were not so much a sign of weakness as of legitimate 
awareness of its difficulties.  Such iterations must also be considered as part of the 
nineteenth-century’s culture of politeness and humility, whereby gracious 
acceptance of honours and the employment of a respectfully submissive form of 
language in correspondence determined a reluctant and humble tone.  Appearing 
overeager was considered to be unseemly. 
Aberdeen’s complaints about workload were almost always clarified with a 
statement of his enthusiasm about the actual conduct of foreign policy: the 
workload was oppressive but he invested all his effort in it.  When Aberdeen wrote 
to his continental confidante Princess Lieven upon taking office, he wrote of his 
‘utmost reluctance’ at becoming Foreign Secretary, but insisted that ‘we have more 
to fear from a bad harvest than from all the thunders of most formidable 
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opposition’.229  Upon leaving office, relief at the release from its ‘torments’ was 
transcended by regret at leaving ‘the management of great affairs, and the 
transaction of business with those whom I personally like and esteem’.  Above all, 
Aberdeen regretted ‘the interruption of that policy’.230  These were not the 
thoughts of an uninterested pacifist and his colleagues agreed with this analysis: 
one wrote that, when out of office, Aberdeen ‘attaches primary importance to our 
Foreign Relations’.231 
Aberdeen’s perceived lack of care for politics has contributed to versions of 
his life that see him as either arrogant and aloof, timid and cowering, or as a hybrid 
of these characteristics, which might be described as awkward pretension.  These 
traits have also coloured perceptions of Aberdonian policy.  Edward Jones Parry saw 
that an ‘excessive confidence’ led to ‘a tendency to underestimate the difficulties of 
the European situation’.232  Douglas Hurd argued that a ‘genuine reluctance in 
office’ evidenced that Aberdeen ‘lacked the necessary harsh grasp of the reality of 
politics’.233  Muriel Chamberlain argued that challenges to his high-held views could 
result in ‘unpleasantly sarcastic’ retorts in the House of Lords, concluding that 
Aberdeen ‘was often at his weakest in the confrontational atmosphere of foreign 
policy.’234  Depending on whose version of events one listens to, these traits were 
influenced by perceived Scottish dourness, by a life beset by personal tragedy, by a 
naïve and anachronistic religious-moral pacifism, or any combination of the three.  
The effects of these personality traits are much overstated. 
Aberdeen did not demonstrate these traits in his relationship with Peel, with 
whom he shared a strong and focused political partnership.  They had worked well 
together before when Aberdeen was Colonial Secretary during Peel’s ‘hundred 
days’, yet it has been suggested that, between 1841 and 1846, his political naivety 
and incapability created extra work for Peel and that his supposedly staunch 
Toryism contrasted with Peel’s more liberal inclinations, proving obstructive to 
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Peel’s policy.  The very nature and object of Peel’s government suggested that this 
was not the case for Aberdeen.  From a combination of preoccupation with 
domestic affairs and trust in his Foreign Secretary, Peel left the final foreign policy 
decisions to Aberdeen, offering his opinions only in the context of debate.  There 
are numerous points at which Peel’s deference to his Foreign Secretary’s judgment 
is clear, none more so than in the Tahiti crisis where Aberdeen carried his policy 
despite standing almost alone in his approach.  Towards the end of the Peel 
government, Charles Greville summarised this symbiotic and mutually respectful 
relationship as follows: ‘[Peel]’s forte is not in dealing with foreign affairs, with 
which it seems that it is dangerous for anybody to meddle who is not in the trade.  
The division of labour seems as essential in politics as in matters of commerce and 
industry.’235  That Peel rarely mentioned foreign affairs in his Cabinet reports to the 
Crown indicated the success of this arrangement – his attentions were focused 
elsewhere – and of Aberdeen’s conduct within it.236 
The staff at the Foreign Office provided the necessary support for the 
Foreign Secretary.  Aberdeen selected both the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 
Charles Canning, Viscount Kilbrahan (1841-1845) and the Permanent Under-
Secretary Henry Unwin Addington (1842-1854).237  Addington was a committed 
Party loyalist, whilst Canning had been elected as Conservative MP for Warwick in 
1836 (he later became the governor-general of India in 1856).  The role of the wider 
Foreign Office in the 1840s was largely administrative, and Addington and Canning’s 
Conservative loyalties ensured that there would be no subversive mutterings from 
below.238  Donald Cameron Watt and Zara Steiner have shown how an expanded 
Foreign Office had, by the twentieth-century, resulted in the increasing influence of 
a greater network of individuals and institutions.239  During Aberdeen’s second 
tenure as Foreign Secretary, however, foreign policy direction was very much his 
own, especially given the relationship with Peel. 
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Aberdeen had not exercised the same freedom or influence in the Duke of 
Wellington’s government by virtue of his deference and the Duke’s domineering 
style, both largely the result of Wellington’s enormous influence at that time.  
Wellington was part of the Peel government but Aberdeen no longer felt compelled 
to defer to his opinion.  This was, of course, partly due to the fact that the Duke was 
no longer his Prime Minister; Wellington was from autumn 1842 Commander-in-
Chief of the army after Lord Hill retired.  That he had also initially been appointed to 
the Cabinet in September 1841 as a minister without portfolio demonstrated the 
regard in which he was still held.  It has been argued that this regard was such that 
Aberdeen allowed the Duke to dictate policy, particularly in the argument over 
levels of defensive fortification 1844-5.240  This view must be challenged.  In Peel’s 
own words, despite respect for Wellington’s opinions, the Duke ‘refrains from 
meddling with matters with which he has no concern, and over which he has no 
control.’241  When the Duke did intervene, as in the defence debate, it was the 
Aberdonian policy of moderate fortifications that prevailed over Wellington’s desire 
for extended measures. 
Freed from the dominance of Wellington, and considered separately from 
the stain of the Crimean War and the distorting lens of Palmerston’s liberal John 
Bullism, Aberdeen’s policy can be seen to have delivered Conservative 
governmental objectives and maintained Britain’s international position.  Although 
an age of austerity and initial international discord rendered concessions a 
necessary requirement for peace and improved relations, economic influence could 
be nurtured and honour could still be upheld.  Friendly diplomacy, if used carefully 
and with a readiness to recourse to the latter option if the former failed, could be 
just as powerful as gunboat diplomacy.  This would be clear in the principal areas of 
Aberdeen’s stewardship: in relations with France, Russia, and the United States. 
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Chapter Three: Anglo-French Relations 
 
The Conservatives’ greatest foreign policy challenge was to keep relations 
with France quiescent, to which end the Anglo-French entente was created.  The 
nature of this arrangement needs to be re-examined in the context of Conservative 
governmental objectives.  Kenneth Bourne regarded the entente as a ‘hopeless 
dream’ because Aberdeen had failed to create the binding agreement achieved by 
Palmerston’s Quadruple Alliance of 1834.242  This had been directed against the 
Holy Alliance, however, with whom relations were now on a better footing and, 
besides, the fallout from the Eastern Crisis made any sort of official alliance with 
France all but impossible had Aberdeen wanted it, which he did not.  Aberdeen 
privately declared that ‘I have never been a lover of what was called the French 
Alliance, which always appeared to me to be an offensive display of exclusive 
connection’ (his friendships with Metternich and the Tsar of Russia were likely to 
have reinforced this view).243  The result was a much looser yet equally binding 
arrangement that historians have interpreted as ‘fragile’ and a ‘failure’ for its 
perceived weakness.244  Some accounts of the period go further and suggest 
outright hostility between the two nations.245 
Aberdeen’s entente was not constructed with a common enemy in mind, as 
Palmerston’s had been directed against the Holy Alliance and as that in the first 
decade of the twentieth-century would be formed to counter German 
expansionism.  Aberdeen’s entente was supposed to contain an escalating state of 
tension with an erstwhile ally, without being directed at a third party.  This 
necessitated a more pragmatic approach with limited expectations because the 
threat of a third party could not be used to keep Britain and France together.  The 
cordial understanding between Aberdeen and Guizot, therefore, involved mutual 
acceptance that, despite inevitable disagreements between their respective 
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governments, or, indeed, between themselves, war must not result.  The entente 
was designed to be pragmatic and realistic in reflection of Aberdeen’s style, and 
was never intended as a rosy all-encompassing amalgamation of policy or outlook.  
It was a business-like arrangement and nothing more.  
Aberdeen spoke of the entente in the House of Lords, February 1844: ‘This 
good understanding was not founded upon any specific agreement or alliance, but 
upon a belief that the essential interests of the two countries are involved, and it 
depends upon a mutual trust in the honour and integrity of the two governments of 
England and France.’246  The point of foundation to which he referred was a grand 
meeting of the British and French Courts and leading politicians at the Chateau d’Eu 
near Normandy in September 1843.  It was the first time a British monarch had set 
foot on French soil since Henry VIII at the Field of the Cloth of Gold in 1520.  The 
return visit by Louis Philippe in 1844 would be the first time a French monarch set 
foot on British soil since Jean II was taken prisoner after the Battle of Poitiers in 
1356.   
Shortly after this visit the term ‘entente cordiale’ entered usage.  Queen 
Victoria spoke of the results of the meeting at the opening of Parliament the 
following year, referring to ‘my friendly relations with the King of the French, and 
the good understanding happily established between my government and that of 
His Majesty.’247  This comment, being made in the public domain, omitted the 
underlying suspicion and wariness with which the British Court still viewed France 
after the meeting at Eu.  When the Duc de Bordeaux visited England the following 
month, for example, Prince Albert captured the monarchy’s views when, in private, 
he declared the entente ‘a got-up thing for various political intrigues.’248  
These suspicions were shared by Aberdeen, who only ever proclaimed the 
entente to be a beacon of cross-Channel brotherhood in the public domain, where 
the sentiment was intended for Gallic consumption.  In private his desire for 
consensus with the French was expressed alongside wariness and backed up by 
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contingency planning.  Over Morocco, for example, Aberdeen sent warships to 
Gibraltar in case the faith he had publicly invested in France proved to be 
misguided.  In Morocco, during the Oregon crisis with the United States, and 
elsewhere, he showed himself prepared to use force if British interests, especially 
trade and/or honour, appeared threatened.249     
In fact, Aberdeen knew that an entente between the mutually suspicious 
and sometimes hostile governments of England and France was impracticable, so 
the ‘mutual trust’ of which he spoke in parliament referred to that between himself 
and François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, the French foreign minister between 1840 
and 1848.  The two scholars shared a long history of friendly political and social 
intercourse and each showered the other with praise at Eu.  Aberdeen wrote of the 
visit being most ‘favourably received’ whilst Guizot wrote to Aberdeen, ‘Vous et 
moi, nous sommes bien necessaires l’un à autre; sans vous je puis empêcher du mal; 
ce n’est qu’avec vous ques je puis faire du bien.’250   
There were other similarities that helped to engender a close and 
productive relationship.  Aberdeen’s private tragedies were mirrored in the life of 
Guizot, who by age thirty-three had lost two wives, Pauline de Meulan and Élise 
Dillon.  Guizot was regarded in France as oversensitive for his public mourning of 
Meulan, as Aberdeen had been when his first wife died.  Whilst there was a popular 
perception of Aberdeen being ‘un-English’, the French populace largely thought of 
Guizot as ‘un-French’ for his policy of cooperation with England.251  Indeed, in 
earlier life the French minister was lambasted by his friends for being ‘too German’ 
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as a result of his fascination with German literature.252  Aberdeen’s philosophy in 
foreign policy was shared by Guizot.  Both men’s predecessors had whipped up 
popular feeling to garner support for their nationalist Eastern policies and this 
confrontational atmosphere lingered on alongside traditional rivalry.  That 
Aberdeen’s and Guizot’s methods of dealing with this atmosphere were regarded 
by their respective publics as being too desirous of pleasing the other suggests that 
the entente was relatively balanced. 
Aberdeen could afford to place his entente and the success of his policy 
towards France partially in the trust of Guizot because circumstances in France gave 
him some leeway to do so.  The continuation of Louis Philippe’s reign depended 
upon keeping the domestic forces of revived expansionist nationalism and 
restrained conservative consolidation in equilibrium, which on the international 
scene meant that the entente had to remain in operation.  Expansionist nationalism 
required the destabilisation of established regimes but it did not make sense to 
encourage this phenomenon too keenly, as to do so would undermine Louis 
Philippe’s endorsement of legitimacy, which was essential to the credibility and 
survival of the still young Orleanist monarchy in that most unstable of countries.253  
This dynamic was one of the reasons why the King replaced Adolphe Thiers at the 
height of the second Mehmet Ali crisis, but reduced the popular outcry against 
Thiers’ removal by carrying it out whilst the French public were distracted by the 
royal assassination attempt of Marius Darmѐs.  France could not afford to be seen 
as too confrontational in an international context without risking isolation but, 
domestically, accusations of subservience to foreign powers would also be 
damaging.   
Conversely, if nationalist impulses were ignored, the Orleanists would be 
vulnerable: French ambition would occasionally require some concession to ease 
the build-up of nationalist pressure.  Aberdeen summarised Louis Philippe’s 
position as follows: ‘The vigorous hand and sagacious mind of the present sovereign 
of France have undoubtedly hitherto controlled and kept under the competing 
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passions of his own subjects.’254  This was an opinion shared by Henry Wellesley, 
first Baron Cowley (British ambassador to France from 1841 to 1846) and Peel.  
Competing French domestic interests provided something of a safety net for 
Aberdeen’s faith in Guizot, who would likely go the same way as Thiers if he tried to 
upset the balance.  Aware of this possibility and of electoral danger for Guizot, 
Aberdeen held talks with likely successors Molé and Thiers to insure against his 
fall.255    
One cannot always place trust in the logical transaction of international 
affairs, however, and the check that Louis Philippe placed on Guizot’s actions was in 
turn supported by a privately expressed watchfulness that Aberdeen 
communicated to his French counterpart.  Writing to the indiscreet Princess Lieven, 
whom Aberdeen knew was sharing her bed and her secrets with Guizot, he wrote of 
that minister that ‘even of him, we cannot feel perfectly certain.’256  Additional 
warning was given of the danger of France’s ‘most offensive and insolent 
pretensions.’257  He knew these remarks would reach their target via the Princess, 
and they were honest expressions of his private sentiments.  To Peel, Aberdeen 
doubted that Guizot was ‘consistent with the pacific policy that he professes’.258  
Aberdeen’s public professions of goodwill and trust should not be taken as 
evidence of a blinkered policy of conciliation.  Wary remarks were sometimes made 
on the international stage, which reminded Guizot that the well of personal faith 
could quickly be emptied. 
It remains that Aberdeen might be seen to have relied too heavily on his 
personal contact with Guizot and that this would create difficulty for their 
successors, who would not be included in this personal arrangement.  Lucille 
Iremonger certainly held this view.259  The argument gains particular momentum 
with reference to Guizot’s conclusion of the Spanish marriages question soon after 
Aberdeen had left office, in ostensible breach of the personal guarantee made 
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between the two men.260  In the climate of heightened and almost universal 
hostility that developed after tension in the East, however, it is hard to see what 
arrangement could have made between England and France after 1841, other than 
a personal entente.  Even Lady Palmerston, one of Aberdeen’s chief critics, 
suggested that Guizot was essential to the hopes of cross-Channel and European 
peace, as wider cooperation was impossible.261  Henry Bulwer, with whom 
Aberdeen would later clash over the Spanish Marriages issue, wrote from Paris that 
the relationship between Aberdeen and Guizot ‘would re-establish the moral 
influence of France on the continent, an influence compromised by perpetual 
changes of late years’: the personal entente was to be a source of consistency and 
stability in a turbulent political climate.262   
Aside from the intricacies of the Spanish marriages issue, to which this study 
will return, even Palmerston took a similar view of Anglo-French relations: 
 
I think it of the utmost importance for the interests of England and France that 
the men who govern each country should be well disposed towards the other.  
Each of the two countries has of course its own interests, and its own line of 
policy, and it must sometimes happen that the views of the two governments 
will diverge; but it is very desirable that when this happens the conflict of 
national interests should have its severity mitigated by the personal good will 
of the two governments.263 
 
Palmerston continued the letter with numerous references to ‘Thiers and I’, 
which indicated that his vision of intergovernmental cooperation was also one in 
which Anglo-French accord was garnered by a personal duopoly.  Writing in 1844 at 
the height of the Tahiti crisis, Palmerston hypothesised about replacing Aberdeen, 
but the leadership style that he advocated was exactly the same as that of his rival.  
Both he and Aberdeen recognised that a personal entente was the most 
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appropriate form for a relationship between Britain and France, although 
Palmerston’s dealings with his French counterpart were unlikely to have been 
based upon the candid and balanced terms Aberdeen and Guizot practised. 
The main tests of Anglo-French relations came in Spain, Greece, Tahiti and 
Morocco, and over a pamphlet written by Louis Philippe’s son, the Prince de 
Joinville, which catalysed the debate on the state of British defensive fortifications.  
The possibility of a customs union between France and Belgium caused some 
additional consternation early in the government as concern spread that Franco-
Belgian economic ties might be followed by political assimilation.264  Little effort 
was required to pour cold water on this possibility.265  Diplomacy relating to the 
slave trade also generated a degree of friction although this has been dealt with 
thoroughly in the extant historiography.266   
The issue of the Spanish marriages ran throughout the Peel government and 
has attracted the greatest volume of claims that the entente was, in David Brown’s 
recent assessment, ‘a notion, a myth’, that underlined weak Conservative foreign 
policy under Aberdeen.267  Muriel Chamberlain dealt with the issue in a chapter 
entitled ‘The Collapse of the Entente’.268  Given that the issue has not been dealt 
with in depth since the study of Jones Parry in 1936 and that it was the most 
complicated and important area of Anglo-French contention, it will be addressed in 
a separate chapter.  By consideration of Aberdeen’s entente in the contexts 
outlined above, this chapter will question orthodox views that it ‘collapsed’ in 
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Greece, was ‘never strong’ in Tahiti and obtained terminal damage in the fallout 
from the Moroccan episode.269 
Greek affairs had long been a source of tension between the great powers 
and they continued to be so during Peel’s government.  King Otho’s reign over 
Greece had by 1841 led to widespread discontent among his people, who were 
demanding a constitution to rein in the excesses of his absolute rule.  Domestic 
interest in the nature of government in Greece was matched by that of Britain, 
France and Russia, who were the guarantors of Otho’s monarchy.  Each power 
wanted to ensure that their fiscal investment was rewarded with the security of 
their interests in the region.270 
Aberdeen’s approach to Greek affairs in his second tenure showed little sign 
of being in favour of either the Greek cause or their Ottoman overlords.271  Greek 
expansionism threatened the stability of the Ottoman Empire, which Aberdeen 
disliked for its Islamism, perceived barbarity towards its constituent peoples, and 
political lethargy, but regarded as essential for holding together an unstable region 
in which there were no other stable alternatives.  The dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire would create a morass of competing local and great power interests that 
would threaten British India and almost certainly bring war.  The best option for 
Britain and European stability, although not beneficial to romantic liberal 
aspirations for the emerging Greek constitutional project (and leading to the 
disfavour of Whiggish history), was to maintain the status quo.  Aberdeen 
accordingly instructed Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Britain’s minister at Athens 
(1835-1849): ‘Any indication […] of an intention to interfere in the affairs of the 
Turkish Empire […] would at once be firmly and peremptorily repressed.’272 
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At the outset of the Peel government, there existed relative Anglo-French 
harmony over Greece.  Aberdeen wrote to Lyons that ‘we desire to establish no 
British influence’ at French expense, whilst Guizot recalled that he saw Aberdeen as 
‘a perfect intelligence with whom it appeared to me, from day to day, more 
necessary and more practicable’ to cooperate, adding that we ‘should put an end to 
those blind jealousies, those puerile rivalries, those contests on the most trifling 
points, and all that tumult below which falsifies and paralyses sound policy 
above.’273   
The threat to this accord escalated when King Otho’s absolutism collapsed in 
September 1843 and negotiations over the organisation of constitutional monarchy 
began.  Britain and France had, with Russia, been the sponsors of the new Greek 
state in 1830 and were therefore central to negotiations.  When there emerged 
‘English’, ‘French’ and ‘Russian’ parties in Greek politics, led respectively by 
Alexander Mavrocordato, Jean Coletti and General Metaxa, old Anglo-French 
antipathies rose to the surface in pursuit of influence, and seemingly undermined 
Aberdeen’s optimistic proclamation that ‘I hope the Greek affair will turn out well, 
of which there is every appearance at present.’274  David McLean, who published a 
detailed article on Greek affairs, suggested that cooperation ended and the entente 
collapsed.275  Close analysis suggests otherwise. 
The main problem for Anglo-French relations was the dynamic of the 
relationship between Lyons and the French minister in Athens, Théobald Piscatory.  
The tensions between them led to volatile Anglo-French relations in Greece itself, 
but Aberdeen’s method of dealing with Lyons helped the broader entente to 
function.  Palmerston had set the tone for popular perceptions of Lyons’ clashes 
with Piscatory in his letter to John Easthope late in 1841, which was a line the 
Morning Chronicle followed thereafter: ‘while I was in office, I always found Sir 
Edmund Lyons borne out in his opinions and suspicions by facts; and however fair 
the language of the French Gov[ernmen]t always was, about Greek affairs, their 
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agents in Greece, whoever they were…went on intriguing all the same.’276  Of 
Piscatory this was true, but it was also true of Lyons.  Upon Aberdeen’s taking 
office, Prussia and Austria had requested Lyons’ removal, which France and Russia 
said they would see ‘with pleasure’.277  Aberdeen would not countenance such a 
move, presumably because it would suggest Britain’s future pliability.  Besides, a 
strong local advocate of British influence could be an asset. 
There was nonetheless substance to international grievances.  Lyons was a 
man of Palmerstonian composition and allegiance, who had commanded a frigate 
in support of the Greeks in the war of independence and captained the 
Madagascar when it carried King Otho to his throne in 1833.  His experience 
combined with a fiery and proud personality to make him highly sensitive to 
challenges to his perceived influence and to the perceived popular will of the 
Greeks as to who should lead them.  A strong local advocate of British influence of 
this kind could inspire, rather than deter, foreign ambition.   
Of this the Conservatives were well aware and Aberdeen repeatedly warned 
against interference in Greek politics.  In response to foreign overtures for Lyons’ 
dismissal he stressed that this would not happen but wrote to Lyons that ‘I am sure 
you will see the necessity of great caution and circumspection in your conduct’ and 
later reiterated that ‘whatever may be the faults of Otho or his Government, you 
are at Athens as the Minister of a friendly state […] you ought to do your best to 
prove this.’278  Repeated warnings were received from Aberdeen and from Stratford 
Canning in Constantinople that cautioned against fomenting trouble in Greece, 
when Hellenic discontent was already being directed against Turkey, where stability 
was essential to British interests.279  
Aberdeen dealt with Lyons by maintaining these private warnings alongside 
confidential expressions of his attitude to France.  As early as January 1842, 
Aberdeen wrote to Lyons: ‘such is their inveterate trickery, that we must always 
keep a sharp eye upon them; but it is just possible that they may be sincere in their 
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professions; and I should be unwilling to believe that M. Guizot is decidedly the 
reverse.’280  Aberdeen was aware of French intrigue and that Lyons had a watchful 
role to play, but the crux of British policy was that relative influence in Greece did 
not really matter if Britain’s geopolitical interest in stable Greco-Ottoman borders 
and relations was maintained, and if British trade continued uninterrupted, as 
Aberdeen explained: 
 
I care very little for what is called French influence in Greece.  It may be 
personally annoying to you to see a French Minister leave you in the 
background, but these are trifles and depend upon it, England is certain always 
to have influence enough in that country, without mixing ourselves up with 
the wretched squabbles which occupy the Court and People of Athens.281    
 
Aware that serious intrigue could well destabilise Greece to such an extent 
that British interests would come under threat, Aberdeen made careful use of 
Lyons’ raw patriotism in the international arena.  Whilst extolling the virtues of the 
entente with genuine intent, Aberdeen ensured that France thought Lyons had full 
British support, writing to Cowley of the ‘approval of Her Majesty’s Government for 
the whole of Sir Edmund Lyons’ proceedings since the Revolution.’282  Lyons also 
received praise in official diplomatic intercourse (as opposed to the private letters 
that would not be published in the diplomatic ‘blue books’): ‘Her Majesty’s 
Government have highly approved of your own conduct throughout the whole of 
the trying circumstances in which you have been placed since the outbreak of the 
popular feeling […] I have great pleasure in here conveying to you the expression of 
their satisfaction.’283  This approach ensured that Guizot was aware that British 
belief in the entente did not give him a free hand, while allowing Aberdeen to try 
and restrain both French ambition and Lyons’ interference. 
Aberdeen’s job became rather more difficult when Mavrocordato came to 
power in April 1844, although this was not initially a problem.  To begin with, 
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matters seemed to improve.  Lyons reported that Mavrocordato, despite leading 
the ‘English’ party, had acted in concert with Piscatory to try and persuade Coletti 
into a power sharing arrangement.284  Optimistically, he added that Piscatory ‘has 
proved that his Government desires not exclusive influence, or the advancement of 
this or that Partisan, but that it seeks only the welfare of the community at large 
and the consolidation of the Constitutional Monarchy.’285  This corresponded with 
Guizot’s earlier insistence that Piscatory ‘persistez à subordonner les intérêts de 
rivalité à l’intérêt d’entente’ and seemed to verify his later claim that France’s only 
object in Greece was stability.286   
Problems began when Coletti began conspiring with Metaxa to bring about 
Mavrocordato’s overthrow, a plan that Lyons identified late in May.  He spoke of 
Coletti conducting himself in ‘the most violent manner’ but clarified that Aberdeen 
‘may rest assured that there shall be no bounds to my endeavours to preserve a 
cordial understanding with [Piscatory]’.287  The situation began to change late in 
July with Piscatory now seemingly complicit in Coletti’s plan.  Lyons fumed that 
‘Frenchmen have more vanity and less moral courage’, adding that ‘I did not 
conceal my opinion’, and wrote of being ‘shocked’ when Piscatory sent Coletti to 
King Otho in his official carriage upon his assumption of power in August.288  
Evidence of the entente seemed thin and even the sympathetic Muriel Chamberlain 
suggests that it had long since broken down in Greece.289 
Despite passions running high on the ground, however, the entente 
remained in operation and secured British objectives without sacrificing honour: 
the only damage done was that to Lyons’ pride.  He took umbrage at Aberdeen 
having visited Piscatory’s country house during the crisis, and may well have made a 
connection between this visit and Aberdeen’s conclusion that ‘I do not think 
[Piscatory] guilty’, especially given Aberdeen’s dismissive admonition of Lyons’ 
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activities: ‘you will give your advice whenever it is asked, and then only.’290  As far 
as immediate Greek affairs were concerned, however, Piscatory’s possible 
involvement in events (the veracity of which is difficult to determine from the 
available sources) was not important, as Aberdeen had often outlined.  The Foreign 
Secretary recognised that Mavrocordato had been an unwilling leader and he 
communicated this to Lyons.291  Indeed, Mavrocordato said as much himself, and 
had looked to Coletti then Metaxa to reduce his responsibilities.292   
Mavrocordato’s reluctance to lead Greece suggested that the strong-willed 
Coletti represented the most stable option at that time, especially given the 
influence that the leader of the ‘Russian’ party General Metaxa held in that 
government.  Despite Russian championship of Orthodox Christendom, coreligionist 
sympathies did not supersede geopolitical practicalities, which for now meant the 
maintenance of the weak and pliable yet relatively stable Ottoman state on Russia’s 
southwestern border.  The Russian response to the French-sponsored Mehmet Ali’s 
encroachments on Ottoman territory had given a clear indication of its likely 
response to a French-sponsored Greece: Ottoman territorial integrity, if not full 
political autonomy, was to be protected.  Metaxa, therefore, provided something of 
a guarantee against potential Greek nationalist expansionism. 
The subsequent power struggle in Greek politics and the oppressive 
measures employed by Coletti to hold on to his position by summer 1845 caused 
Lyons to report that ‘anarchy is making fearful progress’ and to question the safety 
of British citizens in Greece.293  Peel lamented Guizot’s ‘self-laudation for the 
ascendancy of French influence’ and was angered that, in diplomatic intercourse 
                                                          
290
 Lyons to Aberdeen, 9 and 16 October 1844 (copies), Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43136/288 
and 292. 
291
 Aberdeen to Lyons, 11 November 1844, Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43137/15.  Other similar 
sentiments were sent to Lyons: see, for example, Backhouse to Lyons, 13 May 1841, The Lyons 
Papers, WSRO, LE 85/J (not foliated). 
292
 See, for example, Mavrocordato to Guizot, 30 April 1844, McLean, ‘The Greek Revolution’, p. 124: 
‘J’ai vu le moment ou une victime nécessaire pour le pays’.  Translation: ‘I saw the time when a victim 
was necessary for the state.’  Lyons dismissed Piscatory’s claim that Mavrocordato had consulted 
Metaxa about a power sharing arrangement, but given that he had already consulted Coletti to the 
same intended end, there is little reason to doubt that claim: there was no dishonour in accepting 
the French view.  See Lyons to Aberdeen, 21 August 1844 (copy), Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 
43136/242.  
293
 Lyons to Aberdeen, 22 June 1845, Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43137/165. 
86 
 
with Austria, Louis Philippe had apparently disclaimed Anglo-French cooperation.294  
Nevertheless, the Conservative leadership remained united.  Aberdeen ‘began to 
feel powerless to control such a situation indefinitely’ but both he and Peel 
recognised that reports from Lyons were increasingly unreliable, whilst Guizot and 
Louis Philippe could say what they wished as long as they acted in accordance with 
the entente.295  Guizot had stretched the spirit of the entente with a tactless 
speech, which was made to court the viciously Anglophobe French Chambers, but 
this was a rare break from moderation at a time of electoral necessity. 
Coletti was in fact revealing himself to be an uncompromising and tyrannical 
patriot who needed no encouragement from Piscatory or Guizot.  While Guizot 
might claim involvement for electoral benefit, he remained genuinely fearful of 
expansionist nationalism.  In a speech outlining this fear and his belief in the 
protection of the balance of power – ‘cette question se pose dans le monde entier’ – 
the historian should find meaning and significance, for his belief in international 
cooperation and stability was propounded before, during and after his political life 
in a plethora of historical works.296  Aberdeen shared this philosophy and 
responded to Lyons’ panicked letters on the developing problems in Greece as 
follows: 
 
I will take good care that justice shall be done to British subjects wherever 
their rights or interests are concerned.  I defy [the French] to destroy, or to 
weaken the only influence which is worth possessing.  Whether you possess 
the ear of the Minister, or not, is a matter of very little importance, but the 
superior probity, enterprise and wealth of British merchants will always ensure 
the preservation of British influence.297    
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Aberdeen did not believe that Guizot was involved in Greek affairs – conduct 
elsewhere seemed to validate this view – and retained the opinion that other 
countries’ affairs were their own concern so long as British objectives were secure.  
Influence would be a costly commodity and troublesome to manage or measure the 
support for in the cauldron of Greek politics, something with which Palmerston 
seemed to agree: ‘in time of peace, we can look for no political influence except 
that which is beneficial to those over whom it is exerted.’298    
The above extended extract nonetheless revealed a marked difference 
between Aberdeen and Palmerston’s approaches to foreign policy.  Because of 
Britain’s economic superiority, Aberdeen did not think that it needed to throw its 
weight around and was thus content to remain detached from local squabbles.  
Palmerston was more inclined to see foreign policy as a means by which to extend 
British influence by diminishing that of another power, or by which to boost 
perceptions of British power by the vociferous defence of national values and 
national pride.  Earlier generations of historians might have been content to suggest 
that Palmerston and Aberdeen were different because the former employed what 
was deemed a masculine approach, whilst Aberdeen’s passivity was portrayed as 
effete.299  This conclusion was, of course, simplistic, and does little to illuminate the 
reasoning behind either man’s policy making.  The difference between Aberdeen 
and Palmerston was much more subtle.  It was based around their rational, yet 
divergent interpretations of how best to ensure Britain’s international supremacy. 
Despite Greece’s geopolitical importance, events in Tahiti excited English 
and French popular patriotism far more, because it was annexed by French Admiral 
Dupetit Thouars on 1 November 1843.  Many historians have used the annexation 
of an island with a history of British missionary influence to prove the weakness or 
non-existence of the entente, Guizot’s sleight of hand, Aberdeen’s subservience 
and, therefore, the weakness of Conservative foreign policy.300  Seemingly at odds 
with Palmerston, public opinion, and the British press, Aberdeen cuts an isolated 
figure in the historiography by virtue of his apparent inertia during the Tahitian 
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crisis, especially given his concurrent tolerance of Gallic encroachment upon 
Morocco.  The Press was especially scathing of this policy.  The Morning Chronicle 
summarised Aberdeen’s Tahitian policy as follows: ‘As for us Englishmen, if its 
infantine simplicity and absurdity did not force us to laugh, it would certainly make 
us weep with humiliation and shame.’301  Palmerston wrote to the Morning 
Chronicle’s editor in the aftermath of the crisis, claiming that ‘Guizot knew what 
sort of men the Cabinet were but he misjudged the British nation.’302 
Palmerston’s public criticism of the Conservatives’ tolerance of the French 
annexation centred around the accusations of a lack of interest in foreign affairs, 
fear of intervention, and truckling to France: ‘Let them do as they will, and act as 
they please, indifferent to things going on abroad – let them condemn as they 
would what they called a “meddling policy” and allow foreign nations to do what 
they pleased.’303  This line of argument was politically and electorally useful, 
creating an artificial difference with Aberdeen that could be used to court popular 
patriotism and attempt to bring down Peel’s government.  In office, Palmerston’s 
own policy had been rather less robust than his rhetoric might have suggested.  
French agents had attempted to annex Tahiti during Palmerston’s tenure at the 
Foreign Office, but British Consul George Pritchard’s letters pleading for help had 
received short shrift from Palmerston: ‘the Government of this country would not 
have any right to give or to withhold their sanction to the residence of the subjects 
of any other nation in territories which do not appertain to Great Britain.’304   
Beyond this basic legal assessment, Palmerston outlined strategic 
opposition to the protection of Tahiti: ‘considering the great extent of the present 
dominions of the British Crown in the Southern Ocean […] it would be impossible 
for her to fulfil […] any defensive obligations.’305  That Palmerston left Pritchard to 
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pay off French menaces out of his own pocket suggests a pragmatism not dissimilar 
to Aberdeen’s.  
  Historians have also pointed to the Tahitian crisis as either proof of a 
continuing paternalism in Peel’s relationship with Aberdeen or as the opening of a 
divide between the two, which further undermined the Foreign Secretary’s 
position.306  Peel’s description of the annexation of Tahiti as a ‘gross outrage’ is 
often used as evidence of the distance between Peel and an excessively tolerant 
Aberdeen.307  Greville reproduced the phrase in his own analysis of affairs, as have 
many historians.308  In the same speech in which Peel spoke of a ‘gross outrage’, 
however, he echoed Aberdeen’s temperate observation that the protectorate over 
Tahiti had been declared without French governmental backing.309  He had also 
previously stated that Pritchard had aggravated and exaggerated Tahitian disquiet 
by acting above beyond his authority: Peel’s was not a position of knee-jerk 
indignation at French proceedings.310  Peel might use a more forthright language 
and tone in the public domain – he needed to satisfy the more hostile House of 
Commons, just as Palmerston did – but this did not represent a breach of his 
relationship with Aberdeen. 
Peel was nevertheless concerned.  In August 1844, in the context of 
Pritchard’s treatment and Guizot’s evasiveness, Peel contrasted the two nations’ 
positions: ‘what would the French Ministry and the French Press, and the French 
public have thought of such a proceeding on our part?’311  Guizot’s intimation that 
he was having difficulty persuading the French Chambers to accept the idea of 
reparations prompted Peel to write that ‘I do not attach the slightest weight to his 
word’, which added resonance to his earlier comment that ‘[Guizot] has himself 
alone to blame for what has occurred.’312  Aberdeen’s language was more 
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measured: upon receiving a note from Guizot about French intentions in Tahiti, 
Aberdeen wrote to Peel that ‘we must wait to see what Guizot will really venture to 
do.’313  Both retained suspicions of French action but Aberdeen kept expressions of 
this out of the public domain in order to encourage enthusiasm for the entente.  
Peel, of course, as his August letter had suggested, had to take greater account of 
public opinion. 
Aberdeen’s discretion should not be confused with passivity or a lack of 
interest, as it is clear from analysis of his policy and of the entente, when this 
analysis is conducted without reference to a mythical tension between Peel and 
Aberdeen, or to Palmerston’s framing of the debate.  A basic consideration has 
been lost in layers of historiographical criticism: Conservative policy in Tahiti helped 
to avoid a war for which sections of the public clamoured, but circumstances 
rendered ridiculous.  Aberdeen had no legal basis on which to oppose a peaceful 
missionary presence on the island.  In office, Palmerston had been no more 
supportive of Pritchard or Tahitian Queen Pomare than was Aberdeen.  He had 
twice refused Pomare’s requests for official protectorship from Catholic missions on 
legal grounds, and confirmed his position by ignoring those of Pritchard’s letters 
that complained of new missions.314  When Pritchard complained of Catholic 
France’s possible annexation of the island, in letters noted above, Palmerston told 
him that Britain could make no objection.  Aberdeen took the same line when 
Dupetit Thouars turned the hypothetical problem into reality, and Peel ultimately 
agreed with his Foreign Secretary’s position: the Tahiti crisis was not worth war. 
It is thought by those historians who determine the French annexation of 
Tahiti (and Aberdeen’s tolerance of it) a ‘gross outrage’ that much of the ground for 
objection to it involves the mistreatment of Pritchard.  The imprisonment of a 
British Consul for resistance to the French annexation was indeed a significant 
breach of international protocol and it was accompanied by an impetuous 
statement from Dupetit Thouars on 3 March 1844, reproduced in Pritchard’s 
memoirs: 
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A French sentinel was attacked on the night of 2nd March.  In reprisal I have 
caused to be seized one Pritchard, the only daily mover and instigator of the 
disturbance of the natives.  His property shall be answerable for all damages 
occasioned to our Establishments by the insurgents, and if French blood is 
spilt, every drop shall fall back on his head.315  
 
The French refused to apologise for Pritchard’s imprisonment, although they 
later did so for his ill-treatment whilst in prison, and Guizot argued that the French 
would have been justified in arresting Pritchard as soon as Dupetit Thouars had 
declared the protectorate in August 1843, because he refused to give up his 
consulship.316  This was clearly disingenuous, as Guizot knew that Pritchard could 
not give up his post without ministerial sanction, which would take months to 
arrive.317 
Aberdeen shared the public’s distaste for Pritchard’s treatment: ‘it is 
impossible that H. M. Gov[ernmen]t should concur in the justice of the French 
Admiral’s proceedings.’318  It was true that the French annexation had taken place 
by means of transparent intriguing.  The foundations for the annexation had been 
laid during Pritchard and Pomare’s absence from the island in September 1842, 
presumably to circumvent protest, when a declaration of desire for French 
protection was signed by Pomare’s chiefs.  French historians have described the 
declaration as evidence of a deep Tahitian desire to be rid of Pritchard, but this is 
doubtful: Charlotte Haldane has shown how it was clear that the French wrote the 
document and made the Tahitians sign it.319    
Nevertheless, Pritchard’s own role and behaviour were ambiguous, as 
Aberdeen recognised.  He wrote of ‘accusations made against the conduct of Mr. 
Pritchard, which in all probability, are for the most part, true enough; but which are 
certainly very insufficiently supported by anything like proof.’320  Aberdeen did not 
have any concrete evidence of Pritchard’s conspiring against the French 
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protectorate, but there were several reasons to suspect it.  Pritchard was 
undoubtedly a committed missionary and his religious commitment should not be 
underestimated at a time when many were disappearing on a cannibalistic island 
but he had, nonetheless, been in Tahiti for over a decade and gained power that he 
was unwilling to give up without a fight.  He rejected initial Catholic missions in part 
because of reluctance to share his power and because his commercial interests on 
the island had allowed him to set up a palatial residence on a hill overlooking the 
capital Papeete.  His refusal to give up these missionary and commercial interests 
when he assumed the British Consulship caused tensions among Tahitians and 
missionaries of all religious colours.321  Paul de Deckker suggested it was a resulting 
increase in Pritchard’s ego that caused him to fall out with those such as French 
agent Moerenhout, who had once considered Pritchard such a close friend that he 
left much of his estate to him in his will.322   
Guizot and Dupetit Thouars meanwhile suggested that Pritchard was acting 
against the will of Protestant missionaries whom he claimed to be defending, who 
were committed only to religious endeavour, in order to protect his own 
interests.323  Many British residents certainly expressed satisfaction at French 
conduct and tolerance, as did British agents in letters to the Foreign Secretary.324  
Pritchard’s account of the crisis was solipsistic and made little mention of the will of 
the people.325  In his literary works, long personal association with Queen Pomare 
seemed to fuse with a forceful religiosity and local passion to transform Pomare 
into an almost Christ-like figure, betrayed by those close to her and losing power 
for the sins of British indifference.  In these publications, Pritchard also freely 
admitted to intriguing against the French, which confirmed Aberdeen’s suspicions 
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during the crisis that his instructions to ‘observe and report’ had not been 
heeded.326   
Pritchard’s justification for his actions, that the march of events greatly 
outpaced the speed of communication with Britain, does little to extricate him from 
the charge of making life difficult for his government.  The first reason for this is 
that the authority by which he claimed to be acting was the content of previous 
dispatches.  Aberdeen identified the problem with this argument early in the crisis: 
‘you appear to have altogether misinterpreted those passages in the letters of Mr. 
Canning and Lord Palmerston’: they did not advocate hostility.327  Besides, Pritchard 
knew that at the height of the crisis, he had been instructed to move to the Friendly 
Islands.328  These instructions were ignored, as others had been.  Aberdeen had not 
sacrificed national honour in the name of peace in the case of Pritchard, for he 
could not have been imprisoned on Tahiti if he had been in the Friendly Islands as 
instructed by Aberdeen.  His imprisonment seemed justified even if the treatment 
he received at the hands of local agents did not.  It remains that annexation of an 
island with a history of British influence could be seen as contrary to the spirit of 
the entente, but Guizot denied central French involvement in Dupetit Thouars’ 
mission and spoke of ‘undeniable proofs of the spirit of moderation and strict 
justice’.329  Aberdeen’s acceptance of this line of argument seemed something of a 
joke to many, but there is little reason to doubt Guizot’s version of events.   
In the early stages of government Guizot did little in response to news of 
French manoeuvres in Tahiti, probably in the hope that the affair would blow over.  
Approving of agents’ intrigue would arouse the wrath of Britain whereas 
disavowing it would arouse the wrath of domestic opposition: doing nothing was a 
sensible policy for Guizot.  When news reached England and France of the 
annexation of Tahiti, even Aberdeen had his doubts about the entente, but Guizot 
soon dispelled them.  On receipt of the news, Aberdeen noted that ‘should the 
French Government confirm this last act of the Admiral, it may be a question of 
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how far it will be possible to continue our relations of confidence.  For although I 
am convinced that Guizot is perfectly innocent of the act itself, his subsequent 
acquiescence will make it very difficult to trust him on anything.’330  Aberdeen need 
not have worried, for a public disavowal of the Admiral’s action followed so that on 
1 March 1844, Aberdeen could tell the Lords of this ‘entirely spontaneous and 
voluntary act’: not a ‘single line’ of encouragement to make a disavowal had been 
penned.331 
It would, of course, be easy to make a proclamation of disavowal with one’s 
fingers crossed, to depressurise the situation without losing any of its benefits, but 
Guizot’s subsequent actions suggested that he was acting within the spirit of the 
entente and that Dupetit Thouars had placed him in an uncomfortable situation.  In 
the first instance, by August 1844 Guizot had persuaded the French Cabinet to 
acquiesce in Britain’s request for a formal apology for the way in which Pritchard 
had been treated, and to provide reparations as a demonstration of good will.332  
This was a genuine show of commitment to the entente at a time when Guizot’s 
majority in government was decreasing in inverse proportion to nationalist 
sentiment, with French newspapers branding those seen to be truckling to Britain 
as Pritchardistes.333 
The greatest display of Conservative unity and Anglo-French accord came at 
the end of December 1844 when the correspondence relating to annexation 
became available.  Far from being outraged at his Foreign Secretary’s policy, Peel 
agreed to Aberdeen’s request that the relevant papers should be edited before 
being shown to Parliament, to avoid those showing local French transgressions 
falling into the hands of the opposition: Aberdeen was encouraged to offer ‘the 
Parliamentary Tahiti Case – the producible controversy.’334  This process was 
reciprocated in France, where the worst of Pritchard’s excesses were kept out of 
the spotlight, including recent refusals of Dupetit Thouars’ reasonable offers of 
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indemnity.335  The entente had been designed such that inevitable disagreements 
and rivalry should, with the exercise of friendly caution and cooperation between 
Aberdeen and Guizot, not result in war.  This was achieved in the South Pacific. 
Britain had beaten France to Australia and New Zealand in 1840 and French 
protectorship of Tahiti seemed a small price to pay in the name of the entente.  
Throughout the crisis Aberdeen had stressed to France via his dispatches to Cowley 
that Tahiti would not be the beginning of further territorial gains in the South 
Pacific: he made it clear that French advances on the Wallis Islands, the Navigator 
Islands and the Sandwich Islands would be met with force and he threatened to 
send warships to Tahiti if events there did not end satisfactorily for Britain.336  In 
return for his stance on Tahiti, Aberdeen expected and obtained French public 
recognition of the mistreatment of Pritchard despite private frustrations with that 
Consul.  Aberdeen similarly never publicly disavowed Lyons in Greece; France 
should not think itself in a position strong enough to intrigue without reprisal.  It 
was also expected that British mercantile and military endeavour on Tahiti should 
continue unchecked, albeit if a different flag waved over the port.  There were no 
reports of any interruptions. 
Throughout the crisis, Aberdeen’s attentions had been focused on the 
Sandwich Islands, which he deemed of greater strategic importance.337  They were 
positioned almost equidistant between the British New World and British Canada, 
which made them a convenient trading post and broke up a lengthy sea crossing.  
Even the usually critical Ellenborough recognised this strategic utility: ‘the finest 
position in the Pacific is that of the Sandwich Islands.’338  Aberdeen secured a 
guarantee from America and France that the Sandwich Islands would be left to 
British administrative control – they were developed for British mercantile interest 
throughout his tenure – and so they insured against escalation of the Tahiti crisis 
and provided greater advantage for the future.339   
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If France had fully colonised Tahiti and allowed Britain to gain the Sandwich 
Islands then Britain would still have made a net gain, but as the Tahiti affair turned 
out peaceably and without compromising local British interests, British 
international trade and influence in the South Pacific made significant advances 
under the Conservatives.  France also kept its word and returned general Tahitian 
government to Pomare as Britain would eventually return general government of 
the Sandwich Islands to its tribal chief.  As Aberdeen had predicted early during the 
crisis, therefore, French conduct was ‘in accordance with that pursued by the 
British Gov[ernmen]t.’340  While the French were allowed gains in the name of the 
entente, Britain got the better deal without losing men or money on the machinery 
and consequences of conflict.  As the Conservative Cabinet eventually agreed, it 
would have been ‘preposterous and absurd’ to consider war.341 
The popular furore created by the Tahiti crisis was nonetheless exacerbated 
by simultaneous developments in Morocco.  The year in which Peel’s reform 
programme was unfolding saw the greatest public opposition to Aberdeen’s foreign 
policy.  With perceived intrigue in Spain, French influence already established in 
neighbouring Algeria, assumed French conspiring in Greece, and apparent French 
involvement in the competition between the Druzes and the Maronites in Lebanon, 
French encroachment on Morocco gave ready ammunition to those who claimed 
that France was attempting to make the Mediterranean Sea a ‘French lake’.  Such 
an ambition was presumed on both sides of the Channel.  Hippolyte Lamarche’s 
pamphlet of 1846 reflected on a campaign against ‘the disgraceful treaties of 1815’ 
in an attempt to ascertain ‘the first political and naval rank in the 
Mediterranean.’342  The Liverpool Mercury confirmed the sense of popular patriotic 
fear: France, it argued, aimed ‘to exclude from the whole northern coast of Africa 
British commerce and shipping.’343 
Problems came to a head in the summer of 1844 because the French 
colonial leader in Algeria, General Bugeaud, prompted Guizot to issue an ultimatum 
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to the Alaouite Moroccan Emperor Mawlay Abd al-Rahman to withdraw from the 
border with Algeria, where it was thought that Morocco was assisting Algerian rebel 
leader Abd-El-Kader to resist French rule.344  To British irritation, the French thought 
Britain was encouraging Moroccan intransigence.  Aberdeen remained detached 
because he recognised that the position of the Emperor was ‘hazardous’.  Swift 
withdrawal would create rebellion among his subjects, but leaving troops on the 
border, quite possibly a defensive policy designed to guard against Algerian 
ambition, caused understandable consternation in French Algeria.345  When France 
bombarded Tangiers on 6 August during Edward Drummond Hay’s talks with the 
Moroccans, in ostensible breach of assurances Guizot gave to Aberdeen, many, 
including the Home Secretary James Graham, lost faith in the entente.346  Even 
Cowley wrote from France: ‘What with Tahiti and Morocco, it must be confessed 
that the “entente cordiale” between the two countries is in some danger.’347  
Historians such as Norman Gash have since concluded that, especially considered 
alongside the crisis in Tahiti, Morocco laid bare the failures of the Anglo-French 
arrangement.348 
Aberdeen regarded contemporary media criticism as largely responsible for 
popular patriotic indignation at French actions, expressing frustration at its 
‘violence and arrogance.’349  Whilst this was a simplistic analysis of his detractors’ 
concerns, the Press did whip up the opposition with a number of misleading 
articles.  Chief among them was a focus upon Palmerston’s references to a speech 
Aberdeen made in 1830 during his first tenure as Foreign Secretary, in which 
Aberdeen was alleged to have said that he had no objections to French colonial rule 
in Algeria.  As Aberdeen wrote to Cowley, ‘I never said that I had no objections to 
the establishment of the French in Algiers, just that I had no observations to make’.  
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This was something Peel also stressed in Parliament: French expansion was to be 
regretted, but could not always be prevented.350  Palmerston did not challenge 
Gallic development in Algeria between 1830 and 1841 for the same reason, and 
continuing pragmatism determined that Aberdeen ‘had no more intention of 
disturbing the French in Algiers than our predecessors in office had.’351   This did not 
mean that, as Palmerston suggested, Aberdeen had any plans of allowing France to 
usurp British influence in Morocco.352 
Despite public professions of warmth and other efforts to help Guizot 
present his policy in a favourable light to his critics, Aberdeen made clear the 
permissible limits of French engagement in Morocco.353  He wrote that occupation 
of Tangiers ‘could not be tolerated’ under any circumstances and added that actual 
occupation of any part of Morocco ‘would not be viewed other than in a very 
serious light by Great Britain, and could scarcely fail to lead to evils of great 
magnitude.’354  When Aberdeen’s usually delicate style of writing is considered, it is 
clear that this meant war: this was confirmed by the subsequent arrival of warships 
to the Gibraltar garrison, to intervene if France breached its commitments.355 
With regard to French ships bombarding Tangiers on 6 August, historians 
have been quick to dismiss the entente via the argument that Guizot had broken 
assurances made to Britain.356  There are a number of problems with this argument.  
France had not broken any assurances made to Britain: the bombardment of 
Tangiers was a final act and not a prelude to military takeover.  It worked within the 
limits set down by Aberdeen and squared with the assurances that Guizot made: 
France never ruled out action against Morocco but always disclaimed interest in 
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Moroccan territory.357  The bombardment, furthermore, made little impact.  A 
moderate peace treaty was concluded just a month later and British interest in 
Morocco and access to the Mediterranean remained unaffected, as it had been 
throughout the affair.  Similar disagreements between the two North African states 
continued after this treaty and, as they escaped the interest of the British and 
French Press, they made no popular impact as well as no actual impact on the 
ground.358 
It remains that the bombardment appeared against the spirit of the entente, 
even if it did not contradict Aberdeen’s terms of engagement, and the spirit of an 
unrecorded verbal arrangement is necessary to demonstrate its very existence.  
That the bombardment took place when the Sultan was away at Marrakesh, with 
echoes of encroachment on Tahiti during Queen Pomare’s absence, did not seem to 
suggest the transparency that the entente demanded, especially given that the 
French ships continued on to bombard Mogador, which was a crucial artery for 
British trade in the region.   
The important background to the crisis, which is overlooked by the 
historiography, is that Morocco was actively intriguing against French Algeria.  John 
Drummond Hay (succeeding his father after the bombardment of Tangiers) noted 
that the Sultan caught a member of his Makhzan, the Chief Uzir Sir Mohammed Ben 
Dris, contacting the rebel Abd-El-Kader: to ensure that this did not happen again, 
the Sultan removed his errant minion’s tongue.359  The problem, however, ran 
deeper than this.  When Moroccan sources are consulted, such as the work of 
Khalid Ben-Srhir (whose PhD involved extensive research in the archives of the 
Makhzan), it becomes apparent that such actions on the Sultan’s behalf were 
misleading: he too was involved in assisting the Algerian rebels.360  French action 
was clearly not as unprovoked and unreasonable as might first be thought.  As John 
Drummond Hay recorded, ‘The foolish language of a British officer high in rank, on 
the other side of the water, declaring that England would never allow a gun to be 
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fired at a Moorish port, roused the worst feelings towards us throughout the 
French squadron’.361  That France responded within agreed Anglo-French 
parameters of action further suggested that the spirit of the entente lived on: 
disagreements would break out but war must not. 
What seemed to contradict the spirit of the entente, however, was the 
timing of the bombardment, which came during the talks between Edward 
Drummond Hay and the Makhzan.362  John Drummond Hay reflected on this the 
next month: ‘Although [the French] say the Sultan is faithless, they never gave time 
to test whether he would be so or not, after having pledged himself to a British 
agent to act with good faith […] French supremacy is aimed at, throughout the 
Eastern and Western Barbary, and an arrangement with a British agent militates 
against that supremacy.’363 
Aberdeen recognised that talks had actually been going on for some months 
and that French patience was wearing thin with a Sultan who appeared to be 
stalling negotiations in order to continue intriguing.  Edward Drummond Hay, with 
the benefit of years of dealing with the Makhzan that his son did not have, reflected 
on his efforts to rally the Sultan: ‘It would take a volume – not small – to relate the 
bother and the tricks and bad faith with which I have had to contend – and as to 
going fast, as Mr. Bulwer has everlastingly urged, who among mortal men can make 
Moors go fast, nay, nor hardly move at all – in the straight path of honour and 
sound policy?’364  Beyond the Orientalist overtones of Drummond Hay senior’s 
frustration lay the considered reasons for French actions and Aberdeen’s response.  
The Sultan was playing for time and, simultaneously, domestic pressure on Guizot 
was escalating.  France hoped that a few shells would remind the Makhzan of the 
need to draw back from Algeria, which they did (at least temporarily), whilst 
Aberdeen concurred because the Sultan had been causing international 
embarrassment by virtue of connections with Abd-El-Kader, from whom the 
Conservative government was trying to distance itself. 
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The question of whether or not France conducted its Moroccan expedition 
in the spirit of the entente raises one more issue: that concerning the Prince de 
Joinville’s control of the operation.  Joinville, Louis Philippe’s third son, who had 
with some ceremony repatriated the body of Napoleon in 1840, had in 1844 written 
a pamphlet entitled Note sur l’etat des forces navales de la France.  This had 
compared the states of the British and French navies and hypothesised about the 
possibility of an invasion of England.  Historians who consider the entente fragile or 
non-existent at the time of the Tahiti crisis point to the French selection of Joinville 
in support of their views.  The Duke of Wellington reflected that it was ‘not possible 
to conduct things worse.’365 
The circumstances of Joinville’s selection for the Moroccan expedition do 
not suggest the significance attributed to it by Wellington and the historiography.  
Aberdeen’s tolerance of the move was understandable.  French plans in Morocco 
were, as discussed above, extremely limited.  Whilst French papers beat the 
nationalist drum and Guizot might have done more to dampen the noise, he sought 
to defuse domestic nationalist opposition without damaging the entente.  Placing 
Joinville at the head of a showy expedition to Morocco presented the Orleanist 
regime in a positive domestic light, particularly as it built upon the public approval 
of the Prince’s marriage to the Duchess Francisca of Braganza in 1843.  The mission 
also helped to distract Anglophobes who were attacking Louis Philippe and Guizot’s 
policy towards Britain, without redirecting overall French policy against Britain.   
Meanwhile, Guizot and Louis Philippe took great pains to distance 
themselves from Joinville’s pamphlet.  Guizot told Cowley that he had written it 
independently and that ‘no one had any idea he was going to publish it’, continuing 
that it was the ‘production of a young officer anxious for the efficiency of the 
service to which he belonged’ and that Joinville had ‘no desire to interrupt the good 
understanding now established between the two countries.’366  These sentiments 
were echoed by Louis Philippe in correspondence and at a meeting with Cowley at 
the Chateau de Nemilly.367  It is interesting that those historians who have focused 
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upon the French government, and investigated its politics to a greater extent, 
regard its surprise and embarrassment at Joinville’s pamphlet as genuine.368 
On the face of it, one might consider Aberdeen’s lack of response to 
Joinville’s selection unwise, regardless of French responses to the pamphlet.  
Privately, he considered that the selection of Joinville might have been ‘calculated 
to produce so much mischief’.369  The pamphlet had mentioned Malta and Gibraltar 
as hypothetical strategic targets, adding to concern that France aimed to make the 
Mediterranean a ‘French lake’, and other portions of it were phrased with an utter 
lack of tact.  For example: ‘Who can for one moment doubt, but that with a fleet of 
well-organized steamers, we should not be able to inflict upon our enemies on the 
sea coast, losses and sufferings unknown to a nation that has never felt what 
miseries war brings with it; and these sufferings will entail a misfortune upon her, 
that of having lost her confidence.’370  This section seemed rather to undermine 
Joinville’s opening assurance that ‘if I speak of war with England, as of any other 
power, it will not be through a spirit of animosity’. 
To read the pamphlet as a whole, however, is to be struck by its overall 
Anglophile tone.  Repeated references are made to what were seen as the 
admirable qualities of the English national character, and the pamphlet sought only 
to use Britain as an example to which France could aspire, rather than as a target to 
be challenged.  Joinville wrote that ‘I am not one of those who, in the illusion of 
national self-love, think us able to contend equally with the power of Great 
Britain.’371 
Aberdeen thought the pamphlet confirmed ‘the wretched state of the 
French Steam Navy’, that ‘the inferiority of French steamers is notorious’ and it 
seemed sensible to view it as unthreatening.372  Joinville summed up his work by 
stating that ‘I have been obliged to expose the secret of our weakness compared to 
the greatness of British power.’373  France’s weakness had been Joinville’s point, 
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together with the need for unostentatious and non-confrontational improvements.  
Queen Victoria, to whom Joinville was personally known, agreed with Aberdeen’s 
response to the pamphlet: ‘it is not intentionally written to offend England, and on 
the contrary frankly proves us to be immensely superior to the French Navy in every 
way.’374   The Moroccan episode was not an intrinsic threat to the entente and 
neither did the Prince de Joinville’s pamphlet make it one: indeed, the French 
Chambers attacked Joinville for the subservient content of the pamphlet.  It would 
have been illogical for Britain to derail Conservative objectives by risking war for a 
matter that, if anything, actually increased Britain’s international reputation by 
reiteration of its naval superiority. 
Britain’s defences were nonetheless in need of updating and the pamphlet 
produced panic in Wellington, that bona fide but blinkered believer in the ubiquity 
and inevitability of conflict.  In response to his concerns, Peel warned Wellington 
about ‘the effect which too sudden and marked and extensive preparations might 
have upon the dispositions towards us of Powers whose hostility is most to be 
apprehended’, which elicited the improbable response that Britain’s defences were 
‘barely sufficient for the performance of peace duties’: Wellington also spoke of our 
‘undefended state’.375  These sentiments were echoed by other old military 
campaigners such as Sir Charles Napier and, of course, Palmerston, with an eye to 
party politics.376   
Like Peel, Aberdeen was not opposed to moderate defensive expansion – 
Britain needed comprehensive protection – but he argued for a sense of 
proportion.  He spoke out against some plainly ridiculous figures being bandied 
around by those whom he deemed to overestimate the threat, in the parliament of 
a country almost a billion pounds in debt and trying to fund a programme of 
domestic reform.  This was different from opposing any increase in defence 
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expenditure, which is a charge that historians such as Roger Bullen have levelled at 
Aberdeen.377 
Palmerston seized on Aberdeen’s sentiments as proof of pandering to 
France at the expense of national security and argued that readiness for war did not 
presuppose desire for war.  Nor, he maintained, would being prepared for war 
suggest to the international community that Britain was warmongering.  These 
arguments were perfectly logical, but Aberdeen had never suggested otherwise: he 
wanted improvements to be made, but not radical measures taken on what he 
regarded as a wave of misguided panic.  Another artificial difference was created 
regarding levels of commitment to British interests by misrepresentation of 
Aberdeen’s approach.378  In a letter to Peel concerning Wellington’s flustered 
correspondence, Aberdeen argued that ‘an extensive plan of military defence’ 
would ‘virtually stultify our whole policy’ when ‘there is every policy that peace will 
not be endangered.’379  Sweeping change was unnecessary given British naval 
superiority and would probably induce the phenomenon that they were designed 
to prevent: significant French naval expansion and the potential for conflict.  It 
would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Of accompanying peaceful relations with 
vast defensive fortifications, Aberdeen wrote that ‘such a course of conduct has a 
direct tendency to produce the very evil which it is intended to avert.’380  Britain, 
Aberdeen argued, was ready for potential war without an overhaul of defences on 
the scale that Wellington thought necessary.  He insisted that this might undermine 
the pacific course of ‘the most influential men in France’ and provoke greater levels 
of Gallic naval development.381   
By the autumn of 1845, Aberdeen was still struggling to convince colleagues 
of the wisdom of his viewpoint – this might have been why he was not informed of 
a meeting about defence on 5 September – and he offered his resignation in a 
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letter to Peel on 18 September 1845.382  It could be argued in continuation of the 
argument that Aberdeen had never wanted the Foreign Office, that he offered his 
resignation because he was tired of office and uncommitted to his post.  At face 
value, there is much to suggest this: Aberdeen wrote in 1842 that ‘my sensations 
are still those of a gentleman walking about with his head under water…business 
cannot be satisfactorily done, if done at all in such a condition’, and in his 
resignation offer he wrote that ‘office is irksome to me.’383  This study has noted, 
however, that Aberdeen’s comments about the toils of office require 
contextualisation. Palmerston had used a similar analogy when promoted to high 
office in 1830 and he certainly did not lack enthusiasm.   
Closer inspection of this resignation offer shows that the motivation for 
writing it stemmed from a party consideration: Conservative unity.  Referring to 
Wellington, about whose views Aberdeen had written a fiery letter to Peel on New 
Year’s Eve 1844,384 the Foreign Secretary lamented that ‘I cannot but foresee the 
probability of a great difference of opinion’, adding that ‘everything is looked at in 
such a different point of view.’385  He regarded the opposition led by Wellington as 
‘painful’ and thought it best to leave office and avoid a possible division of 
Conservatism as well as to preserve his ‘honour’ and ‘conscience’.386  Further 
division in the Conservative ranks would have been particularly damaging at the 
time when the party was already tearing itself apart over the Corn Laws.  It was 
only at the very end of the letter that Aberdeen talked of office being ‘irksome’.  
Aberdeen was not using disagreement with Wellington as an excuse to jump ship: 
the difference of opinion with Wellington was tangible.  Besides, Aberdeen went on 
to tackle subsequent crises in Oregon and Spain with enthusiasm, something he had 
indicated to American colleagues just days before his resignation offer that he 
intended to do.387 
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Peel refused Aberdeen’s resignation on the grounds that it would be 
‘irreparable’.388  This was doubtless in part necessary in order to appear united 
before France and the opposition, who would perceive the ‘true’ reason for a 
resignation dressed up to disguise Conservative division.389  Peel’s respect for 
Aberdeen was also evident in his refusal, however, which highlighted the personal 
as well as the necessary political bond between the two men.  Aberdeen would 
have been well aware of this, of course.  It is quite probable that the resignation 
was in large part a tactical device and that, when writing the letter and concluding it 
by saying that he would act ‘in whatever manner your deliberate judgement shall 
decide’, he was simply trying to reinforce his position in the defence debate.390  He 
knew that his resignation could not be accepted without imperilling the 
Conservative government at an hour of heightening domestic challenge.  
Either way, a programme of what Norman Gash called ‘selective and 
unostentatious’ armament was undertaken, despite the hotly contested argument 
that defence concerns had generated in the aftermath of Joinville’s pamphlet.391  
Whilst this programme cannot be attributed solely to Aberdeen’s role in the debate 
– decision making on defence budgets was and remains a complex process – that a 
more extensive programme was not enacted did vindicate the Foreign Secretary’s 
position.  When the patriotic storm resulting from Joinville’s pamphlet and the 
fallout from Anglo-French clashes in 1844 had subsided, Aberdeen’s stance of 
careful consolidation was adopted.  It was also telling that when the domestic crisis 
ensued later in 1845, the defence debate disappeared from the political agenda 
without trace: it was clearly not as urgent or as large a problem as was suggested 
by some, when it no longer served a political purpose for both sides. 
By the end of 1845, then, Aberdeen had navigated Britain through a number 
of Anglo-French crises without recourse to war.  The status quo continued in 
Greece (albeit on unavoidably shaky foundations), the Tahitian crisis ended in 
strategic gain and mercantile expansion in the South Pacific despite the popular 
patriotic clamour for war, and clashes between Morocco and Algeria were localised 
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where they might have mutated into international conflict.  The entente with 
France, when considered within its aspirational limits, remained intact and further 
cross-Channel visits had taken place in 1844 and 1845, with the French Court 
visiting Britain and the British Court returning to France.  Aberdeen maintained 
British international standing by making concessions, but setting the limits of action 
that France would not be permitted to breach.  Intransigent diplomats, who tended 
not to share in the vision of Anglo-French accord, were dealt with by a combination 
of cautionary private letters and praise in public correspondence with France.  This 
ensured that the excesses of local British enthusiasm could be curbed, whilst France 
was not made aware of Aberdeen’s irritation with his diplomats: France should not 
think it had too much room for manoeuvre. 
Beyond orthodox views of Aberdeen as, at best, well-meaning but naïve 
and, at worst, witless, aloof and incompetent, stands a capable politician who was 
not afraid to consider war as a strategic option, but nonetheless took pride in his 
peaceful international consolidation, as he explained to the Lords in April 1845: 
 
I am accustomed almost daily to see myself characterised as pusillanimous, 
cowardly, mean, dastardly, truckling, and base […] I feel perfectly certain that 
these vituperative terms are to be translated as applicable to conduct 
consistent with justice, reason, moderation, and with common sense […] I am 
positively satisfied when I see such observations.392 
 
There are historians who considered that such expressions of ostensible loftiness 
and idealism demonstrated that ‘the virtues which [Aberdeen] possessed were ill-
suited to the needs of the age’; where these needs were thought to involve conflict 
rather than consensus, Palmerston’s virtues were seen as better suited.393  Whilst 
Aberdeen was more reserved than Palmerston, it is misleading to paint a 
comparative portrait of the two ministers in chiaroscuro, as has traditionally been 
the case.  Political posturing concealed a degree of consensus, whether this 
concerned specific policies or overall ideas on how to approach Anglo-French 
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relations.  At least for this period, Palmerston’s criticisms made little impact, whilst 
Hansard records that Aberdeen’s speech in April 1845 (quoted above) earned him a 
standing ovation.394 
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Chapter Four: Anglo-French Relations in Spain 
 
The busiest theatre of Anglo-French engagement was Spain, where 
governmental strife and complications over the royal succession threatened to drag 
Britain and France into conflict.  Spain had long been in decline as an international 
power by the 1840s.  Its military and naval might had fallen alongside that of its 
empire and, whilst civil strife continued to drag Spain further towards global 
insignificance, there was little chance of a resurgence of fortunes.  There was 
nonetheless a concern among contemporaries that ‘if Spain could recover her naval 
and colonial power she, with the cooperation of France, could begin to challenge 
the Atlantic supremacy of Great Britain.’395  A potential alliance between France 
and Spain had long been a source of anxiety for Britain.  The War of the Spanish 
Succession in the early eighteenth century culminated in the Treaty of Utrecht 
(1713), which outlawed the union of the Spanish and French Crowns.  By its terms, 
Philip V of Spain, Louix XIV’s grandson, renounced the right to the throne of France 
whilst the French Princes, the Dukes of Berry and Orleans, renounced their right to 
the Spanish throne for themselves and their successors.   
The fear of French influence in Spain persisted and, in 1834, Palmerston 
concluded the Quadruple Alliance with France and the constitutional elements in 
Spain and Portugal.  Battles for power between the constitutional parties and their 
rivals, the absolutists Don Carlos in Spain and Dom Miguel in Portugal, prompted 
Palmerston to conclude an alliance of liberal forces and, in doing so, to prevent 
unilateral French intervention in the Iberian Peninsula.396  He embellished his 
achievement in the language of benevolent liberalism, in which the alliance could 
be branded as a counterweight to the autocratic bloc of the Northern Courts, but 
restriction of the French army was paramount: its march into Spain in 1823 could 
not be repeated.397  Any French intervention on the continent was viewed with 
                                                          
395
 R. Bullen, ‘The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815-48’, in A. Sked (ed.), Europe’s 
Balance of Power 1815-1848 (London, 1979), p. 61. 
396
 See K. Bourne, Palmerston: The Early Years 1784-1841 (London, 1982), pp. 404-407; D. Brown, 
Palmerston: A Biography (London, 2010), pp. 181-182. 
397
 Details of the earlier French intervention can be found in, for example, M. Chamberlain, ‘Pax 
Britannica’? British Foreign Policy 1789-1914 (London, 1988), pp. 62-65. 
110 
 
increased suspicion given French desires to escape (or at least circumvent) the 
constraints imposed by the Congress of Vienna.  
History has accepted that, during Aberdeen’s tenure, Spanish affairs were 
symptomatic of how France was ‘constantly making’ attempts ‘to obtain a 
preponderating influence in European affairs.’398  Such conclusions were 
encouraged by the presence of Maria Cristina (Spain’s Regent Queen 1833-1840) in 
France.  Cristina had been exiled but was looking for an opportunity to return to 
Spain and to a position of influence: her daughter Isabella was queen, but would 
not be declared of age to reign independently until 1844.  If France could gain 
Cristina’s favour, then it would be likely to gain influence in Spanish affairs should 
she return.  The most controversial issue for Anglo-French relations, however, was 
that of the ‘Spanish marriages’, which various historians have touched upon, 
although none have covered proceedings with the detail of Jones Parry’s study in 
1936.399  The marriage issue concerned the unresolved betrothal of Queen Isabella 
and that of her sister, the Infanta Louisa Fernanda, but other events took centre-
stage before the Spanish marriages affair gathered pace in the later years of the 
Conservative government. 
When the Conservatives took office, France was by some observers thought 
to be helping to undermine and overthrow General Baldomero Espartero’s 
Progressista government, which was seen as the ‘English’ and ‘liberal’ option in 
Spanish affairs.  Aberdeen’s reluctance to interfere in the affairs of Spanish 
government was reported as demonstrating his incapability to engage with ‘that 
great struggle between the partisans of freedom and those of absolute 
government, which has convulsed all countries as well as Spain.’400  The 
Conservatives, however, did not construe foreign affairs in bipolar terms, and 
Aberdeen remained consistently detached throughout Espartero’s governmental 
difficulties and those of his successors.  The narrative of a liberal struggle did little 
to elicit sympathy from Aberdeen, who wrote that ‘Spain independent, powerful 
and friendly has always been with me the grand desideratum in Europe for the 
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interests of England.’401  Peel concurred that ‘this or that’ party was unimportant 
compared with the ‘general policy’ outlined by Aberdeen.402 
One of the features of this general policy, by which the Conservatives were 
not prepared to intervene on Espartero’s behalf, was a continuing preoccupation 
with trade.  It mattered little to them who was governing Spain, so long as there 
was no interruption to the incoming revenue from Anglo-Spanish mercantile 
intercourse.  If Spanish domestic circumstances produced an adverse effect on 
trade, then the Conservatives would take action.  Aberdeen had done just this in 
one of his first dispatches to Arthur Aston, the British ambassador to Spain (1840-
1843), when it appeared that civil strife had caused mercantile disruption.  
Aberdeen pressed for the immediate payment of money owed to British 
bondholders in Spain, despite claiming that ‘it is with much reluctance that H[er] 
M[ajesty]’s Gov[ernmen]t is compelled to use the language of remonstrance in their 
first communication with the Gov[ernmen]t of Spain’.403 
Aberdeen also had a longer term vision of Anglo-Spanish trade in which 
Spain would, with time, come to see the benefits of recent commercial activity and 
would thereby become amenable to future extensions of mercantile 
cooperation.404  In later years he also became convinced that the free trade 
movement would encourage greater cooperation between nations: this was 
especially true of Spain, which was for much of the 1840s focused on internal 
issues.  Aberdeen wrote to Henry Lytton Bulwer (Britain’s minister-plenipotentiary 
to Spain, 1843-8) on the topic, hoping that the expansion of free trade would unite 
Spain in an appreciation of the commercial benefits brought by this emerging 
international economic system, thus transcending the inward focus precipitated by 
civil divisions.405  It was thought that increasing levels of international economic 
integration would provide an upturn in fortunes for Spain and, therefore, 
encourage internal stability.  Aberdeen in 1844 stressed that it was a British priority 
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to ‘develop the great national resources of that country, and to extend her 
prosperity and secure her happiness.’406 
These trade considerations dovetailed with the Conservatives’ inherent 
rejection of the idea that the promotion of liberal governments was, in itself, a 
national interest.  Whereas those such as Palmerston were prepared to champion 
liberal and constitutional regimes on the basis that they mirrored British values and, 
therefore, were better partners with whom to do business, the Conservatives took 
a more detached view of the international scene.407  Aberdeen was happy to deal 
with governments of any political colour on equal terms.408  His position on the 
Espartero government’s political affiliations was quite clear: he ‘did not care a 
sixpence for their liberalism.  They may be as radical as they please.’409 
There were other reasons for pursuing a watchful and distant policy.  
Spanish government in the 1840s was changing hands with great frequency and 
heated internecine rivalry suggested that any immediate answer to the Spanish 
question would be both violent and temporary.  These two adjectives did not 
appeal to Aberdeen and did not suit Conservative government objectives.  
Intervention in the name of liberalism would in any case be less than 
straightforward: there was no way to determine between a ‘liberal’ or an ‘illiberal’ 
cause, because government was divided between the Court, the politicians and the 
army, all of which contained a multitude of factions and personal agendas.410  The 
Palmerstonian idea that the Espartero government was a ‘liberal’ and therefore a 
‘British’ cause was a connection the Conservatives viewed as intrinsically 
questionable, which only served to increase their reluctance to intervene in 
Spain.411 
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The Spanish regime was unstable.  Its vulnerability was indicated by – 
among other things – its heavy repression of the Press, and Espartero’s brutal 
response to reports of insurrection in Barcelona in the summer of 1843.  The 
Spanish leader launched a vast shelling campaign in a region that local newspapers 
of all political allegiances had reported as being peaceful.412  Many of the 
government forces defected thereafter; Lord Cowley later wrote that the conduct 
of Espartero’s men in Barcelona was symptomatic of the ‘intrigues and conspiracies 
which have at length brought about his downfall.’413  Wading into a multipolar 
conflict did not seem sensible and Aberdeen sought to use diplomatic manoeuvring 
to keep affairs calm, believing that problems could be resolved in the longer term.  
Despite these considerations, Palmerston expressed suspicion that the 
Conservative policy of detachment might derive more from indecision, weakness, 
and fear of the French, rather than a rational assessment of the best way to pursue 
British interests, noting that ‘Aberdeen and some of his colleagues are greatly afraid 
of France, and I should be inclined to doubt their firmness on trying occasions.’414  
Palmerston was certain of French involvement in rebellions against the Espartero 
government: ‘there can be no reasonable doubt of the fact, and our friend Guizot 
must be as deep in it as his Royal Master.’415  Diarist Charles Greville shared this 
judgment, suggesting that ‘everyone’ suspected France of intriguing in Spain, as did 
contemporary newspapers such as the Morning Post: ‘Not one of [France’s] 
communications is placed any confidence in [sic].’416 
If France could secure influence in Spain by helping to install a pro-French 
government in place of the relatively pro-English Espartero, this would send out a 
message about British pliability to other European powers, who might be 
encouraged to pursue their own designs at British expense.  The Morning Chronicle 
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suggested that the French demonstrated a national vendetta against the Espartero 
government and considered it hypocritical: 
 
An attempt to restore [the previous] Government by arms in Spain, is precisely 
as if one of the family of Charles X hoisted his standard in France, declared the 
acts of the Chambers null, and threatened every Frenchman with death who 
did not submit.  This is precisely what MARIA CHRISTINA has done; this is 
precisely what the French Court and its organs approve.417  
 
Peel was certainly wary of French intentions and made his thoughts on 
France clear.  He was concerned that ‘the language of the [French Assembly’s 
Journal des] Debats is decidedly in favour of adopting the policy of Louis XIV with 
regard to Spain’ – domination and/or absorption – and thought that the dispatches 
of the Comte de Jarnac (French chargé d’affaires in London) indicated ‘the 
intentions of the French’ to be ‘gradual encroachment.’418  He warned against 
France’s ‘underhand – but scarcely covert’ policy that aimed to ‘foment trouble in 
Spain.’419  
Many historians, not least the Prime Minister’s biographers, have stated 
that Peel’s suspicions were required to alert Aberdeen to French activity in Spain 
(and elsewhere), but the evidence suggests otherwise.420  From the beginning of 
Aberdeen’s tenure, he had few illusions about French ambitions, outlining to Queen 
Victoria how French desires to gain influence in Spain ‘would probably be 
connected with practical assistance of some kind’.421  His policy of cooperation with 
France neither stemmed from – nor required – blindness to French designs. 
There was no doubt that some elements of French society wanted to 
overthrow Espartero and replace him with Isabella’s mother Cristina and a 
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Francophile Court, and that some Frenchmen worked towards that goal.  Their 
hopes of Louis Philippe’s support were encouraged by the fact that Cristina had 
struck up an intimate friendship with the King whilst living in a house on the Rue de 
Courcelles in Paris.  The tone of Palmerston’s Eastern policy, and of the humiliation 
that went with it, had inflamed French feeling in very recent memory; for some, 
Spain represented an opportunity for revenge.  As Cowley noted, however, 
interventionism was by no means a national creed: France was far from united in its 
thoughts on Spain.  The ambassador reported that the French journals were ‘almost 
at open War upon the question of the Regency.’422 
Aberdeen’s policy towards France in Spain hinged, as elsewhere, on the 
ability of his relationship with Guizot to help defuse Anglo-French incidents.  With 
regard to French conspiracies against Espartero, and despite the views of some 
newspapers and most historians, this policy appeared to work, because of Guizot’s 
similar outlook.423  Guizot’s memoirs recalled a period of promise for relations in 
Spain.  He lamented that England had in the 1840s been fixated by the past and the 
tradition of rivalry in the region and he advocated non-intervention, pointing to 
numerous examples when French attempts to gain influence in Spain had only 
resulted in difficulties.424  Intervention, in his view, was only likely to increase local 
rivalry by reinforcing the beliefs and belligerence of those with international 
backing.425  The publication of such sentiments might be deemed by some as an 
attempt by Guizot to whitewash his historical reputation, but they nonetheless 
squared with his earlier works and the majority of his actions in government.   
Aberdeen again used correspondence with Princess Lieven to communicate 
to her lover Guizot that Britain was monitoring French activity, in order to ensure 
the French minister remained loyal to the entente and avoided overt interference in 
Spanish affairs.426  France would not be allowed to compromise British ‘honour and 
interest’, which in Spain essentially meant no major upset to the balance of power 
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or to the development of Anglo-Spanish trade, which Aberdeen had sought to 
protect and extend by arguing for reduced tariffs within his first months in office.427  
French citizens could not be prevented from lending themselves to the anti-
Progressista cause, but the French government was not to connive at a pro-French 
administration that threatened British interests.  That Aberdeen regarded Guizot’s 
denials of complicity as carrying ‘every appearance of sincerity’, was a viewpoint 
that appeared to be validated by the French minister’s repeated rebuttals of open 
requests from the French ambassador to Spain, Narcisse-Achille de Salvandy, to 
send money and troops in the cause of Cristina.428   
Guizot performed the function for Anglo-French relations that suited 
Conservative objectives.  He was by no means a paragon of altruistic Anglophilia but 
in Spain, as elsewhere, he was prepared to blunt the excesses of French nationalist 
designs in the name of a peaceful cohabitation of Western Europe.  Specific early 
instances of this included when a plan emerged in the autumn of 1841 for Cristina 
to travel from Paris to the border with Spain where she could be ready to take 
advantage of any decline in Espartero’s position.  As Aston reported, it was Guizot 
that rejected this idea because of the impact it might have on Spain and would have 
on international perceptions of France.429  The French government could have 
employed more subtle means of supporting the anti-Progressista forces, but there 
were tangible attempts to exclude outright support, and the government that 
succeeded Espartero’s was anything but pro-French. 
When it came, the overthrow of Espartero in 1843 seemed the product of 
Spanish domestic discontent, rather than a triumph of French intervention.  
Aberdeen was convinced that outside influences had consistently been 
exaggerated: 
 
If the overthrow of the Regent was contrived in Paris, his elevation was said to 
be contrived in London […] I am satisfied that the English Government had 
nothing to do with the elevation of Espartero any more than the French 
                                                          
427
 Aberdeen to Aston, 14 December 1841, HCPP, ‘Correspondence respecting Commercial Privileges 
in Spain’ (1845), li, 652/3. 
428
 Aberdeen to Queen Victoria, 10 October 1841, Benson and Esher (ed.), The Letters of Queen 
Victoria, I, p. 347; Guizot, Memoirs of a Minister of State, pp. 325-6. 
429
 Aston to Aberdeen, 17 September 1841, TNA, FO 72/578/224.  
117 
 
Government had with his overthrow […] In the course of six weeks there was 
not a single village in Spain which did not rise in opposition to the Regent […] If 
this were produced by a few thousand francs and a few French intriguers, it 
was ridiculous to suppose that all this could have been done […]430 
 
Limited French involvement was not ruled out, but Aberdeen did not think it on a 
level inconsistent with that attributed to England during Espartero’s ascendancy in 
1840, if it had any impact at all.  A Conservative consensus backed this position and 
Peel made a notable speech on the matter, responding to Palmerston’s claims that 
France had intrigued against a stable British ally: 
 
If [Espartero] had had that hold in Spain which the noble Lord seemed to think 
he had, how does the noble Lord account for it, that in the case of a person of 
his high military distinction, who had shown great valour and sincere desire to 
promote the interests of the country in which he exercised power – how does 
the noble Lord account for it that no effort whatever was made in any part of 
Spain to rescue Espartero from the fate with which he was threatened, and 
which ultimately befell him?  And would the noble Lord have counselled active 
interference on the part of this country, for the purpose of maintaining in 
authority any personage in whose behalf so little public sympathy appeared to 
exist?431 
 
Aberdeen’s views were identical to those of his leader.  He often spoke of 
the importance of Spanish independence of action in its own affairs, because any 
changes made on the back of foreign interference were unlikely to be accepted by 
the Spanish population.432  In 1844, Aberdeen declared that ‘if there is anything 
more strongly marked than the determination of the Spanish people, it is their spirit 
of resistance to foreign influence; and, though they may for a time submit, there is 
no doubt that they will rise against it, and resist it, and that it will ultimately be 
completely destroyed.’433  Yet at times, diplomatic counsel was offered to the 
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Cortes in dealing with rebellions or, later, the marriage question.  Aberdeen 
regarded this as divisible from unwelcome and/or imposed interference, and part 
of the natural intercourse between nations.  Responding to news of anti-
government disturbances in the north of Spain in the autumn of 1841, Aberdeen 
wrote to Aston: ‘Although without any intelligence from you, and without accurate 
information from any quarter, it is the opinion of Her Majesty’s Gov[ernmen]t that 
we ought not to hesitate a moment in offering that countenance and support which 
are due to the Gov[ernmen]t of a friendly State; and which may be most valuable in 
a season of danger and uncertainty.’434  
Aberdeen saw his offer of friendly counsel as compatible with Spanish 
independence of action and we have discussed how he would not have offered any 
physical assistance to Espartero.  By stressing the importance of Spain being left to 
make its decisions independently, Aberdeen did not mean that the Cortes should 
function in diplomatic isolation, just that decisions should not be forced upon them: 
diplomatic consultation on political matters was considered standard procedure.  
This was a line of logic that was employed elsewhere and even if one considers it 
inconsistent and/or hypocritical, as the historiography has suggested, this hardly 
mattered if Conservative objectives were being delivered.435 
Some Conservatives, such as the Colonial Secretary Lord Stanley, were more 
inclined to view Espartero as the best option for securing the future stability of 
Spain, but agreed with the government’s policy that it would be futile to interfere 
and maintain a leader for whom there was so little domestic support in Spain.  
Stanley spoke to this end in July 1843, echoing Aberdeen’s view that diplomatic 
counsel was compatible with Spanish independence: 
 
I speak of the affairs of Spain with great pain, because I believe, that in the 
maintenance of the administration of Espartero there was the best chance of a 
steady government, and of the returning tranquillity and improving prosperity 
of that magnificent country […] But can [Palmerston] assert, that so far as was 
consistent with the interests of a friendly country, every support – every moral 
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support which the Court of England could give to the Government of Spain, 
has not been fairly, frankly, and freely given? […] A Government upheld by a 
foreign force can hardly be said to be independent.436 
 
By the time of Espartero’s overthrow, the question of who would marry 
Queen Isabella and her younger sister the Infanta Louisa Fernanda had assumed 
greater significance.  Isabella was to enter her teenage years in October 1843 and 
this, combined with the change of government in Spain, placed the issue of her 
betrothal at the forefront of Spanish politics.  The marriage issue was controversial 
because of the great powers’ vested interests in the potential consorts for the two 
sisters.  If a groom with connections to a great power could be married to the 
Infanta, then influence in Spain could be gained if Isabella failed to produce an heir.  
The hand of Isabella was, naturally, a still greater prize.  The genealogy of the 
Spanish House of Bourbon can be seen in the table below.437 
 
                                                          
436
 Stanley, House of Commons, Hansard, lxx, 28 July 1843, cols. 1480-1. 
437
 See A. Ward, G. Prothero and S. Leathes (eds.), The Cambridge Modern History, xiii: Genealogical 
Tables and Lists and General Index (Cambridge, 1911), table 83.  References to other tables are not 
relevant to this study and may be ignored by the reader.  
120 
 
Almost every eligible bachelor in Europe was at some stage touted as a 
potential consort for Isabella, but there was only ever a handful of likely candidates.  
On the periphery of this group were, firstly, the sons of Louis Philippe, and, 
secondly, Carlos Luis, the Comte de Montemolin, Isabella’s cousin.  If a son of Louis 
Philippe could secure Isabella’s hand then this would, obviously, give France 
influence in Spanish affairs.  This would have been an explosive combination, 
however, given that it might potentially have breached the Treaty of Utrecht by 
uniting the French and Spanish Crowns in a future generation.  Such a union was 
never seriously entertained in France because despite gaining Spain as an ally, it 
would, in Britain, lose a far more powerful friend, and thus place France in isolation 
among Europe’s great powers. 
Such a union might well have brought war with Britain; but it would almost 
certainly have brought war with one or more of the Northern Courts.  Not only 
would autocratic Europe have been affronted by the apparent French expansion 
that they had long been trying to prevent, but in Montemolin they had a candidate 
through which their own objectives might be pursued in Spain, whom they did not 
want to be excluded in the interest of a French prince.  Montemolin was the son of 
the exiled Don Carlos, Ferdinand VII’s younger brother, who had been excluded 
from the Spanish throne by the abandonment of Salic law and Isabella’s succession.  
Don Carlos’ autocratic sympathies were part of the reason for both his own 
exclusion from Spanish rule and for the favour of the Northern Courts towards the 
candidature of his son.  Montemolin’s candidature was unpopular in the vast 
majority of Spain, however, as its success would require a reversion to the Carlist 
influence that the reign of Isabella was supposed to exclude. 
Spain was not likely to select either Montemolin or a French prince for 
Isabella, because both would involve subservience to a foreign power, and because 
of the inflammatory effects on domestic and international relations.  This left 
among the remaining candidates Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who was seen as 
the ‘English’ candidate due to his familial connections.  Leopold was the first cousin 
of both Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, whilst the King of Belgium, a close British 
ally, was Prince Leopold’s paternal and Queen Victoria’s maternal uncle.  Leopold’s 
candidature was not barred by any international treaty, nor likely to provoke the 
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extent of Spanish opposition that would be engendered by the success of 
Montemolin, but it was nonetheless unappealing to France and the Northern 
Courts. 
There remained three principal candidates of the Bourbon House, apart 
from Montemolin.  From the Neapolitan branch of the family, Isabella’s uncle, Don 
Francis, Comte de Trapani, was one.  Two of the queen’s cousins were also 
potential suitors: Don Francisco d’Asis Maria, the Duke of Cadiz, and Don Enrique, 
the Duke of Seville.  The latter two candidatures were of central importance, and 
intimately bound up with the negotiations Aberdeen had to conduct.  
Conservative policy towards France over the marriage issue was informed 
by the same principles as broader Spanish policy.  Aberdeen hoped that the 
development of Anglo-Spanish trade and, in later years, the perceived benefits of 
free trade, would engender Spanish prosperity and stability.  It was in a future of 
calmer times that Spanish determination of an equitable solution to the marriage 
question was thought to be most likely: Aberdeen wrote in 1845 that ‘many things 
may happen in Spain in the course of a few years to affect this question in a manner 
not now apparent.’438  In the meantime, Aberdeen thought that Britain should 
maintain a position of ‘apparent indifference’ in order not to needlessly arouse the 
indignation of other great powers, and therefore to avoid the entrenchment of 
prevailing attitudes of national self-interest.439    
Aberdeen was well aware that other powers did not share his conception of 
the marriages question, and that they were likely to intrigue for the betrothal of 
Isabella to the candidate that best represented their interests.  This can be seen in 
earlier diplomatic exchanges with Austria, in which Metternich had been dragging 
his feet over official recognition of Isabella’s legitimacy as queen.  Aberdeen saw 
that Austria was delaying recognition in order to extract a price: Montemolin’s 
marriage to Isabella, which, if concluded, would lead to the reintroduction of Carlist 
influence in Spain.  Recognition would then be gladly given, as Austria would not 
have to contrive Don Carlos’ coronation in order to see autocratic rule on the 
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Iberian Peninsula.  The Foreign Secretary wrote that ‘it is clear that Metternich has 
held a double language on the affair of the Spanish recognition […] He will wait for 
another crisis, which in fact he is himself instrumental in producing.’440  
Jones Parry thought that Metternich had gained a diplomatic victory by 
using Montemolin’s candidature to divide Britain and France, in that Metternich 
had been making overtures to France on this and other diplomatic projects without 
consulting Britain.441  Given the historical tradition of portraying Aberdeen as in 
awe of his Austrian counterpart, which is based on their diplomatic intercourse 
during the Napoleonic wars, and considering the historiographical portrayal of 
Anglo-French relations deteriorating in Spain, one might indeed assume the success 
of Metternich’s policy.442  But, whilst there were understandable differences in the 
British and French opinions of Isabella and the Infanta’s potential consorts, the 
greatest rivalry concerning Spanish affairs was between the supporters of 
Montemolin and those in France who supported the candidatures of Louis 
Philippe’s sons.  This aspect of the marriage issue involved the conflict between 
autocratic and liberal ideology, in which the Conservatives were not interested.  It 
did, however, present an opportunity for Aberdeen, which he exploited in a more 
subtle manner than Jones Parry appreciated. 
Aberdeen’s policy towards Austria was based upon the assumption that 
Austria would not countenance the candidature of a French prince, and this allowed 
him to play France against Austria.443  He used correspondence with Robert 
Gordon, Britain’s representative in Austria (and Aberdeen’s son) to give inflated 
estimations of the Anglo-French relationship so that Metternich would promote 
Montemolin ever more enthusiastically.444  France could be relied upon to object to 
any candidate associated with Don Carlos, a candidature which would bring 
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Austrian influence closer to France’s border.  France and Austria were thus, at this 
stage, left to cancel out each other’s more selfish designs.445  Spanish opinion, 
directed away from Montemolin or a French prince by strong external opposition, 
could be gently steered towards a more neutral candidate with less threat to the 
balance of power. 
The Conservatives’ policy of considered distance from Spanish affairs, and 
Aberdeen’s idea that appearing uninterested in the issue helped to prevent the 
escalation of diplomatic conflict, was seemingly undermined by the agreement that 
he made with Guizot at the Chateau d’Eu in September 1843.  There, Britain and 
France agreed to support only the candidature of Spanish Bourbons for the Queen’s 
hand, thus excluding Louis Philippe’s progeny, but including Montemolin (whose 
failure could safely be presumed).  This also excluded Britain from actively 
supporting Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg.  With the ‘liberal’ Espartero consigned 
to history and the path ostensibly cleared for France to influence the Spanish 
Bourbon candidates, without fear of a British campaign in support of a Saxe-Coburg 
candidature, Aberdeen might be seen to have acquiesced in a campaign of French 
intrigue to exclude first a ‘liberal’ government, then ‘British’ marriage interests. 
Discussion of the issue of the marriages at Eu, however, was based on a 
genuine Anglo-French desire to implement the values of the entente, not on 
persistent French intrigue or ad hoc British measures to promote peace at the 
expense of national interests.446  The agreement at Eu sought to promote by 
friendly counsel the prospects of those candidatures which would be less 
inflammatory to international relations.  Given that there was no implication of 
physical interference, no binding effect on Spanish decision, and that the general 
consensus in Spain was for a Spanish Bourbon, the gentleman’s agreement did not 
seem controversial. 
Aberdeen’s approach to the marriages question was based upon a rational 
appreciation of British interests, even though the agreement was expressed with 
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the expansive hyperbole that might be expected of a grand state occasion.  Guizot 
recalled his concord with Aberdeen: 
 
We parted with great satisfaction at having thus mutually opened our minds, 
and with a feeling of most amicable confidence.  We do not always consider 
the extent to which the greatest and most difficult affairs of nations would be 
simplified if the men who direct them would know and esteem each other 
enough to rely on the truth of their respective words, and on the conformity of 
their acts with their declarations.447 
 
Charles Greville thought French satisfaction showed that Aberdeen had been 
‘cajoled and deceived’ into supporting a Spanish Bourbon at the expense of British 
interest.448  Douglas Johnson saw the formation of the entente at Eu as the 
beginning of real trouble in Spain and Jones Parry considered it the point at which 
France gave itself a licence to intrigue in Spain without fear of reprisal.449  Cowley’s 
report that the agreement at Eu elicited a nationalist pamphlet calling for action in 
Spain seems to confirm these assertions.450  
  Britain had in fact gained a cheap victory in Spanish affairs.  Interest in the 
marriage issue was only that neither a French prince nor Montemolin should secure 
the hand of Isabella, nor the Infanta’s hand before Isabella had children (this is 
discussed below).451  There were benefits and drawbacks to the other candidates, 
but there were only serious international problems with French or Carlist influence.  
Aberdeen privately expressed his opinion that the main Spanish Bourbon 
candidates (the Duke of Seville, the Duke of Cadiz and the Comte de Trapani) 
represented the middle ground in Spanish affairs; a son of the exiled Don Carlos 
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would be as dangerous for Spain as a French prince would be for European 
stability.452   
The main Spanish Bourbon candidates were, therefore, the best option for 
maintaining the balance of power and Guizot, beneath the pomp and ceremony of 
Eu, was a pragmatist seeking stability for France.  Although he found the 
Conservatives’ strong discouragement of a French prince to be a departure from 
their professed interest in Spanish independence of action, he recognised British 
concerns and measured his policy accordingly.453  Guizot wrote to Count Bresson, 
French Ambassador to Madrid: ‘A cordial understanding is not, I know, a matter to 
be easily carried out on all points at all times.  It is, however, the essential fact of 
the general situation, and I rely on you to maintain it above the local difficulties 
which weigh heavily on you.’454  Aberdeen accepted Louis Philippe’s similar 
sentiments and of Guizot wrote that ‘I think he fully understands our views and 
interests’, but the Foreign Secretary remained watchful.455  In the same letter in 
which Aberdeen welcomed French diplomatic moves, he stressed the need to 
remain cautious and suspicious: the entente was not a licence for French freedom 
of action.456   
The Conservatives’ focus on the main Spanish Bourbon candidates seemed 
sensible, despite the problems that they appeared to present for Spain.  The Duke 
of Seville’s difficulties included his mother Carlotta, whose loathing of her sister 
Cristina blocked Seville’s marriage to his cousin Isabella.  Seville was also pro-
Progressista whereas Cristina belonged to the rival Moderado party.  These 
obstacles were not insurmountable, however, particularly as death removed one: 
Carlotta expired on 29 January 1844.  The vain Seville might also be persuaded to 
switch allegiances in exchange for increased power. 
Seville’s brother Cadiz has been described as a ‘cretin’, impotent, 
homosexual, or any combination of the three, depending on whose version of 
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events one listens to.457  Either way, his credentials as a royal consort were open to 
doubt and historians have echoed contemporary concerns.  Aberdeen’s endeavours 
to ‘do all in my power to prepare the way’ for Cadiz to marry Isabella, believing this 
to be ‘more popular than any other’ marriage proposal in Spain seem, therefore, to 
demonstrate a lack of awareness of, and commitment to, Spanish interest, which 
was still seen as important in making a selection that would last.458  Matters were 
not, however, that straightforward. 
It was the British minister in Spain, Aston, who had branded Cadiz a cretin, 
but he changed his mind after further meetings with Cadiz, and his successor 
Bulwer regarded Cadiz as ‘amiable in manners and not deficient in observation and 
intelligence’.459  Rumours of Cadiz’s impotence appear to have been just that, only 
surfacing in the summer of 1846, when the source was the disgruntled French 
ambassador, Count Bresson, who had hoped for a more ‘French’ candidate for 
Isabella’s hand.460  There also appears to be little evidence to substantiate the 
rumour that the Duke was homosexual, despite Muriel Chamberlain’s recycling of 
it.461  Had this been true, his sexuality would in any case have been no bar to 
fathering children.  Perhaps he was bisexual, but it hardly mattered: Cadiz later 
accumulated a brood of twelve.462   
Aberdeen’s permissiveness of French attempts to promote the candidature 
of the Neapolitan Count Trapani has also elicited charges of submission to 
France.463  Jones Parry suggested that Guizot ignored the entente in an attempt to 
create a league of Bourbon states as France could, by support of Trapani, use the 
Count’s influence in Naples both to challenge Austrian influence in the Italian states 
and to score a diplomatic victory over Austria by defeating her ambitions in 
Spain.464  This was all rather fanciful: had Trapani gained Isabella’s hand, it would 
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have been unlikely to engender any change in Italy: it was not Trapani who was the 
King of Naples.  The impact of the marriage would be very limited outside Spain. 
Muriel Chamberlain suggested that the agreement at Eu appeared 
hypocritical, given Aberdeen’s stress on Spanish independence.465  Jones Parry also 
pointed out that Aberdeen had once described French insistence on a Bourbon 
candidate as ‘a most arrogant and unwarrantable dictation […] calculated by its 
insolence to provoke the most determined opposition.’466  The agreement made at 
Eu was not a decision on behalf of Spain, however: Aberdeen wrote that ‘we agreed 
to support the pretensions of some descendant of Philip V to such an extent as may 
be consistent with the active independence of Spain.’467  Aberdeen’s agreement at 
Eu had changed nothing except, morally, binding Guizot not to promote the 
candidature of a son of Louis Philippe, and binding Aberdeen not to promote the 
candidature of Prince Leopold. 
Historiographical preoccupations such as Aberdeen’s perceived hypocrisy, 
besides being questionable in substance, have obscured the key point in Spain.  Left 
unattended, Spanish affairs threatened to drag the Great Powers into a morass of 
competing claims and to endanger international relations, but Aberdeen’s primary 
concern was that the problem of the marriages went away, if not for the longer 
term, then at least for a while.  The issue was not that important for Britain.  As the 
Conservative MP Lord John Manners noted in the House of Commons, it was ‘a 
subject in which many of its Members took little interest’.468  Britain’s European 
interests would, of course, be damaged if a French Prince or Montemolin secured 
Isabella’s hand, but such a combination was highly unlikely anyway.  Aberdeen 
thought the problem would be better resolved at a time when Spanish civil 
divisions were repaired or at least eased and, as long as France was not seen to be 
overtly intriguing in Spain, he was content to let the situation drift.  This raised 
problems that will be dealt with below, but it remained as the logic behind the 
Conservatives’ policy and helped to defuse the situation.  With more pressing 
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domestic and foreign objectives to pursue, the government could do without 
distraction in Spain. 
The agreement at Eu was the logical outcome of such a policy.  It is telling 
that Henry Bulwer, who had by now replaced Aston as British Minister in Madrid, 
and became one of Aberdeen’s harshest critics in later life, supported the 
encouragement of Spanish Bourbon pretensions in the wake of the meeting.469  
Bulwer would contend in his memoirs that the agreement restricted Spanish 
choice: he wrote of ‘the monstrous pretension of confining [Isabella’s] choice to a 
member of the Bourbon family.’470  This is a sentiment on which current 
historiographical consensus rests, but it conveniently ignored Bulwer’s original 
support for Aberdeen’s policy.  Bulwer wrote in January 1844: ‘If we are ever to see 
tranquillity permanently established in [Spain], it will only be attained by a 
reference to permanent principles, founded on the National character – which 
though apparently lost in party squabbles and petty intrigues, always ultimately 
dominates – and not on the mere passions and policy of the hour.’471  Bulwer had 
shared Aberdeen’s longer-term perspective then, but he later argued that the 
Bourbons were ‘singularly ill-adapted for securing the happiness of Queen Isabella’ 
and incapable of ‘contenting the pride and advancing the interests of the Spanish 
nation.’472  In the months after the meeting at Eu, however, his correspondence 
reveals a support for Aberdeen’s policy that his memoirs omitted: Bulwer had ‘no 
objection’ to a Bourbon candidature.473   
A focus on the long-term perspective at Eu, and the consequent delay in a 
resolution, was not only supported in Britain.  It was also useful to the Queen 
Dowager in Spain, whose role in Spanish stability was vital.  Cristina held grievances 
against all of the candidates.  Her apparently changeable position on the marriage 
question displayed shrewd judgment regarding her own political influence: the 
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prolonging of the marriage issue retained her position of power.474  This is another 
aspect misjudged by Jones Parry, who thought that Cristina would, through ‘the 
foibles and inconsistencies of her sex’, support whichever candidate had been 
suggested to her by an adviser.475  This assessment owed more to Jones Parry’s 
prejudices than serious historical analysis.   
Events gathered pace late in 1845 when Aberdeen and Guizot met once 
more at the Chateau d’Eu to discuss affairs including Spain, which resulted in 
Aberdeen approving what has been deemed a controversial agreement.  Aberdeen 
wrote to Peel: ‘With respect to the Infanta [Guizot and Louis Philippe] both 
declared in the most positive manner, that until [Isabella] was married and had 
children, they should consider the Infanta precisely as her sister, and that any 
marriage with a French Prince would be entirely out of the question.’476  The 
marriage of the Infanta had developed into the more significant question as she got 
older, because inbreeding within the Spanish Royal family had afflicted Isabella with 
physical weakness.  Ichthyosis and obesity also combined to create doubt about the 
willingness of potential consorts to consummate a marriage with her.   
Aberdeen and Guizot’s agreement was a response to the potential for a 
double marriage for the sisters.  The possibility of a childless marriage for Isabella 
raised the prospect of France securing longer term influence in the affairs of Spain 
by marrying a French Prince to the Infanta, which was not disallowed by any 
existing agreement.  Delaying the marriage of the Infanta allowed time for 
reconsideration of any difficulties that might arise from a childless marriage or 
Isabella’s early death.  Peel thought that problems remained: ‘suppose the Queen 
to die after the birth of one child […] [or] suppose them to be idiots’, which was not 
unlikely in the context of Spanish monarchical history.477  He added that ‘a contract 
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of marriage or a conditional promise of marriage is a transaction of a very peculiar 
nature indeed.’478  This doubt about Aberdeen’s policy seems to support arguments 
made elsewhere that divisions were growing within Conservative ranks.479 
Aberdeen was aware of the implications of the agreement but was more 
concerned that the brakes had once more been applied on the topic after rumours 
of a proposed double marriage had emerged from Spain.  The Foreign Secretary 
wanted to suppress the issue once more; the rumours came at a time of continuing 
governmental strife in Spain, while Britain’s conversion to free trade was at an 
advanced stage, with all its attendant political difficulties.  Governmental changes 
in Spain would imperil and undermine any attempt at an agreement, and in the 
Peelite analysis, Britain’s eventual adoption of free trade would help to stabilise 
European affairs.  Peel registered queries with Aberdeen’s policy to make sure the 
Foreign Secretary had considered its implications: he saw no reason to try and alter 
it or block it.  The Prime Minister intervened only to ensure that the agreement 
remained confidential: he denied Aberdeen’s wish to make it public in order to 
insure against French countermovement. 
Despite claims to the contrary, the 1845 agreement remained consistent 
with Aberdeen’s insistence on Spanish freedom of choice.480  Spain was still free to 
choose Isabella’s consort, whilst Isabella’s marriage and reproductive success did 
not force the Infanta into a union with a son of Louis Philippe, it only reintroduced 
members of French royalty as potential candidates in a later, contingent situation.  
Aberdeen’s discussion of Prince Leopold’s candidature in the wake of this 
agreement has given rise to accusations of continuing inconsistency and hypocrisy, 
but no agreement had outlawed a Saxe-Coburg marriage.481  Aberdeen avoided 
promotion of the Prince’s candidature and Guizot recognised that London might 
well favour a Saxe-Coburg.  Guizot knew, however, that the strength of the entente 
meant that Britain would not actively support one.482 
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Particular problems now arose with Britain’s over-active minister in Spain, 
Sir Henry Bulwer.  The Conservatives’ policy required Bulwer to keep wider British 
objectives in mind amidst the signs of local intrigue.  The Conservatives still wanted 
to appear uninterested in the marriage question by offering only detached friendly 
counsel, in order that the issue could be better resolved in the future.  Although 
this approach offered others the freedom of manoeuvre, the policy was deemed to 
be safeguarded by both the entente and the general Spanish preference for Isabella 
to marry a Spanish Bourbon.  Those such as Jones Parry have disagreed: Bulwer, 
they argue, was placed in an impossible position whereby he was faced with 
evidence of French intrigue in the marriage question but requested not to act 
against it, with France trampling over his personal and British national prestige.483  
The Conservatives’ policy, however, was deployed with a wider perspective than 
Jones Parry allowed for, and it did not concern itself with the temporary prize of 
prestige.   
Bulwer was unconvinced by Conservative policy.  As 1846 progressed, he 
grew ever more frustrated with Aberdeen and with France: 
 
England would support Spain in an independent choice, but it did not clearly 
say so, and I knew Lord Aberdeen would not like me to say so.  On the other 
hand, to leave it to be understood that the Spanish Government had no 
resource but to submit to the hard fate that the pride and family interest of a 
neighbouring potentate prepared for her, would expose me equally to 
censure.  The affair was more complicated by Queen Christina’s selection of a 
Coburg Prince.484 
 
Bulwer’s annoyance with Aberdeen derived from his view that a truly independent 
decision for Spain would involve its selection of the Prince of Saxe-Coburg for 
Isabella’s hand, and Bulwer’s conviction of Cristina’s approval grew with time.  His 
frustration at being forced to watch France conspire against this gained the 
sympathy of Jones Parry and others who accepted that France was engaged in 
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pressuring Spain, and who regarded Aberdeen’s policy as contradictory and 
exhibiting a dangerous inertia.485 
Saxe-Coburg’s candidature, however, was far from straightforward, as 
Aberdeen recognised; international circumstances were more complex than Bulwer 
allowed for.  The fact that Leopold’s brother Ferdinand was the King of Portugal 
gave the French understandable concern about the increasing influence of a rival 
Royal House on its doorstep: Aberdeen wrote that ‘[the marriage] may be popular 
in Spain; but I do not believe that Louis Philippe would approve of it’, adding that it 
was ‘objectionable’ on other grounds.486  Aberdeen did not rule out the Prince of 
Saxe-Coburg’s candidature, but tried to steer Bulwer away from supporting it.  
Neither could it be established that Leopold was Spain’s preferred candidate.  With 
Spanish governmental strife continuing apace, there was not an eligible bachelor in 
Europe without support from one quarter or another. 
Bulwer could not tolerate his instructions to monitor and report on affairs in 
Spain, preferring a more proactive policy in defence of British interests, and in 1846 
he delivered a letter from Queen Cristina to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg requesting 
Leopold’s hand for Isabella.  The plan involved a reconstitution of the Spanish 
Ministry and working behind the scenes in order to bypass the rest of Europe.  Keen 
to maintain a degree of openness and embarrassed by his minister’s actions 
Aberdeen, with the support of the British Court, reported Bulwer’s actions to Guizot 
and disavowed them, lest the desired consequences of the plot should come to 
pass.  Bulwer recalled this series of events: 
 
I am bound to say, since it subsequently added to Lord Palmerston’s 
difficulties, that Lord Aberdeen’s complaisance at this juncture, though 
dictated, no doubt, by the most honourable motives, had a mischievous effect 
on future transactions; for it was pleaded subsequently by King Louis Philippe 
as a reason for declaring that we had bound ourselves to support the Bourbon 
alliance; whilst it persuaded the Spanish Government and Court that no solid 
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reliance could be placed upon any assertions we made as to our perfect 
independence on the subject.487 
 
Aberdeen’s stance on Bulwer’s actions was dictated by a wish to maintain 
the entente and, in doing so, to avoid catalysing conflict in Spain.  Leopold might 
well be the candidate Spain ended up choosing and it would be an acceptable 
choice for Britain, but Aberdeen regarded British support of the Prince’s 
candidature as inflammatory and counterproductive, as he explained to the Queen: 
‘It is very possible that the marriage with Prince Leopold may really be the best 
solution of the question, but Lord Aberdeen is convinced that this alliance could 
only be rendered at all acceptable to France by the apparent indifference of Great 
Britain.’488  
Guizot might claim that Bulwer’s actions did not worry him, and he might 
continue to profess that the conclusion of the marriage should be left to time, but it 
was no coincidence that his protestations against increased intervention in the 
Spanish succession became equivocal after Bulwer’s intrigue.489  Indeed, the source 
of Guizot’s declining patience in Spain might be deduced from his memoirs: ‘Sir 
Henry Bulwer had not simply given his approbation to a step of the Spanish 
government to propose at Lisbon the marriage of Queen Isabella with Prince 
Leopold of Coburg; he had known and directed this step in all its details and at 
every advance.’490 
   Perhaps Guizot exaggerated the importance of Bulwer’s actions in order to 
justify a greater level of action in Spain.  Bulwer had long warned of increased 
French intrigue in the succession issue: in October 1845 he wrote to Aberdeen, ‘it is 
difficult not to suppose that something clandestine is going on which at the 
favourable moment is to be declared.’491  By May 1846 Bulwer wrote to Aberdeen 
of increasing frustration with French campaigning against Leopold: ‘Now I very 
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much fear, my dear Lord Aberdeen, that I have said so much already on this 
selection that I shall weary you by returning to the question.  But I persuade myself 
that I cannot yet have expressed myself clearly with respect to it, because I think 
that if I had I should have carried conviction to your mind.’492  It was more than 
likely that his French counterpart Bresson was intriguing and helping to draw 
Bulwer into a rivalry that was far more toxic that that between Lyons and Piscatory, 
or Pritchard and D’Aubigny, which was something Aberdeen recognised.493  He had 
earlier warned Bulwer that ‘I cannot help but fearing that you have permitted 
yourself imperceptibly to be influenced […] by a feeling of personal resentment.’494  
Aberdeen nevertheless thought that the French Minister had crossed the line in his 
encouragement of a marriage of either Cadiz or Trapani with Isabella and the Duc 
de Montpensier with the Infanta.   
But French intrigues and ambitions did not alter the fundamentals of 
Aberdeen’s policy. The Foreign Secretary thought that any local French schemes 
would come to nothing as long as Guizot remained in power; their personal 
friendship and the spirit of the entente would provide insurance against excitable 
ministers.  Aberdeen also intimated that war would result from any serious French 
retraction from its agreements with Britain; as in Morocco, the Foreign Secretary 
did not place blind faith in the entente.495   
It could nonetheless be argued that Aberdeen was storing up problems for 
his successor by failing to suggest a positive solution to the question of the Spanish 
marriages.  The Foreign Secretary was relying upon a connection with Guizot that 
the Frenchman was thought by some to honour only while awaiting the opportunity 
to pursue French influence when the Conservative government fell.  But Aberdeen 
believed that a pragmatic policy in Spain provided the best option for Britain: it also 
accorded with the traditional Conservative reluctance to act in foreign affairs that 
were not deemed immediately threatening.  The Foreign Secretary’s reactive stance 
conflicted with Bulwer’s declining patience with France, but this did not alter 
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Aberdeen’s conviction that the marriage project was better completed in a time of 
peace and prosperity than in one of conflict and discontent.  
As regards the personal nature of the entente with Guizot, the spirit of the 
entente could have continued into the tenure of his successor and cooperation 
need not have ended in Spain, but Palmerston’s conduct gave Guizot little hope to 
expect the sort of relationship he had shared with Aberdeen.  Palmerston had spent 
Aberdeen’s years in office attacking both the Foreign Secretary and all things 
French and despite his belated tour of France, intended to assuage French fears of 
his intentions, the damage had already been done.496  It must also be remembered 
that the personal nature of Aberdeen’s entente had in part been necessitated by 
the cross-Channel hostility to which the tone of Palmerston’s Eastern policy had 
contributed.  Aberdeen was in an unenviable position: he would be condemned for 
failure to obtain a binding agreement (which he did not want anyway), although 
this was unobtainable because of the state of Anglo-French relations bequeathed 
him by the very people who condemned him. 
Historians have regarded the fall of the Conservative government as the 
point at which Guizot began to intrigue openly for a conclusion of marriages 
between Cadiz and Isabella, and the Duc de Montpensier and the Infanta, which 
was what ultimately transpired in 1846.  Lucille Iremonger argued that Guizot was 
unconcerned about his agreement with Aberdeen and continued to pursue his ends 
but, now, to do this publicly.497  Roger Bullen suggested much the same: ‘Guizot 
thought that Palmerston should show him a free hand as Aberdeen had done.’498  
Guizot had begun to drop hints to Bresson about the possibility of increased action 
throughout 1846, but Palmerston’s accession was a watershed moment.  Guizot’s 
reaction to it, in a letter to Bresson, was telling: 
 
I will not be the person to hand Spain over to Lord Palmerston.  You will, 
undoubtedly, make use of his accession to office, to act on Queen Christina 
and her husband […] I have this advantage over Lord Palmerston, that if any 
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coldness or difficulty occurred between us and London, it would be to him and 
not me that the fault would be universally imputed in France and England.  I 
have told this to myself within the last three months.499 
 
Guizot had clearly been contemplating the opportunity to act, but pressing ahead 
with the candidatures of Cadiz and Montpensier was prompted by the return of 
Palmerston, and all the fear that he excited in France.  Fear of Palmerston’s 
approach might be exaggerated as a reason for French action, but the incoming 
Foreign Secretary had created an aura for himself that encouraged this.  
Palmerston’s courting of public opinion and beating of the patriotic drum worked 
wonders for his domestic popularity but, in an international context, the tendency 
to accompany astute diplomatic manoeuvring with an offensive tone could prove 
damaging: he was now reaping the harvest of the seeds sown in the Ottoman 
Empire and on the opposition benches. 
Guizot’s reaction to Palmerston is, however, often used to underline the 
weakness of Aberdeen’s entente, that Guizot was absolved from commitments to 
Britain once Aberdeen departed.  Recently, Laurence Guymer has supported this 
criticism with the suggestion that Aberdeen placed too much value in the 
cultivation of close personal relationships and allowed British interests to suffer as a 
result.500  Aberdeen was aware of the imperfections in the nature of his relationship 
with Guizot and discussed these in a letter to Peel, responding to the Prime 
Minister’s claim that Guizot had abandoned the entente as soon as he could – 
namely, when Palmerston returned to the Foreign Office: 
 
You say that if suspicions existed, explanations ought to have been demanded, 
and this was precisely such a case as might prove the value of the entente.  
This is unquestionably true; but I fear that the entente was always in some 
measure personal, and that little of this confidential communication was to be 
expected between men who mutually disliked and distrusted each other.501 
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The fact that Guizot felt obliged to Aberdeen because of their personal 
relationship showed the strength of an entente that was formed when 
circumstances had seemed to make anything officially binding impossible.  Besides, 
Palmerston’s succession provided an opportunity to change French impressions by 
his words and actions – Guizot’s decision to conclude the marriage combination 
France desired was not set in stone – but, instead, he confirmed France’s fears.  
Palmerston’s naming of Leopold as a possible candidate for the hand of Isabella in a 
dispatch to Bulwer soon after taking office did not on its own represent a huge 
departure from previous practice, although Aberdeen had been more restrained in 
discussion of Leopold’s candidature, but the context of the dispatch did.502  Despite 
declaring hope ‘that the choice may fall upon the one who may be most likely to 
secure the happiness of the Queen, and to promote the welfare of the Spanish 
nation’, Palmerston seemed to imply that alternative candidatures to that of 
Leopold would help engender ‘grinding tyranny’.503  The inference of physical 
intervention and Palmerston’s latter claim to see Leopold’s success ‘with pleasure’ 
merged with his attacks on Aberdeen’s Anglo-French policy to convey an 
impression of hostility to existing agreements.504 
One of these agreements was a memorandum Guizot sent to Aberdeen in 
February stating that if he felt Leopold’s succession to be imminent, Guizot would 
press on with his own marriage designs.505  Muriel Chamberlain captured the 
conclusions of history when she wrote that it was ‘absurd’ for Guizot to claim – 
after Palmerston’s dispatch – that Leopold’s succession was imminent, particularly 
with regard to his February memorandum that Aberdeen had never officially 
acknowledged.  The claim elsewhere that the naming of Leopold represented an 
‘absolute change of policy’ was clearly ridiculous.506  It nonetheless remains that 
Palmerston ignored early warnings from Cowley about the perils of suggesting 
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Leopold, and this meant that the French interpreted Palmerston’s words through 
the prism of confrontation that he had created.507   
Even without any memorandum it would have seemed sensible for 
Palmerston to establish diplomatic intercourse with Paris before showing a 
controversial dispatch to Jarnac, for this course of action hardly equated to the 
transparency of action that Aberdeen had employed in direct contact with Guizot, 
which Palmerston professed to want to continue.  All it did was fuel the fires of 
French agitation and even Palmerston’s admirer Bulwer recorded that he ‘could not 
understand why’ Palmerston had shown Jarnac the dispatch.508 
Historians tend to conclude that Palmerston’s actions derived from the mess 
in which Aberdeen left Spanish affairs. Roger Bullen suggested that Aberdeen 
misinformed the incoming Foreign Secretary and, by failing to provide full 
information on the existing state of affairs, handed Palmerston an impossible 
task.509  Trying to press ahead with some sort of positive policy was deemed 
sensible in this context.510  But cooperation with France had not ended and it seems 
illogical to charge Aberdeen with the consequences of his successor’s actions.  
When Palmerston took office, Prince Albert recorded that despite Palmerston’s 
attacks ‘[Aberdeen] means now to show Palmerston the contrast by declaring his 
readiness to assist him in every way he can by his advice’ on the matter; Aberdeen 
asserted that ‘he had explained the situation fully.’511   
It is unlikely that Aberdeen would have said anything different, but there is a 
significant corpus of evidence to suggest that his protestations were genuine.  The 
Broadlands Papers contain a number of letters from Aberdeen that demonstrate 
the importance he invested in ensuring that Palmerston was fully informed about 
all aspects of British foreign policy.  One offered intelligence on a mission in Japan 
because Aberdeen feared that the British agent involved ‘may not have written as 
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fully in his publick [sic] dispatches’.512  Another offered Palmerston a number of 
private letters relating to Anglo-American affairs that Aberdeen felt crucial to 
continuing cooperation.513  The later transfer of power during the Crimean war also 
saw Aberdeen credited for ‘generosity and magnanimity’ with Palmerston thanking 
him for ‘your handsome conduct, and for your friendly and energetic exertions’ and 
referring to enduring ‘assistance’.514   
Charles Greville offered more evidence of such assistance, recording part of 
a conversation between Aberdeen and Palmerston in 1846: 
 
Lord Aberdeen: “When I came into office five years ago, you wanted to come 
back again and turn me out, and you accordingly attacked me in every way you 
could, as you had a perfect right to do.  I do not want to turn you out […] and I 
am therefore come to tell you that I am ready to give you every information 
that may be of use to you, and every assistance I can.  I have been so long in 
office that there are many matters of interest, on which it may be of great use 
to you to receive information from me; and if you will ask me any questions, I 
will tell you all I can that you may desire to know, and everything that occurs 
to me.”515 
 
Bullen argued that the private and direct nature of communication between 
Aberdeen and Guizot complicated matters still further, by sending the records of 
policies into private collections.516  Yet, in addition to the above evidence, Vernon 
Puryear has shown that Aberdeen was as forthcoming with private correspondence 
relating to Russian affairs as he was with those relating to Anglo-French relations.517  
Aberdeen gave his successor everything that was felt necessary to serve British 
interests – including private documents.  It is highly unlikely that Palmerston was 
unfamiliar with the state of the Spanish marriages issue.  But if it is nonetheless 
accepted that Aberdeen did not provide Palmerston with the necessary information 
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or that he had left Spanish affairs in a mess, then it seems strange that Palmerston 
acted against the clear advice he was given by Cowley, and did not try to establish 
the facts by correspondence with Guizot.  It seems far more probable that 
Palmerston was well-informed but proceeded with affairs in his own idiosyncratic 
way. 
The double marriage of Isabella to Cadiz and the Infanta to the Duke of 
Montpensier was concluded early in September 1846.  Guizot’s account of the 
move being solely a Spanish venture was disingenuous, but there was little to 
support some of the Francophobic responses, which suggested that Spain found the 
marriage abhorrent and that France was revealing its real intentions, having long 
left Britain in the dark.518  Bulwer’s dispatches, based on a combination of 
information and ‘conjecture’, captured the essence of disgruntled contemporaries’ 
concerns.519  The Spanish people were thought to be against the marriage: ‘the 
masses look upon the event that has taken place as a sort of betrayal of the 
Queen’s and the Nation’s interests.’520  The press was thought to be against the 
marriage: Bulwer referenced several papers’ hostility, including El Tiempo, El 
Expectador, El Eco del Comercio and El Español.521  The Spanish government was 
also thought to be united in feeling that they had been forced into the marriage 
combination by the French.  In summary: 
 
At midnight was consummated this important act, consigning a young Queen 
of sixteen for the rest of her life to a husband by whom, it was said but a 
month ago, that she was not likely to have children, and marrying the Royal 
Sister, in better health and with fairer prospects, to the son of the Monarch of 
[France], which has so long domineered over [Spain].522 
 
But all of this ignored political realities and exaggerated Spanish hostility.  
The Spanish people had lined the streets of Madrid to celebrate the royal wedding 
of their own free will.  No section of the Press had anything to gain by supporting 
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the marriage:  Progressista papers attacked the Moderado marriage solution to 
achieve editorial capital and Moderado papers were never going to support any 
marriage combination that diluted the power of Moderado ministers by stabilising 
the royal family.  Bulwer’s claims about the Spanish government’s unity against the 
marriage seemed inconsistent with his earlier protestations about its divisions.523   
Aberdeen was unhappy with Guizot’s conclusion of the double marriage 
after the agreement to marry only Isabella, but this was for the breach of faith 
rather than the nature of the marriage agreement.  He wrote to Peel late in 
September 1846 that there was nothing 
 
so very objectionable in Louis Philippe desiring to make such a match – The 
Infanta is very rich, and I believe attractive in person; and I am convinced that 
the King does not at all desire her accession either to the throne of Spain or 
France, but merely looks to her as an eligible wife for his son.  I should not be 
disposed to resent the marriage, especially with the conditions to which the 
French Government will undoubtedly agree; but I confess that I cannot so 
easily get over the breach of engagement to me.524 
 
With Palmerston looming, French action might be argued to have been 
surprisingly moderate.  Cadiz had long been considered by Britain as an acceptable 
consort for Isabella and, despite Bulwer changing his opinion of that Duke when 
Palmerston returned to office – ‘a certain ridicule which attaches to his squeaking 
voice and insignificant manner is by no means favourable’ – Bulwer had supported 
Aberdeen in his opinions before Palmerston’s ascendancy raised the possibility of 
Britain pursuing a more confrontational line in support of Leopold.525  The marriage 
of Montpensier to the Infanta was not in the spirit of agreements with Britain, but 
Palmerston’s language had already undermined these.  The marriage at best 
represented a limited coup for the French and it did not break the Treaty of 
Utrecht, as Aberdeen stressed: the crowns of France and Spain remained very much 
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separate.526  As France well knew, Britain would never allow anything like the union 
of the French and Spanish crowns, and nor would the Northern Courts.   
Traditional views of Aberdeen’s Spanish policy must, therefore, be 
recalibrated.  A coherent strategy to prevent any major upset to the balance of 
power and thereby protect Anglo-Spanish trade was employed from the first days 
in office, when correspondence showed a focus on mercantile enterprise.  The 
Conservative government was a business-like institution seeking to reverse the tide 
of domestic social degeneration and escalating debt and whilst prosperous trade 
helped the balance sheet, conflict did not.   A watchful policy in Spain also squared 
with the Conservative Party’s distaste for what they deemed reckless 
interventionism on the part of Palmerston and the preceding government.   
Scuffles between Espartero’s government and regional militias elicited no 
impulse for intervention, especially given the multitude of factional divisions that, if 
Aberdeen had been interested in pursuing an ideological foreign policy, ruled out 
the chance to make any definite distinctions of who deserved his support.  France 
was suspected of involvement in the regional rebellions and it seems certain that 
some Frenchmen were involved, but Aberdeen’s personal entente with Guizot 
helped to ensure that central encouragement was minimal. 
Aberdeen employed a consistent approach to the marriage question 
whereby he maintained a considered distance from which flashpoints could be 
defused but also from which involvement did not jeopardise an Anglo-French 
accord that was yielding benefits abroad and at home.  British interests could thus 
be protected without expense and without the potential for a conflict that would 
draw attentions and energies away from domestic affairs.  In the Spanish Marriages 
question, Aberdeen made agreements with Guizot to promote certain candidates 
and to account for certain hypothetical eventualities but these were an extension 
of the desire for openness and Spanish independence rather than proof of 
inconsistency or hypocrisy (if we accept that either of these historiographical 
charges actually matter).  Aberdeen made these agreements to support solutions 
that he believed were best for British interests and couched them in language that 
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made clear that alternative marriage combinations remained open, so long as the 
Treaty of Utrecht was not contravened. 
The lack of French action, despite growing French restlessness over Spanish 
affairs, paid testament to the effectiveness of a personal entente between 
Aberdeen and Guizot.  This relationship might have transferred to Palmerston, had 
the incoming Foreign Secretary attempted to establish diplomatic intercourse with 
his French counterparts, rather than continuing in the vein that had made them so 
suspicious of his intentions in the first place.  Guizot might well have been looking 
for a chance to get revenge on Palmerston for his policy during the Eastern crisis, 
but that Guizot felt morally bound not to act against Aberdeen showed the success 
of the entente in keeping foreign relations stable.  Aberdeen was aware of the 
difficulties posed by his investment in a personal Anglo-French policy in Spain but, 
given his brief of pursuing a quiet yet efficient foreign policy in order to allow focus 
on domestic issues, it is difficult to see what other arrangement the Foreign 
Secretary could have orchestrated. 
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Chapter Five: Aberdeen, Russia, and the ‘Crazy Machine’: The Eastern Question 
 Whereas Britain’s policy in Western Europe revolved around its relationship 
with France, the primary concern in the East was relations with Russia, especially 
those aspects that concerned the Ottoman Empire.  It has been written that 
‘Russian foreign policy was at this time chiefly concerned with the fate of the 
Turkish Empire’, a policy preoccupation reflected in the focus of this analysis, which 
will primarily consider Anglo-Russian relations in the context of the ‘Eastern 
Question’.527  This question – a phrase used as shorthand for the debate over the 
longevity of the ostensibly ailing Ottoman Empire and its fate upon collapsing – was 
a problem of enduring importance for British statesmen.  The Ottoman Empire 
straddled land across which lucrative trading routes with British India passed and to 
have lost access to it would have created enormous strains on mercantile 
intercourse.  Britain would also have been left with a journey around the Cape of 
Good Hope if it was to avoid a vast land detour to respond to a crisis in its Indian 
colony (the Suez Canal was not opened until 1869).  Fear of a threat to India was in 
some minds increased by Russian activity in Persia and French sponsorship of the 
rebellious Egyptian leader Mehmet Ali.528  
The fate of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara and 
then to the Aegean Sea provided Aberdeen and other British leaders with a further 
geostrategic consideration during the nineteenth-century.  If an unfriendly foreign 
power were to conquer Constantinople it would gain jurisdiction of the straits and, 
therefore, control access to the Black Sea.  If that power turned out to be Russia, 
which was the most likely potential usurper, there existed the additional problem 
that Russia would obtain a route of easy access into the Mediterranean Sea via the 
Aegean.  This would raise a number of obvious concerns if it wished to pursue a 
confrontational and/or expansionist policy, in an area where Britain already had a 
potential French threat to consider. 
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British statesmen took differing approaches to the question of the straits 
and the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth-century.  Palmerston’s 
suspicion of Russia had initially led him to avoid cooperation over the fate of the 
Ottomans, but by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which was signed between Russia 
and the Porte on 8 July 1833, it appeared that Russia had gained special privileges 
that impinged on Ottoman freedom and British interests in the region.529  Deeming 
Russia to desire the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in order to further its own 
territorial designs, Palmerston began to pursue the regeneration of the empire as a 
means by which to repel perceived Russian expansionism, and to protect Britain’s 
mercantile and imperial objectives in so doing.  This policy resulted in an Anglo-
Ottoman trade treaty in 1838 and there followed the Straits Convention of 13 July 
1841, which concluded the latest Russo-Turkish conflict and was thought to reverse 
Russian maritime advantages that the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had provided for in 
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.530 
Aberdeen’s willingness to cooperate with Russia to ensure Ottoman survival 
endured throughout his career.  Aberdeen spoke in the House of Lords on 16 July 
1828 of the necessity of Ottoman existence and of belief in Russian subscription to 
this observation: ‘the existence of Turkey as an independent power – as a power of 
weight, and of considerable influence in the affairs of Europe – was essential to the 
preservation of that balance, which it had always been the policy of this country to 
preserve.’  He continued that it was ‘very fortunate that such views were 
entertained by the Emperor of Russia.’531  The genesis of the Foreign Secretary’s 
views can be found in his conservative predilection for the balance of power as set 
out at Vienna, and the belief that British interests were to be found within its 
maintenance: he wrote that whatever tends to ‘derange that balance, the re-
adjustment of which, after years of blood and toil, the great Powers of Europe 
happily succeeded in effecting, will of necessity mar the perfection of their work, 
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and, by giving rise to jealousies and apprehensions, may too probably lead to fresh 
complications and disasters.’532 
What Aberdeen was not prepared to do, in assisting with the preservation 
of the Ottoman empire, was to embark on sweeping commercial and social reforms 
of a power that he regarded as ultimately doomed by its own inadequacies.  This 
thesis has noted Aberdeen’s hostility to Islam, and this was undoubtedly a factor in 
his refusal to countenance anything other than limited reforms, a view that placed 
him in the company of most of the contemporary Conservative Party as well as a 
significant portion of wider British society.533 
Reluctance to engage in grandiose schemes in the Ottoman Empire also 
originated in practical observations, which were grafted on to religious and social 
prejudices.  Papers available to the Peel government on the Anglo-Ottoman treaty 
of 1838 revealed that liberal aspirations for regeneration had met with limited 
success.534  Reports from Britain’s consulates around the Ottoman Empire showed 
that despite economic success stories such as in the Dardanelles and around 
Adrianople, Ottoman corruption and poor or non-existent implementation of 
regulations left areas such as Alexandria, Erzeroum, Damascus and Smyrna still 
suffering.  Promises made to improve areas such as Serbia had also remained 
unfulfilled since the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812.  This inertia did little to persuade 
those such as Aberdeen that his views of inevitable Ottoman decay were 
misguided.535 
There were those such as Palmerston and Britain’s Ambassador to the 
Porte, Stratford Canning, who regarded Aberdeen’s position as self-defeating and 
contradictory, especially given that they thought limited reforms had yielded 
success.536  In a letter to Aberdeen in February 1845, Stratford defended his appeals 
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for regeneration of the Ottoman Empire and questioned the inevitability of its 
decline, even though he shared Aberdeen’s prejudices: 
 
Here as elsewhere, there is a tendency, on the whole, towards improvement 
[…] Could we do less without detriment to our credit and interests, without 
failing in the great duty inseparably attached to Great Powers?  If now we have 
seemed to do more, has not the exception been amply warranted in each case 
by the provocation, and generally, I may add, by the success?  Do not be 
apprehensive of my going too far.  I know pretty well with whom I have to 
deal.  The Turks are no more to be treated like other people, than other 
people are to be treated like Turks.  With rare exceptions every Turk is more or 
less a child.  It would be difficult to light a cigar with the spark of principle and 
hono[u]r possessed by the present Governors.537 
 
 Aberdeen instructed that reforms were to be made if absolutely necessary 
to the immediate health of the Ottoman Empire, but he did not accept that Islamic 
Turkish society could or should be remodelled on the West as Stratford hoped: it 
was to be accepted that the Ottoman Empire could not be insured in the longer 
term.  Stratford saw that this placed him in the difficult position of striving for the 
survival of the Ottoman Empire but not being licensed to take any significant 
measures towards this end.  He wrote to Aberdeen in June 1844 with his response 
to instances of the Turkish authorities torturing Christian subjects: 
 
I am forbidden […] to “stand forth as the avowed protector of the Christian 
subjects of the Sultan”, and I am to avoid being “considered as the organ 
through which complaints of hardships or persecution should be conveyed to 
the knowledge of Porte.”  At the same time I am authorized by another of your 
lordship’s instructions to offer in such cases to the Turkish Government “the 
earnest exhortation and advice of Her Majesty’s Government founded on the 
evident interests of the Porte”; and further I presume that wherever the rights 
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or interests of Her Majesty’s subjects are immediately concerned, I am at 
liberty to assume a more decided tone, and, in pleading their cause, to afford 
any Christian subjects of the Sultan, whose case may be similar, the benefits of 
my arguments and official representations, as in the recent instance of torture.  
With these landmarks to guide my course I have endeavoured to befriend the 
persecuted without committing Her Majesty’s Government or causing any 
inconvenient results which it was the object of your lordship’s instructions to 
avoid.538 
 
 Stratford’s frustrations with his mission originated in his more liberal views 
of foreign policy.  The Conservatives’ reactive policy of ‘make do and mend’ that 
Aberdeen instructed him to pursue did not match with his subscription to the 
proselytising and ostensibly civilising liberal values preached by those such as 
Palmerston.  Aberdeen refused to sanction a mission based on those values 
because the Turks had a dismal record of implementing changes, and because of 
the concomitant socio-religious view that the Ottoman Empire would eventually die 
a natural death.  This eventuality would still present its dangers, but not as many as 
if a combination of great powers was to administer political or military euthanasia 
to Turkey: a palliative approach to the Ottoman Empire was seen to avoid a 
premature scramble for its spoils, and to allow time for the European powers to try 
and make diplomatic preparations for the end. 
 This approach bore the hallmarks of Conservative policy elsewhere, not 
least in Spain, where the calls of certain more liberal politicians for intervention on 
behalf of the ailing Espartero administration received short shrift.  Given the 
Conservatives’ domestic preoccupations, it made little sense to them to intervene 
in the affairs of foreign states when they perceived no immediate threat to the 
balance of power or to Britain’s commercial interests.  The Ottomans were not 
trusted and even if the Russians’ moves in the East were ostensibly unthreatening, 
they were treated with due caution, but the Conservatives were reluctant to rock 
the boat whilst it continued to sail on waters of relative calm.        
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This was not the bold and decisive policy that the country had grown used 
to under Palmerston and, indeed, part of the problem for perceptions of 
Aberdeen’s policy lay in Palmerston’s conversion in the late 1830s to portraying the 
Ottoman Empire as a state that could be revived by British liberal principles and 
reform.  This was the result of both a personal conversion in relation to the 
Ottomans and of strategic considerations, as Turkish regeneration was deemed to 
provide protection against external encroachment.  Palmerston’s conversion also 
allowed him to court a largely Russophobe British public.  The idea of protecting 
British interests by extending liberal benevolence to Turkey struck a chord with 
contemporaries such as Stratford.  The idea also influenced generations of a Whig 
historiography, which presented Aberdeen’s diplomatic manoeuvring with Russia as 
demonstrative of a willingness to leave British interests at the mercy of the Tsar.539  
The Conservatives’ palliative approach to the Ottoman Empire brought 
enduring conflict with Stratford, but it remained the guiding principle for 
Aberdeen’s policy in the East throughout the 1840s and into the future.  His 
objections to perceived Ottoman barbarity would never reach the heights of 
Gladstone’s moralising in the late 1870s, when Disraeli’s vociferous support of the 
Ottomans was decried as a heartless and uncompromising implementation of 
realpolitik, given the Turkish atrocities against their Bulgarian dissentients.  In 
Gladstone’s revulsion at Turkish (and Disraelian) behaviour he seemed to lose sight 
of the geostrategic utility of the Ottoman Empire, something Aberdeen did not.  
Despite Aberdeen’s approach to Turkey being based upon a lack of willingness to 
engage in rehabilitating reforms, this did not translate into unthinking Turcophobia 
or a concomitant blindness to British interest. 
Similarly, a willingness to work with Russia in the East in the 1840s did not 
amount to Russophilia.  Articles such as that in the Liverpool Mercury in March 1842 
suggested that Aberdeen was in fact part of a Tory tradition that embraced the 
crowned autocrats of Europe on ideological grounds but, at least in the case of 
Aberdeen, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny.540  There were practical 
reasons for Aberdeen to work with Tsar Nicholas, and his willingness to do so was 
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encouraged by his time in the Wellington government of 1828-1830, which had 
contained others who regarded the Tsar as someone with whom productive 
diplomacy could take place.541  At that time, the British ambassador to Russia, 
Baron Heytesbury, had advised that Nicholas I was someone with whom Britain 
could work: ‘I have seen [Nicholas] not only in his closet when prepared to speak on 
business, but in those more unguarded moments when doing the honours of his 
table; and not a word has dropped from him but what was marked by a candour 
and good-feeling as far removed from the sentiments which some people would 
attribute to him.’542  Heytesbury went so far as to say of Nicholas in the wake of the 
Treaty of Adrianople, which concluded the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-9: ‘as old 
prejudices are with difficulty and but slowly got rid of […] a change is already in 
progress, and we must be prepared, everlong, to see the Emperor of Russia assume 
the novel character of friend’ and ‘ally’.543 
There is also cause to question the extreme views of Russia held in some 
liberal circles, views that might lead to reluctance to work with the Tsar.  Nicholas 
was undoubtedly a staunch conservative who could at times treat democratic 
measures as tantamount to sedition, but he was not an uncompromising and 
maniacal tyrant.544  Bruce Lincoln had this to say of the Tsar’s record in 
government:  
 
One often reads of the intellectual oppression, the tyranny, the arbitrariness 
which made such a deep impact on the lives of some.  This is, perhaps, partly 
the result of an overemphasis upon the Russian radical movement by both 
Soviet and Western scholars, for much study has been devoted to Russia’s 
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dissident intellectuals during these years, and many of the memoir and diary 
accounts published and translated into Western languages have been those of 
intellectuals who suffered intensely under the Nicholas system.545 
 
 Whilst Nicholas was not an autocrat on the scale of some Russian tsars, he 
remained a fierce patriot and a difficult statesman to deal with.  The Conservatives’ 
willingness to work with Russia did not overlook this consideration and Aberdeen 
exercised due caution in his dealings with Nicholas.  As elsewhere in Europe and in 
dealings with America, public professions of reciprocal good intention were backed 
up with continuing private vigilance.  This had been the case since Wellington’s 
government when Heytesbury’s aforementioned observations elicited a firm 
response: Nicholas’ public message of mutual cooperation was to be insured by 
probing Russian diplomatists on the realities of Russian cabinet politics.  Of public 
iterations of goodwill, Aberdeen commented that ‘tranquilizing and satisfactory as 
these assurances undoubtedly are, it cannot be denied that they are also vague and 
uncertain.’546  This type of thought process is an obvious necessity for a Foreign 
Secretary but, given the accusations of unthinking Russophilia that are directed at 
Aberdeen in later dealings with Russia, his considered and wary approach is worth 
highlighting. 
Nicholas’ Russia in the 1840s proved to be a power that the Conservatives 
could work with, if treated with the caution necessary in Great Power politics.  
Despite natural competition between the powerful states and differences of 
emphasis, Britain and Russia’s objectives in the East were fundamentally similar.  
Britain’s Conservative government envisaged a period of uncomplicated policy in 
which disturbances in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere in Asia were to be 
defused by diplomatic cooperation rather than political posturing.547  Any external 
interference in Turkey was to be avoided as long as trade remained uninterrupted 
and the Ottomans fulfilled their commercial obligations.  When it looked like this 
might not be the case, such as in 1844 when stalled negotiations between Turkey 
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and Russia resulted in disruptions to British trade, Aberdeen stiffened the language 
of his private correspondence in an attempt to show other powers that open 
diplomatic cooperation was backed up by firm resolution in defence of British 
interests.548  It was a tactic used in other international engagements in order to 
circumvent the antagonism engendered by public criticisms. 
Russia also wanted the Ottoman Empire to survive because she regarded it 
as weak and pliable, a situation far more appealing than the alternative power 
vacuum.  Russia preferred to have the relatively stable, predictable and malleable 
Ottomans as neighbours rather than the host of aggrieved and competing 
nationalities that would be released by Turkish dissolution.  Russia fought the 
Ottoman Empire on numerous occasions but whilst the peace treaties that followed 
provided for Russian gains, these did not threaten the fabric of Turkish power: 
Russia generally showed a degree of restraint commensurate with its geopolitical 
endorsement of Turkish territorial (if not administrative) integrity.  Not all historians 
agree with this conclusion, but it is significant that the majority of those with access 
to the Russian archives have supported the idea of Russian restraint, at least in the 
first half of the nineteenth-century.549 
Central Asia was one area in which Aberdeen and the Conservative 
government were able to work with Russia to ensure the Ottoman Empire’s 
stability.  The Peel government inherited wars in Afghanistan and China from the 
Whigs and Aberdeen sought conclusions to them, believing that tranquillity – of 
which Russia was thought to be ‘really desirous’ – best for British interests.550  In 
this approach Palmerston saw weakness and naivety: he thought that under 
Aberdeen, Britain would need  
 
some less timid power who may kindly be disposed to take us under its 
protection […] No doubt for valuable consideration we could prevail upon our 
dear friend the Czar to take us under his wing, and his Conditions would 
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probably be acceptable to many, as he would most likely be satisfied with 
being allowed to relieve us from the sin of selling opium to the Chinese, and 
from the crime of attempting to defend our Indian Empire by civilizing 
Affghanistan [sic].551 
 
 Despite Palmerston’s characteristically sardonic criticism, seeking 
conclusions to the wars seemed sensible.  The opium trade in China had been 
secured by 1842 and in doing so Britain maintained and expanded a lucrative 
market, even if its moral stock lost value.  Similarly in Afghanistan, the war was 
drawing to a natural close with Britain having found, in a lesson that powers have 
often since ignored, that objectives were all but impossible to achieve in that most 
idiosyncratic of countries.  The only qualification Aberdeen made to British 
achievements was that he thought the occupation of Hong Kong should be 
temporary.  As elsewhere, Aberdeen supported the reinforcement and furtherance 
of trade, but saw new territorial acquisitions as contrary to the Conservative 
government’s consolidationist foreign goals.  In this he was not alone.  Notable 
support came from the Colonial Secretary Edward Stanley, who regarded Hong 
Kong as difficult to defend.552 
Aberdeen and the Conservative government were not blind to the 
commercial advantage that Russia sought in central Asia.  This much is indicated by 
dispatches in which the Foreign Secretary urged vigilance even at times of relative 
harmony, but he did not attach the menace to Russian mercantile interest that 
Palmerston and others did.553  Aberdeen was content to allow a system of mutual 
commercial extension so long as British interests were not directly threatened by 
Russian activity.  When Russia concluded a trade deal with the Khiva in 1844, for 
example, Aberdeen registered no discontent: it represented no direct threat to 
either Ottoman stability or British trade.  He may also have had in mind Russian 
efforts to prevent Persia from an outright attack on the Khiva in 1842, which he had 
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earlier commended as a demonstration of moderation and positive international 
intent.554  It was a policy of ‘give and take’ in which Russia had overlooked British 
commercial aggrandisement in Russia’s Danubian borderlands in 1842.555 
There remained those who retained a much more sceptical opinion of 
Russia’s Asian policy and British acquiescence in it, none more so than the Morning 
Chronicle.  In an article of 1842 that criticised the Conservatives’ historical faith in 
Russia and mocked Aberdeen’s tolerance of Russian policy for conforming to this 
faith, the newspaper commented on Russian policy towards Persia in the 1830s.  
This policy was perceived to demonstrate one of the reasons for which Britain 
should have pursued a more confrontational policy towards Russia in the 1840s.  
The article refers to The Times’ commendation of Russian policy and to a particular 
episode when in 1838 Russia recalled its ambassador to Persia, Count Simonitch, 
after that ambassador had ostensibly undermined Russia’s peaceable intentions by 
trying to instigate a Russian attack on the city of Herat, which was strategically 
important to Britain: 
 
The object and the gist of the whole disquisition lies in the assertion that in the 
affairs of Persia, the Russian cabinet had always acted with invariable probity 
and amity towards England; that all blame, if any […] ought to be placed at the 
door of Count Simonitch, who with this respect acted in direct opposition to 
his instructions; and lastly, that this double-dealing ambassador has been 
disavowed and recalled long before his personal policy had failed […] Now, I 
shall not stop to animadvert upon the easy and profitable task of disavowals 
and recallings, after real, but concealed purposes had been detected, and 
signally foiled.  Nor shall I inquire, how did it happen that the Russian cabinet, 
which uniformly visits with such alacrity and unbending severity any departure 
from its instructions on the part of its agents, had in this instance sent to 
Persia, and afterwards maintained there for several years a person known and 
convicted by his own statements, of harbouring ideas averse to the policy of 
his government.556 
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Suspicions seemed warranted in this case, but after Palmerston secured the 
Straits Convention in July 1841 there came a period of increased cooperation that 
rendered the Chronicle’s comparisons with the 1830s redundant.  Competition 
would, of course, naturally remain, but Aberdeen’s brand of open diplomacy helped 
to build on Palmerston’s achievements.  Its success might be measured in such 
Anglo-Russian ventures as the Convention on Commerce and Navigation, signed on 
11 January 1843.557  Afghan peace and central Asian cooperation paved the way for 
this convention, which aimed to bring about ‘the reciprocal abolition of the 
differential and countervailing duties’ between the two countries.  The 
Conservatives’ Western European method of following conciliatory policy with 
improvements to commercial relations was being repeated in the East (this 
approach was also applied in relations with America).  During the negotiations for 
this trade agreement Baron von Brunnow, the Russian representative in London, 
wrote about the ensuing talks: 
 
This Anglo-Russian mediation, giving to all oriental people an evident proof of 
the good understanding between the two great powers, will produce, I trust, a 
very useful impression upon the mind of the Asiatic nations at large, who 
constantly were speculating upon the supposed jealousy of England and 
Russia.  It is particularly with the intention of counteracting and correcting 
these mistaken views that both our governments have joined in this 
mediation, which I had the honour of proposing to Lord Aberdeen’s 
acceptance, and which he most kindly agreed upon.558   
 
Such hyperbolic statements did little to assuage the suspicions of those who 
considered Russian commercial expansion to be aimed at the gradual erosion of 
Ottoman power rather than demonstrating any level of altruism, particularly 
because Russian politicians – like British ones – were not united behind the 
prevailing policy of cooperation.   
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There nonetheless remained reasons for those who wished to pursue a 
mutually expansive policy to feel justified in their approach.  Foremost among these 
was the philosophy of Russians such as Nesselrode, who saw the future security of 
Anglo-Russian prosperity in the East in the existence of buffer states.559  The 
traditional competition along ‘front lines’ of commercial and military conflict was 
seen to be better replaced by a more fluid system of overlapping interests: 
Nesselrode applied the buffer state philosophy during Palmerston’s tenure at the 
Foreign Office and in that of Aberdeen.  Cases of this policy in action included 
Russian acquiescence in Britain’s entry to Afghanistan in 1838 and its distance from 
negotiations that concluded the war in 1842.560  Russia did not detach itself from 
interests in the country – trade deals with different Afghan factions continued 
throughout the British military engagement – but it did not seek to exclude Britain 
from strategic objectives in Afghanistan, a region of great geopolitical importance 
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. 
Nesselrode was someone with whom Aberdeen could work.  He was fiercely 
patriotic like the Tsar, and Russian interests would naturally be prioritised, but, as 
with Aberdeen, there was in Nesselrode a willingness to seek his country’s interest 
through cooperation.  He was the son of a Catholic and a Jew and descended from 
Hanoverians who had settled in Livonia, an area under Russian jurisdiction but with 
its own entrenched customs and national language.  Although this type of complex 
lineage was not uncommon in the Russian foreign service, it enabled Nesselrode to 
appreciate the viewpoints of other nationalities and contributed to an 
internationalist outlook, at least for the duration of the Peel government.561  In 
some respects these commonalities mirrored those between Aberdeen and Guizot 
who, as discussed in previous pages, was by no means the archetypal Frenchman. 
Aberdeen nonetheless needed to be careful not to allow Nesselrode’s 
professions of conciliation to distract him from the changeable nature of 
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international affairs and the unpredictable march of events: personnel and times 
change.  Alarm bells should therefore have been ringing when the Tsar visited 
England between 31 May and 9 June 1844, with the intention of discussing the 
future of the Ottoman Empire.  The visit itself went well.  The Tsar arrived at the 
terminus of the South Western Railway at 5.40 pm on Saturday 1 June to be 
greeted by Prince Albert, and the first of many grand dinners took place that night 
at Buckingham Palace, where Aberdeen and the other leading lights of the Peel 
government dined with Queen Victoria’s illustrious guest.562  Aberdeen wrote that 
‘the visit of the Emperor was most successful.  All ranks were equally charmed with 
him’ and in this sentiment he was joined by all including the host, who wrote that ‘a 
great event and a great compliment his visit certainly is, and the people here are 
extremely flattered at it.’563 
The incident that later overshadowed memories of this otherwise convivial 
visit was the Tsar’s pursuit of an Anglo-Russian contingency alliance in case of 
Ottoman collapse.  This involved the private pursuit of an arrangement whereby 
Britain and Russia agreed to act in concert if the future of the Ottoman Empire 
appeared to be threatened.  Many commentators – including Baron Stockmar, 
confidant of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert and present during the Russian visit – 
thought the alliance was designed to bring the Ottoman edifice down at the same 
time as erecting a diplomatic wall between Britain and France.564  Leopold I of 
Belgium – Queen Victoria’s uncle and cousin by marriage – held the same view: 
‘[The Tsar’s] policy is naturally to separate as much as possible the two great 
Western Powers; he is too weak to resist single-handed their dictates in the 
Oriental question; but if they act not in concert, it is evident that he is the master; in 
all this he acts wisely and in conformity with the great interests of his Empire.’565  
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The Russian project for an alliance excluded France and, coming at a time of 
apparent Anglo-French discord over the Prince de Joinville’s expedition to Morocco 
and the French annexation of Tahiti, it appeared to demonstrate Russian intentions 
once again to place France on the periphery of European affairs. 
The timing of the Russian visit need not be regarded as overly suspicious 
because Russia had for some time been making approaches to Britain about the 
Tsar visiting London.  The Tsar made his initial proposals when Aberdeen came into 
office and repeated them in 1843.566  Russian visits to Britain had also been planned 
in 1844 before the news of the Moroccan and Tahitian incidents had broken but, as 
had happened previously, Russian domestic difficulties were blamed for 
abandonment of the plans.567  This was an era in which the Court embraced royal 
visits from all nations: Prussian royalty visited England in 1842 and 1844, whilst 
French delegations came in 1843 and 1845.  Both the Court and the Conservatives 
showed them the appropriate degree of respect: Russia was not afforded special 
treatment.568  To Princess Lieven, Aberdeen recalled the King of Prussia’s visit in 
1842: 
 
I passed a great deal of time with the King of Prussia when he was in this 
country, and perfectly subscribe to the truth of the description you gave me of 
him before his arrival.  Intelligent, high-minded, and sincere.  Like all Germans, 
he is sometimes a little in the clouds; but his projects are generous, and he 
wishes to do what is right.  Our people liked him much, wherever he went; but 
you know that we are the most king-loving people on the face of the earth, 
and even if he had deserved it less, he would not have been without the 
applause of our population.569        
 
 Each group of visitors was treated with the necessary pleasantries, but more 
care needed to be paid with the Russians, as any concomitant weakening of the 
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Anglo-French relationship would affect the overall balance of Great Power 
relations.  Although Russia wished to work with Britain in Europe and in the East, if 
Britain and France could be divided then Russia would become the dominant force 
in Europe.  Britain’s voice carried more weight with France at its side, especially 
given the traditional links between Russia, Austria and Prussia.  Nesselrode’s 
expressions of official support for the existing state of Anglo-French relations, such 
as that reported by Britain’s representative in Russia, John Bloomfield, were 
equivocal: 
 
[Nesselrode] was supposed not to desire a close connection between Her 
Majesty’s government and that of King Louis Philippe [but] he placed too much 
value on the preservation of peace not to be well aware of the great 
advantage which Europe derives from the amicable relations of England and 
France […] His Excellency added that the present cordial good understanding 
between England and the Conservative Powers of Europe acted as a 
wholesome check upon France.570  
   
Whilst lip-service was paid to the prevailing Anglo-French accord, Nesselrode was 
putting out the diplomatic feelers for closer relations between Britain and Russia, at 
the expense of those between Britain and France. 
Aberdeen was alive to the dangers posed by Russian sleight of hand and his 
opinions squared with those of the wider Conservative government and Queen 
Victoria.  Whilst respectful views of the Tsar and his imperial station ensured a 
convivial visit, Britain was insured against Russian wiles by personal suspicions of 
the Tsar and an appreciation of the constant need to nurture the French 
relationship.  Aberdeen wrote of the Tsar that ‘in spite of his commanding 
appearance, and manner, and power, there is something about him which always 
inspired me with a sensation of melancholy.  I believe it is the expression of his eye, 
which is very peculiar […] Our friends at Paris have no reason to regret this visit; for 
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I think we shall all be the better for it.’571  Queen Victoria’s sentiments echoed 
those of her Foreign Secretary: 
 
The expression of the eyes is formidable. And unlike anything I ever saw 
before.  He gives me and Albert the impression of a man who is not happy, and 
on whom the weight of his immense power and position weighs heavily and 
painfully; he seldom smiles, and when he does the expression is not a happy 
one […] If the French are angry at the visit, let their dear King and their Princes 
come; they will be sure of a truly affectionate reception on our part.  The one 
which Emperor Nicholas has received is cordial and civil, mais ne vient pas du 
coeur.572   
 
 Nesselrode gave Aberdeen a memorandum of the conversations that took 
place during the Tsar’s visit – notably those relating to future cooperation over the 
fate of the Ottoman Empire if the fall of Turkish power was deemed imminent – 
and it appeared that Aberdeen’s acceptance of the memorandum brought Britain 
dangerously close to Russia.  It seemed to historians such as Puryear and, more 
recently, Alex Troubetzkoy, that an alliance with the Russians had been agreed.  If 
this was the case then it raised the possibility that Russia might connive at the 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire and embroil Britain via the agreement, 
something commentators would later suggest Russia was trying to achieve with its 
pre-Crimean policy.  Puryear went as far as to say that the agreement ‘was 
comprehensive enough to amount to an alliance on a world basis, for England 
obligated herself in conjunction with Russia and Austria to exclude France in an 
eventual partition of Turkey, the corollary of which would be cooperation in every 
other problem.’573 
It is worth turning to the memorandum in detail.  The opening lines posed 
few problems: 
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Russia and England are mutually penetrated with the conviction that it is for 
their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the 
state of independence and of territorial possession which at present 
constitutes that Empire, as that political combination is the one which is most 
compatible with the general interest of the maintenance of peace.  Being 
agreed on this principle, Russia and England have an equal interest in uniting 
their efforts in order to keep up the existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to 
avert all the dangers which can place in jeopardy its safety.  With this object 
the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly 
disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering without absolute 
necessity in its internal affairs.574 
 
There followed, however, sections of the document that have aroused 
suspicion of Russian intentions, including those that stipulated for interference in 
Ottoman affairs to enforce adherence to treaty obligations and to protect Christian 
subjects under Islamic dominion.  Although Russia’s pursuit of these ends was 
ostensibly innocent in the 1840s (discussion of this observation will follow, in 
relation to events in Greece and Serbia) Aberdeen’s acquiescence to such terms 
could encumber future British policy towards Russia. 
What was more important was that further references were made to the 
longer-term status of the Ottoman Empire: ‘Unforeseen circumstances may hasten 
its fall, without it being in the power of the friendly Cabinets to prevent it.’  
Cooperation between Britain, Russia and Austria was then discussed with the 
addendum that France would be powerless but to assent to the decisions of this 
triumvirate, given that Russia had preponderance of action on land and Britain at 
sea.   
The agreement made between Aberdeen and the Russians was 
commensurate with his desire to work with the Russian court in order to control its 
more ambitious elements – Canning and Palmerston had used this tactic before – 
but as a believer in the Vienna Settlement he would not have agreed to a binding 
arrangement of any kind, particularly not one that excluded France, the focus of his 
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foreign policy in the Peel government.  Whilst it was thought that the Ottoman 
Empire must inevitably fall apart, Aberdeen did not want to do anything to hasten 
its demise. 
A lack of clarity in communication with Russia was a major contributory 
factor in Nesselrode’s view of the British position. This ambiguity did not mean that 
Britain had actually agreed to an alliance, but blame must lie at Aberdeen’s door for 
the misunderstanding. He did not, however, abandon British interests in the East by 
deliberately chipping away at Ottoman power or, for that matter, abandon France.  
Nesselrode wrote to Aberdeen on 28 December 1844 in words that hinted at an 
alliance: the Tsar was said to feel ‘that [the memorandum] embodies the most 
exact résumé of his conversations with you and your colleagues, and that the 
principles which it establishes will be the most certain guide as to the course we are 
to follow in common in eastern affairs.’575  It was Aberdeen’s reply that created the 
confusion:576 
 
It gives me much pleasure to find that no differences exist respecting the 
accuracy of your statement, to which I already had borne my humble 
testimony.  The personal intercourse which I had the pleasure of renewing 
with yourself in the course of the last year led to the mutual expression of 
opinions in which I think that we are entirely agreed, and which I hope may be 
kept in view during all our negotiations with the Levant.577  
 
Although Aberdeen had not agreed to an alliance, his reply was sufficiently 
vague to let the Russians think that they had a gentleman’s agreement regarding 
the Ottoman Empire.  The Foreign Secretary’s response might be argued to have 
been made on logical grounds.  Rejection of a memorandum of warm but non-
committal conversations would have caused unnecessary offence to the Russians 
seeking cooperation with Britain, and given ammunition to those in the Greater 
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Russia Party seeking aggrandisement at British expense; it would have suggested 
British willingness to pursue an independent course and given Russia less incentive 
to maintain its policy of conciliation.  It remains that Aberdeen’s response left room 
for Russian misunderstanding, misrepresentation and manipulation.   
Aberdeen’s oversight contributed to the Great Powers’ mutual inability to 
comprehend each other’s policies in the 1850s as the Crimean War drew near.  
Disagreement broke out in 1851 between France and Russia over the relative 
influence of their respective Catholic and Orthodox religions in the administration 
of the Holy Places of Jerusalem.  When Russia began looking for allies in the 
dispute, using article VII of the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji as justification to protect 
the Orthodox religion and the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, the Tsar looked to 
Austria on the basis of their agreement at Munchengratz in 1833, and to Britain in 
light of the Nesselrode Memorandum.578  Britain, however, did not think Orthodoxy 
in danger nor deem the Ottoman Empire under threat from the Holy Places dispute, 
yet the Tsar nonetheless professed surprise and dismay at the lack of British 
acquiescence in Russian overtures for support.  These differing interpretations of 
existing agreements set into motion a chain of misunderstandings and mutual 
suspicion that would end in war.  
Historians of the Eastern Question have been attracted to the study of 
Nesselrode’s memorandum because of its implications for interpretation of British 
and Russian policy as the Crimean war broke out, but there were other more 
pressing eastern issues for Britain to grapple with in the 1840s.  The Russian and 
Ottoman dimensions of Aberdeen’s policy towards Greece have been largely 
overlooked, for example, as historians have concentrated their attentions on the 
way in which affairs affected the Anglo-French entente.579  Russia was one of the 
three guarantors of King Otho’s monarchy, so Anglo-Russian diplomatic intercourse 
on the future of Greece is worthy of attention as both sides campaigned for their 
interests to be upheld in a region where significant financial investments had been 
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made.  Aberdeen’s policy in Greece, apart from demonstrating the characteristics 
we have discussed in relation to Anglo-French policy, also shows the continuities 
with earlier Conservative policy, perhaps more clearly than in the case of British 
policy towards France and America.  The intellectual genesis of Aberdeen’s policy 
towards Russia in Greece was located in the old Conservatism of Wellington. 
In order to explore Anglo-Russian relations over Greece in the 1840s, it is 
necessary briefly to turn back to the 1820s, where the roots of that policy lay.  As 
has been noted, in the Wellington government, despite Aberdeen being Foreign 
Secretary, British foreign policy was directed by the Prime Minister.580  The 
overriding international objective of the Wellington government was to protect the 
system of Great Power cooperation and stability at a time when this was deemed to 
be under threat in the East, both from competing international interests and the 
policies of the previous government.581  Greece had revolted against Turkish rule in 
1821 and ongoing disturbance led to Britain, Russia and France signing the Treaty of 
London on 6 July 1827.  This paved the way for the creation of an independent 
Greek state under Turkish suzerainty by its provisions for mutual cooperation and 
the potential imposition of an armistice.  Prime Minister George Canning deemed it 
better to work with Russia in order to try and exert a measure of control over its 
actions, and he sensed an opportunity to split the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria 
and Prussia. 
Both Wellington and Aberdeen felt that the Treaty of London committed 
Britain to a situation in which it had little capacity to intervene or justification in 
interfering.  Aberdeen made various speeches in the House of Lords that might be 
described as exhibiting lukewarm enthusiasm for the treaty, or even to show 
hostility to it.582  He felt that the outbreak of discontent in Greece trapped Russia 
and the Ottomans in a morass of increasing mutual public antipathy and, 
eventually, war, that Great Powers could only exacerbate by intervention, whilst he 
and Wellington shared in a reactive conceptualisation of international affairs, as 
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evidenced in one of the Duke’s letters to his Foreign Secretary: ‘I quite agree with 
you.  [Britain] ought never to commit an act of violence or of injustice, excepting in 
its own defence, and after having exhausted all the other means of obtaining justice 
for itself.  This is not a very popular sentiment in England, but it is not the less the 
true policy for this country to follow.’583  This was a policy by which Britain was to 
react to the initiatives of others in order to protect its interests, rather than using 
proactive and/or confrontational means to bolster the British position. 
There are obvious practical limitations in restricting oneself to a detached 
supervisory role in international affairs, but these multiply if an existing agreement 
pulls in the opposite direction.  This conflict between a preference for reactive 
policy and existing treaty obligations led Aberdeen into declaring confused and 
sometimes contradictory policies towards the East, much to the irritation of 
Stratford Canning.584  A lack of coherent policy meant that Britain, to some extent, 
left itself as a hostage to fortune.  This was a charge that Aberdeen faced in his later 
dealings with Russia – those regarding the Nesselrode memorandum and his policy 
in the 1850s – and, as discussed earlier, in the crisis over the Spanish marriages in 
the 1840s.  The Treaty of Adrianople concluded the Russo-Turkish war in 1829 with 
territorial and commercial gains for Russia and this seemed to confirm the dangers 
of British vacillation.585 
We have discussed above how Aberdeen thought that Russia wanted to 
preserve the Ottoman Empire.  It was this logic that married with distaste for 
intervention (learned from those such as Wellington and Castlereagh) to drive 
Conservative policy towards Russia over Greece in the 1840s.  Stratford had long 
been warning of the danger of trouble in Greece spilling into the Ottoman Empire 
and other contemporaries and historians have expressed the same concern.586  
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Aberdeen was seen as risking Ottoman integrity by not taking a more decided stand 
in the developing crisis. 
There were a number of reasons why Aberdeen felt that the Greek situation 
could be resolved without the need to confront Russia.  Russia had always pursued 
something of a parental policy towards its international coreligionists and when the 
power struggle began between Greece’s political parties, the Tsar requested that 
King Otho renounce his Catholicism in order to placate his overwhelmingly 
Orthodox subjects.  Aberdeen’s reading of this request indicated that he had caught 
a whiff of the proverbial rodent: 
 
To require that a sincere and conscientious Prince should renounce the 
Catholic religion would be equivalent to the demand that he should abandon 
the succession altogether, for it must be presumed that compliance would be 
found impossible.  To say the truth I fear there is too much reason to suspect 
that this pretension is now put forward by those who are desirous of effecting 
the overthrow of the existing dynasty.587 
 
Russian interest in its coreligionists was not inextricably linked with Great Power 
politics, however, and there were reasons not to follow the trail of motivation from 
a Russian wish to see Otho overthrown, to deliberately fomenting trouble in a 
country bordering the Ottoman Empire, or to the desire to see a pro-Russian 
monarch installed on the Greek throne.  Barbara Jelavich has argued that the Tsar’s 
interest in the Greek Revolution was driven by genuine religious concern, rather 
than politics.  She has also cited various dispatches that demonstrate Russia’s 
irritation that revolution was ruining institutions that the Russian government had 
invested much effort and finance in creating.588  The Russians, like Britain, wanted a 
peaceable solution to the problem. 
Aberdeen’s letter nonetheless indicated that he was alive to the possibility 
that Russian interest in Greece might have arisen from a more geopolitical 
perspective, whilst sending it to Russia’s Ambassador to Britain gave a direct 
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reminder that Britain’s conciliatory overtures did not presuppose blind faith in 
Russian activity.  Other communications demonstrated this point, such as 
Aberdeen’s letter of October 1843 to the British representative in Greece, in which 
it was written that Russian moves on Turkey ‘would at once be forcibly and 
peremptorily repressed.’589  As in dealings elsewhere, Aberdeen’s public 
professions of good faith were coupled with correspondence that demonstrated 
British watchfulness and reminded the Russians of where the boundaries of good 
faith were to be found. 
As with affairs in Greece, events in Serbia provided another case where 
revolution seemed to carry wider significance regarding the fate of the Ottoman 
Empire, yet it is a theatre of the Eastern Question that has been largely overlooked 
by historians.590  Discontent had been increasing in Serbia since Mihailo Obrenović 
came to the throne in 1839 when his father Miloš abdicated.  Mihailo’s perceived 
inactivity and lack of care ultimately led to a revolution in which he was replaced by 
Alexander Karageorgević in 1842.  There was widespread anger at Russia’s attempts 
to keep the Russophile Obrenović in power, given that the revolution was seen to 
be aimed at the fulfilment of Ottoman commitments to reform Serbia and, 
therefore, to strengthen the bond between client state and imperial master, which 
decades of neglect had so damaged.   
Russia was widely suspected of seeking to maintain Obrenović’s power in 
order to damage Serbo-Ottoman relations and precipitate a Serbian move for 
independence at the expense of Ottoman power.  Aberdeen’s failure to intervene 
was seen by many to have cost Britain prestige and stability of trade, whilst 
evidencing Aberdeen’s failure to grasp the Russian policy of encroachment all over 
the Ottoman Empire.  Hansard’s recording of the Liberal Lord Beaumont’s oration is 
worth quoting at length, given his impassioned articulation of these arguments, and 
their wider application to Aberdeen’s overall approach to the Eastern Question: 
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He would not hesitate to declare that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
in this country had permitted a heavy blow to be struck at our political 
importance, as well as our commercial prosperity in the East, and by so doing 
had seriously endangered the very existence, as well as independence of the 
Ottoman Empire, for he must remind their Lordships that in the long series of 
attempts made by Russia against the Turkish empire, Serbia591 was but one 
chapter in the history, one thread in the web, one link in the chain with which 
that northern invader was seeking to encircle and bind down the Sublime 
Porte […] he knew not how to explain the conduct of Russia, unless he 
compared it to the habits of the spider, which, after having with consummate 
skill and systematic perseverance spun the foul web in which its victim is 
destined to entangle itself, retires to its nook, and there with sullen 
complacency and malignant patience, waits until the expiring victim has 
completely exhausted itself, and no longer able to attract attention by its 
struggles; then in silence approaches the entangled wretch, and at leisure 
devours it, when not a sound of complaint or an effort at resistance can be 
heard.592  
 
Lord Beaumont’s suggestion that Britain’s commercial interests were undermined 
by revolution in Serbia assumed that there were British interests there, but 
Aberdeen thought it ‘a province with which this country had no particular 
concern’.593  There seems no evidence to suggest any adverse effect on British trade 
in the region.  
Aberdeen’s response to Beaumont’s thoughts on Russian activity in the 
region was to criticise the revolution as an opportunistic coup that had been 
dressed up in the garb of a populist, liberal and democratic movement: ‘The noble 
Lord had distinctly referred to the revolt as an effect resulting from the attempt of a 
free people to exercise their right to elect their chief; but so far from this being 
correct, the revolt was the effect of a corrupt bargain with the Pacha of Belgrade, 
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and two or three ambitious Serbian chiefs.’594  However reasonable his points, 
Aberdeen’s dismissal of the revolutionaries’ genuine wish for reforms that the 
tyrannical Obrenović had failed to deliver, betrayed a lack of understanding of the 
situation in Serbia.  1842 had marked the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty of 
Bucharest, which had made provisions for democratic and social reform in Serbia 
that had hitherto proven elusive.  Karageorgević sought power to press for the 
reforms for which his people had long campaigned in vain. 
Aberdeen’s dismissal of widespread Serbian reforms derived from his 
enduring view that the Ottoman Empire could be patched up but not regenerated.  
His hostility to the reform movement in Serbia is likely to have been increased by 
the proclamations of Britain’s Consul-General in Belgrade, who saw reform as a 
gateway to political reconstruction in the Balkans, and whose views were widely 
publicised in British newspapers: 
 
Never was there such an opportunity for the re-establishment and complete 
restoration of the empire […] to reconstruct, if not a positive, at least a 
negative strength for Turkey […] Serbia, bound by fresh ties to Turkey, would, 
by her ascendancy, command the respect of the neighbouring provinces, and 
would be prompted by her own interests to attach them to their common 
suzerain.  By her moral influence, which extends very far, she would control 
Bosnia and Bulgaria, setting at the same time as a counterpoise to Greece, by 
the diversity and conflict of national tendencies.595     
 
Despite his Consul-General’s encomium, Aberdeen was sceptical.  The prospect of 
political reorganisation on the back of a revolution clashed with both Aberdeen’s 
ingrained political beliefs and his intellectual and practical investment in the 
existing balance of power.  Such messages from Belgrade set the Foreign 
Secretary’s alarm bells ringing and he commented in the House of Lords, with the 
usual restraint of the gentleman-politician: ‘Her Majesty’s Government did not 
entirely approve of the conduct of our Consul-General, it appearing to them that he 
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had gone beyond the province of his duty in pronouncing an opinion upon an 
internal revolution.’596 
There remains the accusation, as in other theatres of the Eastern Question, 
that the Conservatives’ diplomatic cooperation with Russia blinded Aberdeen to 
Russian encroachment on the Ottoman Empire.  The Morning Chronicle, that 
reliable critic of Conservative policy, offered the following opinions on the source of 
Russian motivation for its support of Obrenović: 
 
The Czar demands, first, the dismissal of the Patriot leaders and ministers […] 
authors of the revolution, and, secondly, the disgrace of Khiamil Pacha, who is 
known to have countenanced and encouraged the Patriots […] The Serbian 
revolution was carried into effect in the teeth of the Russian Consul-General at 
Belgrade, who exerted every effort to prevent its success, by supporting the 
deposed prince.  The revolution in itself is contrary to the undeviating 
principles and projects of Russia.597 
 
Aberdeen’s policy towards Russia and the Ottoman Empire had nonetheless 
been coherent and typically Conservative throughout the Peel government.  It 
combined the reactive and detached elements of Wellington’s Eastern policy with 
heightened socio-religious distaste for all things Islamic, although dim views of 
Muslim power were not exclusively Conservative.  Aberdeen’s views were not 
simply informed by his party’s intellectual inheritance, however, for the Ottomans 
were troublesome enough to fuel the criticisms of their detractors.  Examples of 
incompetence or conscious obstructionism were not difficult to find: the corruption 
spawned by the 1838 Anglo-Turkish treaty and Turkey’s failure to implement basic 
reforms in Serbia pointed towards a lack of control and/or care. 
Aberdonian policy in this period was also rooted in a geostrategic 
appreciation of the importance of the Ottoman Empire: Conservative foreign policy 
in this period was not based on abstract ideology.  The Ottoman Empire provided 
security for British trading routes as well as against potential Russian – or, for that 
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matter, French or Austrian – encroachment.  In short, its very existence was a 
practical reason to support it, for Ottoman endurance helped to maintain the 
balance of power so cherished by Conservative statesmen.  Aberdeen’s inherent 
Conservatism nonetheless prevented him from trying to remodel the Ottoman 
Empire on British constitutional and liberal values, preferring to plaster over cracks 
rather than trying to repair them.  Palmerston and Stratford thought Aberdeen’s 
refusal to countenance lasting reforms demonstrated a contradictory approach, but 
Aberdeen regarded the idea of trying to reform an inherently decaying power to be 
illogical.  The Conservative approach was to seek cooperation with other powers in 
order to try and build up a rapport that might be needed in due course to deal with 
Ottoman collapse. 
It remained of paramount importance to Aberdeen to keep the Ottoman 
Empire in existence for the duration of his tenure, and he saw it as important for 
Britain to protect Turkish integrity for many years after.  This much is clear from 
statements made about Russian policy in Greece and Serbia, where the potential 
for Russian encroachment elicited affirmations of Britain’s enduring support for 
Ottoman safety.  This was decades before Disraeli would seize the patriotic mantle 
for the Conservative Party with his vociferous and confrontational support of the 
Ottoman Empire, but Aberdeen’s was a patriotic and Conservative policy of its time.  
Private correspondence was used to remind the Russians that public proclamations 
of good faith were backed up with an underlying watchfulness to ensure that British 
interests were not compromised. 
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Chapter Six: Anglo-American Relations 
 Europe was not the only consideration in the Peel administration’s 
construction of foreign policy.  Like other British Foreign Secretaries of the previous 
decades, Aberdeen needed to have one eye fixed on the former colony that, even 
in the 1840s, held huge potential as an ally and economic partner, if the natural 
suspicions and rivalries between the two countries could be successfully 
negotiated.  The Peel administration’s handling of affairs was pressurised by 
tensions that had been allowed to escalate under the previous government.  An 
appreciation of this background is crucial to understanding the context in which 
Conservative policy was formed, especially as sections of the historiography have 
offered anachronistic interpretations of this background.     
The story of Anglo-American relations was for much of the twentieth-
century told as one of an inevitable and inexorable rapprochement between two 
powers with a common language and common objectives.  H. C. Allen’s seminal 
work of 1955 described the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth 
century as witnessing a ‘ripening of friendship’ that ‘appears in the growing 
similarity of political ideas and practices which accompanied the development of 
democracy in both countries, but particularly in Great Britain.’598  Britain’s 
democratisation was seen to have dissipated national distaste for the American 
democratic project, whilst Americans regarded the emergence of democratic 
procedure as diluting the British arrogance they had found so irritating.  Conversely, 
American economic development challenged the haughty view with which many 
Britons regarded the inhabitants of their former colony: Americans had been 
portrayed in literature as common, base, and intellectually deficient.599  
Winston Churchill expanded on Allen’s themes of developing friendship in 
his History of the English-Speaking Peoples, in which the steady improvement of 
Anglo-American relations was related to other historical forces: ‘The nineteenth 
century was a period of purposeful, progressive, enlightened, tolerant civilisation.  
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The stir in the world arising from the French Revolution, added to the Industrial 
Revolution unleashed by the steam-engine and many key inventions, led inexorably 
to the democratic age.’600  Later adherents to this view included Reginald Stuart, 
who in 1988 wrote that ‘emotional surges, as in the Maine – New Brunswick 
boundary dispute, the provincial rebellions of 1837, or the Oregon controversy in 
1846, could not deflect a strengthening Anglo-American diplomatic accord.’601 
The painting of the history of Anglo-American history with such broad 
brushstrokes is an approach that has recently been challenged by those such as 
Duncan Campbell, who argued that the rapprochement between the two countries 
was by no means inevitable: indeed, they were the ‘Unlikely Allies’ to which the 
title of his book pertained.602  Campbell’s analysis is supported by the sheer weight 
of transatlantic quarrels.  War nearly broke out between the two countries when a 
dispute over Cuba developed in 1822, which would have been the third major 
armed conflict between Britain and a nation that had only existed for four decades.  
Boundary disputes between the American and British territory on the North 
American continent provided a constant source of disharmony, whilst the issue of 
slavery saw an enduring clash between British abolitionism and the Americans’ 
perception of this movement as thinly veiled commercial opportunism.603  British 
assistance to the Confederacy in the American Civil War caused a serious diplomatic 
fissure in the 1860s and whilst the Alabama settlement went some way to repairing 
relations, the alliances of the twentieth-century were still in the distant future. 
Allen and Churchill’s works were published in the Eisenhower-Krushchev 
years of the Cold War, when strong Anglo-American relations were promoted in 
order to strengthen the democratic powers against the Soviet threat and the 
emergence of the People’s Republic of China.  Allen’s portrayal of Anglo-American 
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history was, by admission, to serve the age in which it was written: ‘I have not 
written this book purely as an academic study: I have written it because I believe in 
the necessity for cordial Anglo-American relations […] the future of democracy can 
only be safe in the hands of an Anglo-American alliance.’604  Such sentiments 
ensured that periods of transatlantic conflict were explained away as teething 
problems in a teleological historical narrative. 
Campbell’s account of a relationship that lurched between periods of 
hostility and times of relative calm is a more appropriate basis from which to 
understand the nineteenth-century context in which Conservative foreign policy 
was being made: the inevitability of Anglo-American accord would not have been 
apparent in the 1840s.  The Peel government came to power with Anglo-American 
relations in a state of disrepair.  A series of maritime incidents caused by conflicting 
views on slave issues raised the political temperature, whilst a succession of other 
crises had thrown unsettled boundary issues between British Canada and America 
into sharp focus.  Matters were not helped by the American perception, albeit 
mistaken, that Palmerston had called the American flag a ‘piece of bunting’.605  
Palmerston’s first tenure as Foreign Secretary had been one of comparative 
conciliation with America, dominated by assistance in the resolution of conflicts 
between America and France, but Aberdeen came to office amid heightened 
tensions.606   
The McLeod affair proved particularly inflammatory.  Alexander McLeod 
fought with Britain during the Canadian rebellion of the late 1830s and, in response 
to American support of the rebels, he helped a loyalist group to set the American 
Caroline ablaze and push it over Niagara Falls in December 1837.607  By 1841 
McLeod had been arrested and put on trial for the murder of an American, Amos 
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Durfee, during the attack on the Caroline, and Palmerston threatened ‘immediate 
and frightful’ war if McLeod was executed.608  American and British indignation at 
the other’s stance on this event combined with a host of other festering political 
sores to create a combustible atmosphere.  The New York Herald of 19 January 
1841 demonstrated this combustibility, with additional reference to Britain’s heavy 
handed anti-slavery measures: ‘The progress of British aggrandizement in every 
part of the world, savage and civilized, ought to alarm all independent nations […] 
our vessels are seized – our territory held – our waters invaded – our citizens 
murdered – our property outraged by British agency and British subjects.’609  
The increasing urgency with which Anglo-American disputes required 
resolution was fuelled by the rise of the nationalist, religious, and romantic 
American self-belief in its justification for expansion across the whole North 
American continent, which became known as ‘Manifest Destiny’.  This phenomenon 
helped to place the lack of agreed borders between Maine and New Brunswick and 
between Oregon and British Columbia on the political agenda, especially given that 
British frontier fortifications and manpower were limited.610  The issue of the 
borders had remained unresolved since vaguely worded references in the Treaty of 
Paris of 1783, but momentum was growing as fast as political action was going 
nowhere.   
American Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who would become the lead 
American negotiator on the Maine-New Brunswick boundary, reflected on the 
1830s with sarcasm: ‘Great progress this, surely?’611  Whilst in part trying to defend 
his own negotiating record in the 1840s, Webster criticised Palmerston’s parting 
suggestion of a further investigation to be led by scientists selected by the Kings of 
Prussia, Sardinia and Saxony.612  To halt the deterioration in Anglo-American 
relations, a new approach was envisaged: Webster ‘hoped to live long enough to 
see the north-eastern boundary settled; but that hope was faint, unless he could 
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rescue the question from the labyrinth of projects and counter-projects, 
explorations and arbitrations, in which it was involved.’613 
The accession of the Conservative government with Lord Aberdeen as 
Foreign Secretary presented both Britain and America with the best chance of a 
settlement yet.  Daniel Webster could use Aberdeen’s public professions of 
conciliation to sell his own to America and despite all the usual nationalist noises in 
the newspapers, a more optimistic tone could be detected that indicated the 
changing mood.  The New York Herald, in an article entitled ‘Our Relations with 
England’, now saw that ‘there is no reason to anticipate a period more auspicious 
for [the boundary dispute’s] equitable and satisfactory adjustment than the 
present.’614  
Aberdeen had long regarded Britain and America as natural allies and 
regretted both the historical and immediate hostility between the nations.  In 1811 
he articulated these sentiments in the House of Lords, expressing ‘regret, that two 
nations, who ought, from so many interesting circumstances, to be united in 
friendship, should have spent so much time in discussions on topics which 
separated their mutual interests and dispositions.’615  Aberdeen combined this 
belief in transatlantic kinship with an appreciation of the American mindset.  Wilbur 
Devereux Jones noted how the Foreign Secretary ‘understood perfectly the 
importance of dispelling the impression of superciliousness which Americans so 
keenly resented then in British statesmen’, and this was important given previous 
episodes.616  Canning’s time at the Foreign Office, for example, had been 
characterised more by strained relations than cooperation: his more 
confrontational outlook coincided with the American declaration of the Monroe 
Doctrine and, in later years, with the barely concealed Anglophobia of John Quincy 
Adams’ presidency.  Conflict peaked with the closure of British West Indian ports to 
American shipping in July 1826.617 
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Aberdeen’s overall approach to America, as to other nations, was rooted in 
the Peel government’s domestic political objectives and in the tradition of a 
cooperative yet robust Conservative foreign policy.  The need for a foreign policy 
that avoided entanglement and expense in order to channel energies and finance 
into domestic regeneration dovetailed with Aberdeen’s preference for a policy of 
open conciliation and the maintenance of British influence through mercantile 
enterprise.  This was particularly desired because the breakup of the Spanish 
Empire in the Americas had been having a destabilising effect on the international 
balance of power.  One of Aberdeen’s principal intellectual progenitors, Viscount 
Castlereagh, had soothed transatlantic relations in the wake of the Napoleonic wars 
via an economic strategy.618  A focus on the value of emerging American markets 
allowed Castlereagh to transcend British irritation at America entering the 
Napoleonic wars as cobelligerents of France: heightened economic intercourse was 
seen as the best method of securing British interests and peace.  As this chapter will 
outline, Aberdeen’s utilisation of economic relations for political purposes was 
central to his diplomacy, particularly in the dispute over the border between Maine 
and New Brunswick. 
The extension of an economic and political olive branch held out promise for 
the resolution of Anglo-American problems, given the Americans’ historical 
tendency to respond to domineering British policies with indignant political 
recalcitrance.  The mandate for this policy of conciliation has been challenged by 
Muriel Chamberlain, who argued that Aberdeen was ‘plainly out of tune with his 
colleagues’ with regard to American affairs, but evidence to the contrary will be 
examined.619  An initial barometer of British political opinion was Westminster’s 
rejection of the Duke of Wellington’s proposal that Britain should respond to 
transatlantic difficulties by making large increases in defence spending: the 
initiation of dialogue was preferred to spiralling preparations for conflict.    
In order to further examine Aberdeen’s implementation of Conservative 
policy, this study will examine the boundary disputes between the two countries.  
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As Duncan Campbell has outlined, they were the most pressing issues.620  The 
boundary disputes were complex problems and as such will be treated in separate 
chapters, particularly as the latter dispute featured a number of different 
personnel, most significantly a new American President with a vastly different 
approach to the old mother county.  Whilst there were other territorial issues, 
these were peripheral considerations such as the fate of Texas (governance of the 
Lone Star state was contested between American federalists and separatists, as 
well as potential Mexican conquerors).  As elsewhere, the Conservatives were 
uninterested in areas in which they did not perceive themselves to have a direct 
political concern: Aberdeen wrote that in Texas, Britain’s ‘objects are purely 
commercial, and she has no thought or intention of seeking to act, directly or 
indirectly, in a political sense, on the United States through Texas.’621  Similarly, 
American designs on California and its harbours elicited little interest from 
Aberdeen: Britain already exercised naval supremacy and, given that America 
sought to obtain California at Mexican expense, this was an area where Britain 
would not risk unnecessary conflict with both America and Mexico.622   
The only marginal political considerations in Texas involved whether or not 
slavery was to be allowed, and ensuring that there was no disruption to the vast 
cotton exports received from the Texans.623  Britain had tried with France to 
prevent annexation to the United States but, given that annexation was unlikely to 
affect these exports, that this was another area where Mexican and American 
interests clashed and threatened to drag others into war, and that French interest 
in the issue was equivocal, the project was shelved.  One historian has concluded 
that ‘Aberdeen lost interest in mediation and therefore reluctantly accepted the 
United States’ annexation of Texas.’624  This was only half true: Aberdeen had 
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never, with good reason, been fully interested in the first place.  In the Foreign 
Office to consolidate, he was more concerned with areas in which American 
expansionism threatened existing British possessions.  
The slavery issue provided a source of constant discord.  Britain’s attempts 
to put a stop to slavery by maintaining the right of search, which involved boarding 
suspected slaving ships in order to inspect their papers and cargo, caused 
consternation among Americans and other powers.  The clash of British 
abolitionism and the slaving interests of America (and other powers) was a vast and 
international concern that has already attracted numerous studies.625  It was also 
an area of government policy in which so many politicians were involved that it is 
hard to measure the nature and impact of Aberdonian endeavour.  For this reason, 
and because the existing historiography of the slavery issue is comprehensive, the 
issue requires only brief elucidation. 
Aberdeen was strongly opposed to what he called ‘this detestable traffick in 
human beings’ and his first ever vote in Parliament had been in favour of 
abolition.626  In the Peel government, Aberdeen was content to corral smaller 
nations into line with his views and British abolitionism, as was demonstrated when 
Brazil refused to renew its consent to the right of search in 1844, prompting the 
instigation of ‘Lord Aberdeen’s Act’, which engendered the unilateral British 
extension of the right of search to Brazilian ships.627  When it came to the United 
States or France, the two large powers with which significant slaving disagreements 
lingered throughout the 1840s, Aberdeen was reluctant to jeopardise wider 
objectives by pressing for abolition and the right of search that the two nations 
found so offensive.  Rival powers saw in British abolitionism an economic policy 
designed to undermine the lucrative markets of its competitors, dressed in the garb 
of humanitarian altruism.  Aberdeen recognised that overcoming this opposition 
was going not going to happen in the shorter term and concentrated on more 
immediate Conservative objectives.  It is hard to see, for example, that anything 
could have been achieved during the Webster-Ashburton negotiations if the mutual 
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antipathy caused by competing views on slavery had been allowed to permeate 
proceedings.  The Conservatives’ was a pragmatic course with little room for the 
pursuit of grand causes, however strongly Aberdeen and others felt about slavery. 
Aberdeen’s approach to the disputed boundaries with America was to get 
them negotiated as soon as possible, honourably and peaceably.  This would 
dampen the potential for conflict between America and Canada at a time when 
Britain was already having trouble with the internal stability of its North American 
dominion.628  Stability would regularise trade and the British willingness to 
compromise was thought to encourage a spirit where new markets could be 
opened with both America and Canada (which proved to be the case).  These 
objectives presented a challenge to which Peel responded in October 1841 by 
flirting with the idea of a separation from Canada, instead of becoming embroiled in 
its problems: 
 
Above all, if the people [of Canada] are not cordially with us, why should we 
contract the tremendous obligation of having to defend, as a point of honour, 
their territory against American aggression? […] if they are not with us, or if 
they will not cordially support and sustain those measures which we consider 
necessary for their good government and for the maintenance of a safe 
connection with them, let us have a friendly separation while there is yet time, 
rather than recommence a system of bickering and squabbling on petty points, 
the result of which will be increasing ill humour and alienation on their part, 
constant encouragement to American sympathisers, and ultimately the 
necessity of our vindicating British honour, with Canadians feeling adverse to 
us, the war at the door of the United States, and three or four thousand miles 
from our shores.629  
 
 Peel’s frustrations cooled as the magnitude of internal Canadian discontent 
decreased, however, and the Conservatives supported Aberdeen’s intentions of 
resolving matters by compromise with America rather than rashly cutting ties with 
                                                          
628
 For further detail, see Jones and Rakestraw, Prologue to Manifest Destiny, pp. 1-70; A. Corey, The 
Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations (New York, 1941). 
629
 Peel to Aberdeen, 25 October 1841, C. Parker, Sir Robert Peel, iii (London 1899), p. 389.  
181 
 
Canada.  Canada remained a valuable asset in an age when the development of 
South Africa, Australia and New Zealand was in its embryonic stages and, despite 
the growing recognition of the need for political reform, no serious breach was 
envisaged in calmer times.630  Peel confirmed to Aberdeen that ‘we must reach a 
settlement’ of the disturbances on both sides of the boundary.631  Whilst using 
more forthright language in the public domain in comparison with Aberdeen, as he 
had done in European diplomacy, his epistle of October 1841 further challenges the 
traditional portrayal of the Peel-Aberdeen relationship.  Here was a case where the 
Prime Minister flirted with a rash course of action that would have undermined 
British colonial and mercantile interests.  This was not the unflinching and 
dictatorial paterfamilias of the historiographical mainstream, intervening to negate 
the uncertain vacillations of the Foreign Secretary.   
Colonial Secretary Lord Stanley shared Peel’s considered views on the 
necessity of compromise and the overall Conservative balance-book approach to 
foreign policy: Angus Hawkins argued that, for Stanley, ‘secure profits, not more 
colonial possessions, were the key to Britain’s international pre-eminence.’632  
Stanley supported the search for compromise in America.633  The Duke of 
Wellington would always argue for a more confrontational policy than Aberdeen 
and favoured the use of a show of strength as the initial bargaining tool, but it was 
this approach that was out of step with Conservative foreign policy in the 1840s, 
not Aberdeen’s.  As in Europe, Peel found himself restraining the old military 
campaigner who, as a man with infinite public duties, often admitted that he had 
not read the documents relevant to the opinions he was expressing.  Stanley shared 
his frustration with the Duke’s excitability and his propensity to complicate policy-
making.634 
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Whilst keeping one eye fixed on wider strategic concerns, Aberdeen and the 
Conservatives needed to defend local British interests.  Within weeks of coming to 
power, leading Conservatives met to discuss potential plans for war if American 
demands proved too much.635  As with Aberdeen’s European policy, Britain would 
be transparent with its negotiating position in the hope that this might elicit a 
reasonable response, but as with French activity in Tahiti and Morocco, this 
openness did not give the other power the freedom to take advantage and act how 
it pleased.  America was instructed that British conciliation would only stretch so 
far: peace was desirable, but not at any price. 
War was nonetheless thought unlikely.  This contrasted with the views of 
certain historians who believed that war with France and/or America was almost 
inevitable throughout the period of the Conservative government.  These include 
John Galbraith, who paid particular attention to the Oregon boundary.636  
Meanwhile, Jones believed that the letters of certain American senators, claiming 
that France would stand with the United States in the event of war over the Maine-
New Brunswick boundary, provided proof of the likelihood of this possibility.637  
Kenneth Bourne also suggested that a third Franco-American coalition could have 
been initiated against Britain in the 1840s: 
 
In the neutrality of the French […] few Englishmen had any great […] faith.  
With the possible exception of the quarter interlude of 1871-95 they lived for 
a century in almost constant fear of a repetition of 1778 or 1812, the occasions 
on which they believed the French had taken advantage of Britain’s troubles in 
America. […] The British acquiesced all the more readily for fear of 
complications in Europe.  The settlements of 1842, 1846 and 1871 were but 
further episodes in the same story.638 
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This is a tempting theory, but the chance of Britain facing a war with either 
France or America was small; the chance of France and America entering a war 
against Britain as cobelligerents was smaller still.  France was an ambitious power 
but Guizot was genuinely supportive of Aberdeen and would have been reluctant to 
act against his colleague.  The entente added further moral pressure and, besides, 
Anglo-French cooperation saved France from the isolation in which it would almost 
certainly otherwise find itself; there was little likelihood of support from the 
conservative powers.  All France and America had in common during the 
Ashburton-Webster negotiations was distaste for Britain’s approach to slavery, and 
those who wanted to create a storm from this issue found themselves in the 
minority: the French were a divided people in the early 1840s.  Henry Blumenthal 
summed up this argument: ‘whatever aspirations France had for world leadership, 
its divided councils caused an indecision that played into the hands of its rivals.’639  
France found no common cause at all with America during the Oregon boundary 
dispute and Guizot expressed many concerns about the problems that war over 
Oregon would engender. 
Unilaterally, America was unlikely to consider war with Britain; it wanted 
instead to settle its boundaries with Canada and facilitate expansion to the west 
and south, which it knew it could achieve with relatively little opposition.  The 
presidents with whom Aberdeen dealt also posed little threat of war.  John Tyler 
was preoccupied with domestic politics and consequently sought conciliation on 
the international stage.640  James Polk would play a game of noisy patriotic 
brinksmanship over the Oregon boundary but this was a bluff that was eventually 
exposed, as will be considered below.  Polk might have joined a war with France 
against England over the Oregon affair if the French had been interested in starting 
one, but they were philosophically and practically against this. 
French pressure was for a settlement.  Guizot reflected on the possibility of 
war in a letter to the French chargé d’affaires in Washington, Alphonse Joseph Yves 
Pageot: ‘we warmly desire that a pacific solution takes place, for it would be doubly 
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regrettable if the peace of the world were threatened by such a matter, and we are 
in any case firmly decided to keep the most complete neutrality as long as it will be 
possible for us to do so.’641  From the rest of the letter French reluctance to fight 
was clear.  Pageot shared these views and demonstrated them in a letter to Guizot: 
‘the American democracy is animated by a spirit of usurpation that can endanger 
the peace of the world.’642  The writings of French intellectuals added to a 
consensus that France saw America as a danger to its interests during Aberdeen’s 
tenure, rather than a vehicle by which to obtain them at Britain’s expense.643 
Aberdeen’s American policy was founded on the need to foster trade 
through peace and cooperation and to breathe life into Britain’s flagging economy 
by doing so: it did not derive from concerns about war with France or America.  
Russia and Austria concentrated on European affairs in this period so Aberdeen was 
free to pursue a policy born of Conservative objectives and his humanitarian 
distaste for war without fear of international intervention.   
The negotiations over the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick 
have resulted in a number of charges against Conservative policy.  Aberdeen’s 
instructions have been deemed to be incomplete and confusing; it has been 
suggested that his selection of Lord Ashburton as British negotiator resulted in 
greater concessions than might otherwise have been made; and, given that the 
mission was initially supposed to resolve all outstanding disputes between Britain 
and America, there has been criticism of the fact that Ashburton solved little more 
than the boundary issue.  These charges are more noticeable in the work of British 
and Canadian historians than in that of their American counterparts.644  But the 
critical question is whether the treaty actually protected British interests.  This 
consideration has often been lost in a historiography overly concerned with 
diplomatic minutiae. 
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The debated land and final settlement of the boundary question can be seen 
in the following map.645  The 1831 arbitration referred to is that conducted by the 
King of Netherlands, whose verdict formed a point of reference throughout 
negotiations: 
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To protect British interests Aberdeen needed to ensure that a commercial 
and potential military route existed in relative safety, to take resources from Halifax 
down the course of the St. Lawrence River.  Having American territory too close to 
187 
 
the St. Lawrence provided a threat to British territory, particularly given the lack of 
natural obstacles in that area.  The Madawaska Settlements in the Aroostook Valley 
were at the time areas of pine swamp but some, including, occasionally, Ashburton, 
thought that they might be useful when developed in the future.  Local interest in 
this area was intense, however, something that was typified by the (albeit tragi-
comic) Aroostook war in the late 1830s.646 
Aberdeen’s initial failure to mention specific strategic concerns to 
Ashburton has been seen by some as a dereliction of duty that led to confused 
negotiations, with the Duke of Wellington needing to step in to resolve this.647  
There is some mileage in the first argument given that Aberdeen could have spent 
the time he had been in government getting better prepared, especially as there 
had been an enforced delay whilst waiting for weather conditions to be fit for an 
Atlantic crossing.  Rather than allowing time to further damage the chance of 
reconciliation when the climate was favourable, however, Ashburton’s prompt 
departure at least ensured that America was shown that Britain’s commitments to 
conflict resolution were real.648  Aberdeen intended for Ashburton’s precise 
instructions to catch up with him on their way across the Atlantic and, in the 
meantime, he sent Ashburton away with several batches of papers so that the full 
history of the dispute and the present situation would be known.649  Aberdeen also 
gave Ashburton one concrete instruction: the award of the King of the Netherlands 
was as far as Britain was prepared to be pushed.650  
Wellington corresponded with Aberdeen on the subject of America in 1841 
but only to make general assertions about the need to stand firm: Aberdeen’s 
instructions to Ashburton predated his correspondence with Wellington on the 
topic of the Netherlands award.651  It was later in February that Wellington wrote to 
Aberdeen, with reference to the history of the Netherlands award: ‘let it be 
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understood that the whole of [the territory] is a matter of negotiation, and that we 
who accepted are no more bound to any part than the United States who rejected 
the whole.’652  This elicited a deferential response from Aberdeen but one that did 
not change the fundamentals of his instructions to Ashburton: the Dutch King’s 
award remained the limit of British conciliation.653  It was also the state of Maine 
that had rejected the award rather than the United States, which evidenced 
Wellington’s lack of familiarity with the specifics of the dispute. 
Where Wellington appeared to have influenced Aberdeen’s instructions was 
in the extent to which the potential British land beyond the Netherlands award 
should be contested.  Aberdeen wrote to the Duke in March 1842: 
 
In consequence of your observations on Lord Ashburton’s Instructions, I wrote 
to him, and in a private letter desired him to suspend all proceedings on the 
subject of the North East Boundary, until his Instructions should have received 
the necessary alterations […] By Lord Ashburton’s former Instructions he was 
authorised to accept the award of the King of the Netherlands, in case of 
necessity, as his ultimatum.  By the present draft he is to make the acquisition 
from the United States of that portion of territory which is considered 
essential to us, a sine quâ non.654 
 
Wellington had certainly encouraged Aberdeen to seek the advice of military 
personnel, namely Sir James Kempt, Sir George Murray and Sir Howard Douglas, but 
while all agreed on the need for a military road, none could agree on the specifics 
of its route.655  Aberdeen’s letter calmed Wellington but effected no real change to 
policy, as ‘that portion of territory which is considered essential to us’ remained 
undefined. 
Whilst the lack of precise instructions irritated Ashburton at times, 
Aberdeen’s overall message was clear: the United States must not receive more 
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land than was awarded by the Dutch King and ‘the most indispensable condition for 
the security of our North American possessions is to be found in a direct and 
constant communication between Quebec and the Sea at the Port of Halifax.’656  
How much land Britain obtained beyond the Netherlands award was left to Lord 
Ashburton, which has led to Aberdeen being accused of carelessness, but these 
charges overlook the nature of the dispute and the nature of the mission.  
Ashburton was sent to engage in personal diplomacy with Daniel Webster in an 
attempt to overcome the partisan posturing that undermined the conclusions of 
more traditional arbitrations and negotiations.  Personal negotiations – without 
constant reference to London or overly prescriptive instructions – allowed 
Ashburton to keep up momentum and to respond with haste to the problems 
caused by tensions between the federal administration and local politicians.  There 
was also conflict between Maine and Massachusetts politicians, as Massachusetts 
had retained ownership of some of the land in Maine as part of the terms of 
Maine’s independence in 1820.  This was a complex dispute in which a degree of 
fluidity in Ashburton’s instructions seemed a sensible way to bring about a 
settlement. 
Flexibility in the negotiations required that Aberdeen chose a man who 
could be relied upon to invest sufficient effort in securing British interests.  
Ashburton, married to an American, was a landowner in the region in dispute, and a 
banker for whom Daniel Webster had worked as a lawyer on some of his American 
ventures.  To some, this suggested a lack of care for British interests.657  He viewed 
the negotiations as ‘tedious’ and frequently expressed annoyance with the 
mission.658  Many historians have criticised an attitude that Ephraim Douglass 
Adams branded ‘cavalier’.659  Jones observed that Palmerston would not have 
chosen Ashburton: indeed, Palmerston called Ashburton ‘most unfit’ in the House 
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of Commons.660  Lord John Russell deemed Ashburton’s selection ‘unfortunate’, 
given his background and perceived overenthusiasm for making concessions.661  
All of this rather missed the point; of course Aberdeen would not have 
chosen the kind of negotiator Palmerston or Russell would have chosen, and his 
selection of Ashburton should not be judged on their terms.  In the first place, there 
were good reasons for circumventing the British minister at Washington, Henry Fox, 
whose manners made him unpopular with the Americans: Merrill Peterson 
described Fox as ‘a withered, gray [sic], little old man, addicted to opium, 
overwhelmed with debts, he never entertained and his only amusement was at 
cards.’662  Ashburton’s financial stake in the area also ensured that he would want a 
lasting and peaceful settlement, something that could not be achieved by short-
changing Canada.663  
Ashburton’s selection must also be viewed in the context of the political 
situation in America, in that his opposite number shared his willingness to 
compromise.  Daniel Webster had lived and worked in England as Ashburton had 
lived and worked in America and the two friends were based in nearby houses in 
Washington on Lafayette Square.664   Although personal diplomacy aroused 
national suspicions that one negotiator was influenced by the other, this close 
contact helped to facilitate a situation in which both men would look for a 
compromise with which they could be content.665  As Ashburton commented, his 
mental and geographical proximity to Webster helped to overcome the ‘delay and 
difficulties’ resulting from ‘the present condition of this government’ in Maine.666  
By contrast, friction between Fox and Webster over the belligerency of local 
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politicians had hitherto proved to be an obstacle to Anglo-American 
reconciliation.667 
Circumstances in America vindicated Aberdeen’s decision to trust in 
Ashburton and his personal diplomacy with Webster.  As Thomas Le Duc and other 
historians have argued, interest in the boundary on a local level far outweighed 
federal interest in specific details.668  Webster could thus be relied upon to see the 
broader picture, as demonstrated in a letter to Ashburton: ‘in our conferences on 
the boundary question, we have both been of the opinion that no advantage would 
be gained by resorting, at this time, to discussion at length of the grounds on which 
each party considers its claim of right to rest.’669  This was a sentiment he repeated 
in correspondence with his American colleagues.  Webster wrote to Edward Everett 
(American Ambassador to Britain, 1840-5) comparing Ashburton’s circumstances 
and outlook to his own: Ashburton had ‘the advantages of much knowledge and 
experience in public affairs […] with a true desire to signalize his mission by assisting 
to place the peace of the two countries on a permanent basis.’670  Although the will 
to compromise was not universal among Americans, Everett was another member 
of the political majority who shared this will.671 
The compromise settlement determined by the Washington Treaty of 
August 1842, as detailed on the above map, protected the interests that Aberdeen 
had set out to achieve: a mutually acceptable boundary that encouraged economic 
prosperity by soothing Anglo-American relations in the region and on a wider scale.  
President Tyler reflected on the ‘security afforded to mercantile enterprise’ and 
Aberdeen set out the economic benefits to Britain in the House of Lords.672  
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Palmerston branded the treaty as the ‘Ashburton capitulation’ and an article of the 
same title took Palmerston’s views to a wider audience:  
 
There is not, perhaps, on record, any more miserable specimen of diplomatic 
address.  Often have English negotiators been charged with a degree of 
inferiority in this respect, but never, I believe, has the world witnessed such a 
total want of sagacity, firmness, and tact of any kind […] England’s 
representative expatiates on the value and necessity of peace, as if war had 
terrors for England alone.673  
 
Given that many Americans called it the ‘Webster capitulation’, one might conclude 
that the settlement was in fact fair to both parties.674  War for extra land of 
questionable value seemed an unnecessary undertaking.  Indeed, Britain had 
improved on the arbitral Netherlands line and secured extra land to the west of the 
mouth of the St. John River, thus affording a measure of added protection to the 
commercial-military route from Halifax along the course of the St. John.675  
Palmerston’s objections appeared to be for the purpose of political grandstanding, 
given that he had written at the time of the Netherlands award commending a 
‘liberal compromise’ proposal that did not ‘favour either party’.676 
Aberdeen suspected that more land could have been obtained with a firmer 
line but deemed a speedy reconciliation with America more important than 
territory that he did not equate with British interest.677  The satisfaction of the 
military experts that Canada was sufficiently secure from American attack lent 
support to this viewpoint, in that speed and conciliation had not come at the 
expense of strategic objectives: Aberdeen wrote in reflection that ‘according to the 
military authorities whom we consulted, we have obtained by the treaty all that is 
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essential to our security, and with this we ought to be satisfied.’678  This approach 
met with the approval of Peel: 
 
The possession of a few hundred square miles of territory, more or less, was of 
little importance compared to the adjustment of differences which had now 
existed for nearly half a century […] differences which, from their long 
continuance, and from their peculiar nature, were calculated, unless speedily 
and definitely adjusted, to leave but little hope that peace could be 
preserved.679 
 
Lord Brougham concurred with Peel and proclaimed, with reference to the 
boundary, that he was ‘utterly indifferent what direction that line takes, let it go a 
few miles or leagues to the right hand or to the left hand […] welcome!  Take it all!  
Give it up!  Only give me peace between America and England.  But, my Lords, I am 
not left to that in defending the treaty.’680 
Many other opposition figures took a rather dimmer view of Aberdeen and 
the Conservatives’ willingness to compromise.  Russell joined Palmerston in 
denunciation of the treaty by saying that ‘I do not myself see why a little more 
firmness on the part of Lord Ashburton might not have led to a more advantageous 
settlement.’681  Although this might well have been a possibility, opposition 
criticisms would have carried more weight if the previous government had made 
tangible progress with the dispute.  Lord Stanley argued this point in the House of 
Commons and added to the Conservative consensus on the issue: ‘Was it not 
notorious that the late Government had for a long time been engaged in 
negotiations with the Government of the United States upon all the questions 
comprehended in the Ashburton Treaty?  How was it, then, if the matter were so 
easy that they had not obtained a better treaty?’682 
The only thing to have changed about the Webster-Ashburton negotiations 
since their outset was a controversy over maps.  Various maps of the disputed 
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territory had been produced during and after the Treaty of Paris with proposed 
boundary lines suggesting the extreme American claim, the extreme British claim, 
and just about every other possibility in between.  Ashburton reflected on the 
discovery that American historian Jared Sparkes had provided Webster with a map 
supporting the entire British claim: ‘I should certainly, if I had known the secret 
earlier, have made my stand on the upper St. John and probably at the Madawaska 
Settlements.’683  This led to the criticisms of Palmerston and Russell and has led 
historians such as Howard Jones and Donald Rakestraw to conclude that ‘if 
Ashburton had learned of the maps supporting the entire British claim, he could not 
have given in without betraying his own people.’684 
The argument over different maps was in fact redundant.  Historians such as 
Samuel Flagg Bemis have concentrated on analyses of individual maps, but such 
analysis misses the bigger picture: competing claims and counterclaims constituted 
one of the main reasons why the issue had hitherto remained unresolved.685  
Aberdeen’s approach of setting a minimum claim with flexibility beyond it helped to 
transcend this problem, especially given that there were just as many maps 
confirming the extreme American claim as confirmed the British: one of these 
maps, known to Aberdeen and his predecessor Palmerston, lay concealed in the 
British Museum.686 
Both Aberdeen and Webster were aware of maps supporting the claim of 
the other.  This was one of the reasons why the historian can appreciate the 
genuine nature of the spirit of conciliation and compromise between the British and 
American federal representatives.  Although Aberdeen received opposition criticism 
for this, Webster was actually impeached for his role in negotiations, with multiple 
suspicions of his having suppressed maps supporting the American claims and using 
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maps supporting the British claims, along with bribery, to placate local officials.687  
The impeachment failed but, despite its party political background, it went to show 
the extent of contempt in which sections of America held Webster for his 
compromise with Britain.  This further detracts from the proposition that Aberdeen 
and Ashburton had been cajoled by America.  
Aberdeen has faced further criticism over the negotiations in 1842 for failing 
to resolve other outstanding issues with America, including disputes over slavery 
and the boundary between Oregon and British Columbia.  He had initially hoped to 
solve these problems, but it soon emerged that an all-encompassing resolution to 
Anglo-American issues was too problematic.  The Creole affair added heat to the 
traditional disputes over the extent to which Britain was allowed to police slaving 
and proved an obstacle to an agreement that was already highly improbable, given 
the antipathy to which the slave debate gave rise.688  The Creole was an American 
brig that had been engaging in the legal slave trade along America’s Atlantic coast 
when the slaves on board mutinied and steered into Nassau in the British Bahamas.  
Here they were granted manumission, much to America’s chagrin. 
Failure to resolve disagreement over the legality of British action and to 
reach a wider agreement on slaving prompted criticism from opposition MPs.  
Charles Napier spoke of ‘ignominious’ failure and Palmerston also attacked 
Aberdeen and the government.689  Peel considered in the House of Commons why 
Palmerston had not raised the slave issue until after the Ashburton-Webster treaty 
had been concluded, perceiving his rival’s rhetoric to have masked a lack of 
progress in the cause of abolitionism: ‘he was aware, that all would have felt it to 
be an unseemly thing in him, who had been the cause of this interruption in the 
progress of humanity.’690  Palmerston had hardly been the sole cause of Anglo-
American discord on slavery, but his bold criticisms of American slave policy had not 
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helped and they provided the rocks on which his criticisms of Aberdeen foundered: 
Palmerston had played his part in creating a highly charged atmosphere. 
One historian has observed that it would have been ‘practically impossible’ 
for Aberdeen to have resolved slave disputes with America at this time.691  Indeed, 
unlike the boundary question, slavery was a broader international issue and, given 
that it affected international law and other slaving nations, Aberdeen’s favoured 
method of personal diplomacy could not be employed.  The resolution of the Creole 
affair itself would have suggested that Britain was able to be browbeaten, given 
that the indignation and hostility of the Americans was so entrenched.  Aberdeen 
could not afford to respond to such agitation in the name of better relations: part 
of the Washington treaty introduced measures for the mutual extradition of 
criminals, under which Webster wanted those involved in mutiny and revolt to be 
included.692  This held obvious implications for the slaves and British officials in 
Nassau and would have created a storm in Britain.   
Aberdeen was as firm on this as he had been flexible over the boundary 
negotiations. He instructed Ashburton that the extradition agreement must not 
include those involved in the Creole affair and, after the signing of the treaty, wrote 
to Peel asserting that Webster’s protests on the issue of slavery could ‘scarcely be 
expected to lead to any practical result.’693  Given that slave issues had actually 
been the foremost priority for Webster, their exclusion from the final treaty 
demonstrated both Aberdeen’s refusal to abandon issues he knew would be 
inflammatory at home, and Webster’s willingness to compromise.694  One American 
commentator expressed frustration at this situation: ‘the mission took the 
character of beneficient [sic], in professing to come to settle all questions between 
the two governments; but ended in only settling such as suited Great Britain, and in 
the way that suited her.’695 
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The other boundary issue between the United States and British North 
America was that which concerned contested territory in Oregon.  Negotiations in 
the northwest proved still more controversial than those in the northeast, with 
both Britain and America at times threatening war if their demands were not met.  
The Oregon negotiations provide a case study through which to analyse 
Conservative policy when it was made in a more hostile environment than had 
prevailed elsewhere.  
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Chapter Seven: Anglo-American Relations: The Oregon Question 
 
British interests in the Oregon dispute, as elsewhere, involved the 
protection of British trade, the security of existing British possessions, and the 
maintenance of British honour.  Aberdeen set about achieving these ends with his 
usual approach of personal diplomacy and professing genuine conciliation, but with 
the readiness to use force if this openness was abused.  This chapter will examine 
these methods and consider his handling of Richard Pakenham, British Minister in 
Washington from 1844, which has coloured interpretations of Aberdeen’s overall 
policy.  Aberdeen’s policy in the final months of negotiations requires particular 
consideration, because it shows how the Foreign Secretary applied his methods in 
order to reach a settlement with America.  The extent to which the final settlement 
protected British interests is usually lost in the largely narrative historiography.  
Here, press, popular and political reactions to his policy will be considered to 
examine Aberdeen’s wider mandate.  
Britain’s failure to resolve the Oregon boundary during the Ashburton-
Webster negotiations provoked criticism.  The Marquess of Clanricarde expressed 
concern for the longevity of peace as long as questions remained unsettled and the 
Marquess of Lansdowne spoke in the House of Lords about his unease: he deplored 
‘that anything should have been left unsettled’ and exhorted the government: 
‘before the wax bearing the impress of their seal to the treaty had become cold, 
before the breath, even of the negotiators had ceased its utterance, they had to 
turn from the frontier of New Brunswick to the Oregon.’696  Historians such as 
Charles Sellers have reiterated claims that this proved the effeminacy of Aberdeen’s 
policy, calling Aberdeen ‘lady-like’, as did elements of the press: Aberdeen might 
have solved the Oregon boundary if he had approached the negotiations in 
Washington more ‘manfully’, as an article in the Manchester Times asserted.697  For 
contemporaries, men that were perceived to be afraid of confronting their rivals 
were deemed to exhibit feminine characteristics, whilst those that were perceived 
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to demonstrate diplomatic fortitude conformed to the contemporary 
conceptualisation of manhood, and were lauded for doing so.  Such observations 
have since merged with the historiographical phenomena considered in earlier 
chapters, so that liberal politics, John Bullism and masculinity have merged into a 
historiographical ideal of what it meant to be British and, ergo, a successful 
politician.  There was, of course, no room for Aberdeen’s Conservatism in this 
model. 
 
 
  
More considered criticism has concentrated on Aberdeen and Webster’s 
competing territorial claims for Oregon during the Washington negotiations.698  The 
disputed land in the boundary negotiations was that which was still under joint 
occupation by the terms of an Anglo-American treaty of 1827.  This was the 
territory enclosed at its northern and southern extremities by the fifty-fourth and 
forty-second parallels of latitude, and enclosed at its eastern and western ends by 
                                                          
698
 For this map, see historylink.org. 
200 
 
the continental divide with British North America and the Pacific coast.  Aberdeen 
initially instructed Ashburton not to accept anything less than the land above the 
forty-ninth parallel and territory beneath it that was enclosed by the course of the 
Columbia River.699  As Julius Pratt has shown, the extra land beyond the forty-ninth 
parallel proved to be the stumbling block in negotiations.700  Given that Aberdeen 
later deemed the land between the forty-ninth parallel and the Columbia River 
inessential to British interests, it is conceivable that the problem might have been 
solved in 1842 if British demands had been reduced.   
Failure to resolve the boundary in 1842 transpired to be more of a problem 
than might have been predicted at the time: the subsequent growth of belief in 
‘Manifest Destiny’ would increase American resolution in future negotiations.701  
The nationalist element of the American sense of entitlement in Oregon increased, 
as can be seen in the work of Robert McNutt McElroy.702  The religious impulses for 
expanding American territory in Oregon also increased, partly as a result of the 
biblical ideal of maximising the use of land, which Americans felt they were best 
placed to do, and partly from news that Native Americans in the area, especially the 
Nez Percé, were seeking conversion to Christianity.703   
These impulses transmitted into a wave of American immigration into 
Oregon, which aimed at bolstering America’s claim to the area.  American 
politicians encouraged this immigration with an 1843 law allowing a white male to 
acquire one square mile of land for free and with a policy of letting the question 
drift in order to maximise American settlement: John Calhoun famously described 
this process as ‘masterly inactivity’.704  In these circumstances, frustration with 
Aberdeen’s inertia emerged in the Press: the Glasgow Herald concluded that the 
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Hudson’s Bay Company, Britain’s dominant business enterprise in the area, was ‘to 
vanish into the sea before the tide of emigration.’705  
Historians have criticised Conservative policy for being complacent about 
the dominance of the Hudson’s Bay Company and noted that the concerns of 
officers in the company were eliciting little response from the government.706  One 
officer wrote to Aberdeen’s brother, John Gordon, who was captain of a British 
vessel in the area: 
 
The American immigrants arrive in this country strongly prejudiced against us, 
in consequence of the calumnies propagated by designing persons in the 
United States, and of an assertion made in the Senate by the late Dr. Linn on 
the occasion of introducing his Oregon bill, that the Hudson’s Bay Company 
[…] had caused five hundred American citizens to be murdered on the west 
side of the Rockies.707 
 
Immigration was in fact rather limited given the size of the debated territory and 
was generally confined to areas that were likely to be awarded to America.708  
Gordon took a different view of immigration, writing to Britain’s Commander-in-
Chief in the Pacific Sir George Seymour, that the Hudson’s Bay Company 
encouraged American immigration by offering to trade so many supplies with 
arriving settlers.709  This was something with which William Peel, Robert Peel’s son 
and leader of a reporting mission to Oregon, agreed.  He added that British 
connections with local peoples helped settlers to integrate.710  Criticisms of the 
government tended to overlook the consideration that immigration was not viewed 
with political suspicion on the ground. 
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Whilst delay in solving the Oregon question did allow American settlements 
in the area, the extent to which these settlers were hostile to Britain was debatable, 
and Aberdeen regarded ‘masterly inactivity’ as potentially beneficial to Britain.  He 
wrote to Richard Pakenham, British Minister in Washington from 1844, that ‘Mr. 
Calhoun is known to have heretofore expressed an opinion in the Senate, that the 
great object on the part of the United States ought to be to gain time […] delay 
would by no means be unfavourable to Great Britain.’711  Being occupied in 1843 
and 1844 with the construction and maintenance of the Anglo-French entente, 
which took greater precedence than a faraway boundary dispute, Britain could save 
itself for quieter times and consider its position.  This approach came with its 
problems, not least the emboldening of confrontational elements in America, but 
European policy was prioritised. 
Aberdeen’s full engagement with the Oregon issue began late in 1844 and 
ended with the bill for its resolution passing the Senate by thirty-eight votes to 
twelve on 12 June 1846.  As with the Washington negotiations, historians have 
pointed to Conservative worry about potential French interference as providing a 
backdrop to the construction of Aberdeen’s conciliatory policy.712  But, again, whilst 
France maintained friendly diplomatic relations with the United States, Aberdeen 
recognised that its interest in the Oregon issue was minimal: references to Gallic 
concerns are notable by their general absence in his American correspondence.  
Besides aforementioned French concerns with American policy, France was 
concerned that northern American politicians were holding out for all of the 
disputed territory to provoke a war that would enfeeble Britain and potentially 
incur a slave rebellion in the South.713  Mexico might then take advantage and 
attack the South.  This would hardly square with Guizot’s concerns about 
maintaining the balance of power and, besides, as Pageot observed: ‘I do not think 
[…] that they will ever get an American congress to take the initiative in declaring 
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war on Great Britain in order to get possession of the whole of Oregon.’714  
Moreover, President Polk noted that the pacific nature of British relations within 
Europe was a reason why he took British threats seriously, because there was no 
fear on Britain’s part that action in Oregon might engender wider conflict.715  
Aberdeen’s policy can thus be considered with regard to his interpretation of British 
interests rather than in the context of external pressure. 
Whereas the personal diplomacy of the Washington negotiations was 
largely conducted through Ashburton, Aberdeen focused more on relationships 
with American ministers in England during talks over the Oregon dispute.  American 
politics were more excitable in the approach to the presidential elections of March 
1845 and remained so under the leadership of James Polk.  Cultivating friendships 
with Americans in England allowed Aberdeen to send his messages to America via 
its own diplomats, which circumvented the nationalist reactions that could be 
engendered by direct contact between Aberdeen or Pakenham and Washington. 
It could be construed that the trust placed in American ministers backfired.  
Jones has argued that Edward Everett (American minister to Britain, 1840-5) ‘may 
well have prolonged the crisis by over-emphasising Aberdeen’s conciliatory 
position.’716  Leaking strategic information designed at conciliation might also be 
considered inadvisable, given that it could encourage intransigence by reinforcing 
belief in Britain’s pliability.  Such might appear the case, for example, with 
Aberdeen’s disclosure to Everett that the Hudson’s Bay Company was to move its 
headquarters out of mainland Oregon and on to Vancouver Island.  On 16 April 
1845, Everett had noted that ‘Lord Aberdeen added, that for the last two years the 
Company had been erecting an establishment on the Southern point of […] 
Vancouver Island, with a view to making that their principal station.  I do not 
remember to have heard this fact stated before, and you will no doubt regard it as 
one of importance.’717  This may be interpreted as Everett instructing the recipient 
that Britain was not prepared to do diplomatic battle over the Oregon territory, 
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given that the Hudson’s Bay Company had ostensibly given up on the area.  In 
speaking of the company’s relocation, however, Everett may, equally, have been 
referring to a demonstration of Britain’s desire for an equitable compromise: 
Everett was persistently derided by American patriots as being ‘too English’ in his 
views on the matter.718 
The extent of Aberdeen’s friendship with Everett’s successor, Louis McLane 
(June 1845-August 1846), has led one historian to observe that they worked 
together in private towards a compromise boundary to such a close extent as to 
make one ‘wonder if the full story of the Oregon settlement has yet been told.’719  
Indeed, the Foreign Secretary later reflected in Parliament on his friendship with 
McLane and McLane’s influence in dampening the passion of American hawks: ‘that 
gentleman I have long known, and long had reason to esteem in official intercourse 
fifteen or sixteen years ago; and I am perfectly certain, that, by every means in his 
power, he has contributed to [the settlement].’720  McLane, President of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railway and with business connections in Britain, also wanted 
peace in order to maintain trade and because he viewed war as senseless in the 
immediate context of the border dispute and in the wider context of a belief in 
Anglo-American fraternity.721  Aberdeen regarded McLane’s professed interest in a 
compromise settlement as genuine and saw that the American’s pacific efforts 
could be relied upon in correspondence with the American government. 
As he had with the Anglo-French entente, Aberdeen insured his tactics by 
declaring the limits within which America must operate in response to his open 
conciliation.  The clearest condition placed on America was that if it seized any 
territory in the course of negotiation, this would be considered a casus belli.722  
America was also given regular reminders, through communications to Pakenham, 
that war remained a strategic option for Britain if conciliation bred intransigence.  
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Aberdeen wrote in the wake of Polk’s address in the spring of 1845, with reference 
to a military survey of the area: 
 
Whatever may be the course of the United States Gov[ernmen]t, the time is 
come when we must be prepared for every contingency.  Our naval force in 
the Pacific is amply sufficient to maintain our supremacy in that sea; and Sir 
George Seymour has been instructed to repair without delay to the Coast of 
the Oregon territory […] We are still ready to adhere to the principle of an 
equitable compromise; but we are perfectly determined to concede nothing to 
force or menace.723   
 
Other hints were dropped throughout the negotiations: a year later Aberdeen 
referred to ‘measures it may be expedient to adopt in order to meet any 
emergency which may arise.’724  American belief in the seriousness of Britain’s 
preparations developed great importance towards the end of the talks, as it 
encouraged Polk to back down. 
In Britain, the Conservative Cabinet aimed to strike a balance between 
appearing ready for war without provoking it and without draining money from 
Britain’s domestic regeneration fund.  In the spring of 1845 Aberdeen wrote to 
Peel, in a letter that also dealt with financial concerns: ‘We ought to make all 
reasonable preparations without delay; but it should be such as may be consistent 
with the preservation of peace.  In spite of Mr. Polk’s address, I cannot believe, 
where they see us determined, that the American Government will drive matters to 
extremity.’725   
As in Europe at this time, Peel agreed with a policy of moderate defence 
expansion despite excited outbursts at moments of heightened tension.726  In the 
autumn of 1845, the Prime Minister met with James Graham, Sidney Herbert and 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, the ninth Earl of Haddington, and concluded that full 
land defence of British North American possessions would be ‘so expensive – that 
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many will think actual war a more tolerable evil than such a state of burdensome 
and anxious suspense.’727  The government was agreed that only limited land 
fortifications should be made – even Wellington assented to British restraint – and 
that naval pressure should provide the main insurance for Aberdeen’s diplomacy.728  
The Foreign Secretary had set the precedent for this approach by sending a naval 
force to Oregon in 1843 to ‘show the flag’ alongside the message of conciliation.729 
Aberdeen combined this strategy of applying military and moral pressure on 
America with diplomatic pressure.  The proposal of arbitration was a favoured 
manoeuvre, which has attracted criticism: Jones and Rakestraw have argued that 
‘Aberdeen contributed to the problem by relying on the proved ineffective tactic of 
arbitration.’730  This overstates the point.  He believed that arbitration could 
transcend the public clamour that was proving so damaging to attempts at 
resolution, but recognised the unlikelihood of American submission.  Repeated 
proposals of arbitration did, however, help to apply pressure on America to come 
up with some constructive proposals of its own.731  Watching from Europe, France’s 
lack of interest in the Oregon issue could also only grow with every British 
diplomatic initiative that sought to contain the crisis: American intransigence only 
heightened existing French worries. 
America launched its own diplomatic initiative in July 1845.  American 
Secretary of State James Buchanan proposed an American compromise offer 
stretching from the Rockies to the Pacific along the forty-ninth parallel, with Britain 
to have free ports on the southern tip of Vancouver Island.  It made no mention of 
navigation of the Columbia River, even for a temporary period, omitted to give 
Vancouver Island to Britain, and was written in a language of hostility and 
confrontation that made the historically erroneous justifications of its claims all the 
more unpalatable to Britain.732  This was a long way from the settlement or 
sentiment that Britain wanted and Pakenham rejected the proposal out of hand.  
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Aberdeen’s subsequent criticism of Pakenham was regarded as demonstrative of 
the Foreign Secretary’s tendency to confuse diplomats with contradictory 
instructions and then blame them for any negative results: this is also a frequent 
theme in the historiography of Anglo-French relations.733   
Aberdeen criticised Pakenham for not referring the offer to the British 
government despite previous instructions that such American terms were 
unacceptable and that Pakenham was to use his own judgment in responding to 
any proposal.  Historians such as Donald Rakestraw have asserted that it would 
have been ‘impossible’ for Pakenham to accept the American offer and that he was 
only acting on instructions given by Aberdeen.734  Aberdeen’s realisation that he 
was culpable for Pakenham’s refusal of the offer, and for the resultant concession 
of the diplomatic initiative to Washington, was seen to influence his decision not to 
recall the diplomat in the wake of the crisis.735   
Pakenham had indeed acted within the letter of some of his instructions but 
had not considered the wider picture with regard to Buchanan’s offer: Aberdeen’s 
policy of continued arbitration proposals and military preparations had been 
designed to pressure America to the negotiating table.  Aberdeen’s failure to 
communicate his ideas with clarity was undoubtedly a factor in proceedings, but 
Pakenham had also ignored Aberdeen’s request that should Buchanan make an 
offer, regardless of its likely inadmissibility, it must not be refused outright.736  
Refusing the offer outright had given Polk the opportunity to walk away from the 
table once more.   
In response to Aberdeen’s criticism Pakenham initially concentrated on the 
detail of the offer, which he observed was a ‘shabby attempt to keep up the 
blustering tone of Mr. Polk’s inaugural address, in talking of the clear and 
unquestionable title of the United States’.737  His continued rebuttals of Buchanan’s 
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incoherent justifications were accurate and incisive.738  Pakenham’s grounds for 
rejecting the offer, when questioned by Aberdeen, nonetheless revealed an error of 
judgment.  He argued that he could not accept the offer ‘ad referendum’ because it 
fell short of British requirements and that ‘I purposely omitted in declining to 
accept the proposal, to say that I should not refer it for Your Lordship’s 
consideration, wishing in this way to afford to Mr. Buchanan an opportunity to add 
something to his offer.’739  This handed the diplomatic initiative to America and 
refusal to accept the offer ‘ad referendum’ was a curious approach to diplomacy, 
which is ultimately a more elegant form of haggling. 
In censuring Pakenham, Aberdeen agreed that the offer could not be 
accepted but in declining to refer it to the British government, Pakenham generated 
an abnormal degree of irritation in the Foreign Secretary.740  This is revealed in 
some of the rough drafts of correspondence that calmer reflections prevented from 
being sent.741  The letter suggested that this irritation was not based on feelings of 
personal culpability as Rakestraw has suggested, but that it came from wider 
political dissatisfaction with Pakenham.  Peel supported Aberdeen and, when 
considering the Foreign Secretary’s proposal that Pakenham suggest to America 
that his and Buchanan’s letters be expunged from official records, Peel wrote that ‘I 
am very much afraid of entrusting such a delicate operation to Mr. Pakenham, after 
the experience of the last proceeding on his part.’742  The Prime Minister’s 
exasperation was reiterated in Parliament, where Lord John Russell spoke in 
agreement.743 
From this point onwards Aberdeen needed to increase the pressure on 
America, given that the American compromise offer was withdrawn in the wake of 
Pakenham’s rejection.  This resulted in the use of Louis McLane in London to 
circumvent the need for direct dealing with the American government, which had 
                                                          
738
 Pakenham to Buchanan, 29 July 1845, copy incl., TNA, FO 5/427/189.  For Buchanan’s letter to 
Pakenham, see Buchanan to Pakenham, 12 July 1845, copy incl., TNA, FO 5/427/153.   
739
 Pakenham to Aberdeen, 29 October and 13 September 1845, TNA, FO 5/428/55 and 18. 
740
 See, also, Peel to Aberdeen, 22 November 1845, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MS 40455/274. 
741
 See, for example, Aberdeen to Pakenham, 3 October 1845, TNA, FO 5/423/139. 
742
 Peel to Aberdeen, 2 October 1845, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MS 40455/184.  
743
 Peel and Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, lxxxiii, 22 January 1846, cols. 154 and 152. 
209 
 
hitherto resulted only in unproductive clashes.  Standard Aberdonian openness 
began the exchanges, followed by references to the possibility of military measures: 
 
Lord Aberdeen said very promptly and frankly that it would be improper to 
disguise that, with the sincerest desire to avoid it, they were obliged to look to 
the possibility of a rupture with the United States; and that in such a crisis 
warlike preparations now making would be useful and important, but he 
stated at the same time, very positively and distinctly, that they had no direct 
reference to such a rupture; and would have been made in the same way and 
to the same extent without regard to the relations of Great Britain with the 
United States.744 
 
This appeared to have little effect on Polk and, if anything, it seemed to encourage 
him to engage in further brinksmanship: he wrote in his diary of being encouraged 
by Aberdeen and Peel’s conciliatory position.745  Realising he was getting nowhere, 
Aberdeen made increasing references to military preparations and this seemed to 
have the desired effect.  McLane wrote to Buchanan with escalating concern about 
Britain’s mobilisation and Polk started to exhibit signs of worry.746  Early in 1846 the 
President began suggesting that he would refer British offers to the Senate: 
Aberdeen appeared to have prised him away from his position of non-compliance.  
The incident went to show that Aberdeen was prepared to alter course and 
consider more confrontational methods if his preferred approach of open 
diplomacy appeared to be getting nowhere. 
In an attempt to win wider American political and popular approval for an 
equitable compromise solution to the boundary dispute, Aberdeen also leaked 
news of the Conservative government’s intentions to repeal the Corn Laws.  As 
Charles Greville recorded, with reference to The Times editor John Delane: 
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There can be very little doubt that it was Aberdeen’s object that Delane should 
publish what he did, though he did not tell him to do so, and the reason is very 
obvious.  Yesterday the American Mail went off, and it took with it the 
morning papers […] as Foreign Secretary his most earnest desire is to get over 
the Oregon affair as well as he can, and he knows that nothing will have so 
great an effect in America, nothing tends so materially to the prevalence of 
pacific counsels, as an announcement that our Corn Laws are going to be 
repealed.747 
 
One of Delane’s biographers has questioned Aberdeen’s motives but 
subsequent writers have agreed with Greville that Aberdeen’s actions were 
deliberate.748  Aberdeen was by now committed to the repeal cause and it was 
common knowledge that there was a large agricultural-political lobby in America 
that supported the free trade of grain.  The vast grain surplus of the Mississippi 
Valley could be traded and transported via the Juan de Fuca Strait, free from the 
duties that restricted its distribution.  Norman Graebner has observed that there 
was a notable change in politicians such as John Calhoun after the free trade news 
reached America and the American press praised the Conservative government, 
even if Aberdeen had overstated its unity on the issue to maximise political 
effect.749 
The move towards a solution gathered momentum and the treaty passed 
the American Senate in June 1846: the boundary was to run along the 49th parallel 
to the sea and then through the Juan de Fuca Strait, with Britain retaining the 
whole of Vancouver Island.  The Columbia River was to remain temporarily open to 
British shipping whilst all ports to the south of the boundary line would remain free 
in perpetuity.  The Hudson’s Bay Company’s property and remaining British subjects 
on the American side of the line were protected by law.  One historian charged 
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Aberdeen with an embarrassing retreat, believing that the Foreign Secretary had at 
one point sought to claim the whole of the disputed territory.750  The charge of 
‘surrender’ has also proved common with respect to Aberdeen’s previous claim to 
the land between the 49th parallel and the Columbia River.751   
Aberdeen had backed down on his claim to this land in the name of peace 
but, given the low priority of the Oregon dispute during the Washington 
negotiations, the British government had not paid it much attention.  Numerous 
surveys had since been conducted and the land was deemed worthless, whereas for 
Americans it sat at the end of the ‘Oregon trail’, which had acquired vast 
significance in the age of migration and Manifest Destiny.  Aberdeen made up his 
mind that this land was inessential to British interests long before the conclusion of 
the treaty, preferring to concentrate on the whole of Vancouver Island, free port 
access, and the 49th parallel.752  The land north of this line was the best for the fur 
trade and the most populous in terms of British settlement. 
 Aberdeen had not undermined the Hudson’s Bay Company through the 
Oregon treaty, despite subsequent criticism to that effect.753  The Hudson’s Bay 
Company suffered little considering its move to Vancouver Island and the easier 
access to ports that this engendered.  Navigation of the Columbia River would 
expire within a decade but it was only navigable for two months of the year and 
alternative land routes were available.  This seemed like a small cost to pay when 
the potential benefits of free trade were considered.  It must be considered that a 
more confrontational Foreign Secretary might have jeopardised the peace and what 
was a fair settlement by fixing Polk to the hostile platform on which he initially 
stood.  As sections of the British Press were reporting in the wake of the Oregon 
treaty, transatlantic commerce experienced a boom with news of the agreement.754 
Whilst the settlement protected British strategic interests, the Oregon 
dispute had for Britain long since developed into one mainly concerning honour.  In 
Oregon, this essentially meant compromising in a way that protected British 
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interests but without it being seen that compromise originated from the threats of 
Polk.  The concept of peace with honour had come to define the talks over Oregon, 
long before Disraeli used the term to conclude the Eastern Crisis of 1878 or Neville 
Chamberlain used it to herald the Munich agreement of 1938.  Ministers talked of 
the primacy of honour in Parliament and some historians have since argued that 
the land in dispute was not important.755  If Aberdeen was to maintain external 
belief in Britain’s international resolution he needed to uphold the mantra he spoke 
of in Parliament and that he and Peel often paraphrased in correspondence: ‘our 
honour is a substantial property that we can never neglect.’756  Honour also needed 
to be preserved to convince the wider public that peace was desirable.  The Belfast 
News-Letter captured the strength of feeling that Aberdeen had to placate: 
 
The Americans must be made to understand, that they are not to tamper with 
the honour or rights of Britain with impunity.  They are a vain, boastful race.  
Their pride is intolerable.  They imagine that they may, without question, 
assume everything, and intrude everywhere.  Our Yankee neighbours must be 
taught otherwise; and now that they seem desirous to shake their flag in the 
face of old England, and wrest from us our just possessions, we feel confident 
that, throughout the whole nation, there will universally prevail this one 
sentiment – that to such indignity and wrong Great Britain must not, for a 
moment, submit.757 
 
 The question of whether or not the Oregon treaty was honourable for 
Britain should not be measured against the boundary lines proposed by previous 
ministers.  Canning might have held out for more land, but Lord Liverpool would 
have been happy to treat along the 49th parallel followed through Vancouver Island, 
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which amounted to less land than the 1846 settlement secured.  Competing claims 
had ebbed and flowed for decades without anything being resolved. 
Central to the debate about British ‘honour’ – which has been joined as 
much by historians as contemporaries – is the question of whether or not Polk 
forced Aberdeen to compromise by aggressive diplomacy or if Aberdeen’s 
measured approach drew Polk away from his professed claims to all of the territory 
in dispute.  Most historians take the line that Polk was the prime mover and that 
Aberdeen surrendered.  Robert Ferrell argued that Polk forced Aberdeen to accept 
the 49th parallel and Charles Sellers talked of a policy ‘shift’ in the face of Polk’s 
persistence, whilst Henry Blumenthal talked of Britain’s ‘complete reversal’.758  Paul 
Bergeron dealt with the issue in a chapter entitled ‘Polk and the Winning of the 
Northwest.759  Elsewhere, it has been suggested that the idea of accepting the 49th 
parallel only occurred to Aberdeen late in 1845.760  
Aberdeen had in fact made up his mind to treat along the 49th parallel in 
1844, before Polk became President.761  Polk’s blustering meant that this could not 
be offered sooner without appearing to truckle to the American President: his 
policy of claiming the whole of Oregon did not affect the Conservatives’ position on 
the boundary dispute and delayed resolution of the conflict.  Some historians have 
argued that Polk never believed in his claim to the whole of Oregon and was only 
using it to apply pressure to Britain and achieve patriotic domestic support.762  This 
argument is redundant from the British point of view because Aberdeen retained 
the same territorial objectives throughout Polk’s presidency regardless of the 
nature of American tactics.763 
Aberdeen always felt that Polk would compromise in the end as there were 
significant groups of people in America whose opprobrium Polk could rely on if he 
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started a war with Britain over Oregon.  Most Southern politicians feared the war 
would disrupt the lucrative cotton trade with Britain and that there was a chance of 
slaves seizing the unrest as a chance to rebel against their masters.  Significant 
numbers of American Whig politicians had property and commercial interests in 
Oregon that war would compromise and possibly liquidate, whilst embryonic 
businesses in neighbouring California could ill afford the impact of war.764  The 
uncertainty caused by the possibility of war was already doing damage to the 
markets.  Polk might be holding out to appease the confrontational lobby that 
propelled him to power – particularly the western politicians of Ohio, Indiana and 
Illinois – but he could not do so for long without provoking war and generating 
greater opposition than he would face by backing down in 1846.  
British military preparations and Aberdeen’s related correspondence 
represented the deciding factor in bringing America to the negotiating table.765  
There were impulses for peace in America, but Polk’s fears that Buchanan and 
Calhoun were trying to bring about compromise to increase their presidential 
prospects at the expense of his reputation delayed the conclusion of talks into 
1846.  Polk revealed concern at British military developments towards the end of 
1845 and shortly afterwards in 1846, at the time of McLane’s messages of warning 
from England, the president began to exhibit the desire to compromise.766   
If Britain was now to offer a compromise solution, which it did, Polk could 
preserve some of his honour on the basis that Britain had made the proposal.  He 
could also dampen the noise that Buchanan and Calhoun might generate and avoid 
a war that was looking ever more likely.  Britain did not have to concede anything 
more than Aberdeen had been prepared to concede in September 1844.  
Meanwhile, some historians have suggested that it was escalating problems in 
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Mexico, not Aberdeen, which forced Polk to compromise, but his diary shows that 
the president considered the Oregon and Mexican issues as unrelated.767 
The actions and reactions of the British Press and populace combined with 
those of the political world, more so than at any time during Aberdeen’s tenure, to 
demonstrate that whatever constituted British ‘honour’ was secure in the eyes of a 
wider cross-section of contemporary opinion.  Criticism would be quick to surface in 
these arenas, but what instead appeared was support for the different facets of 
Aberdeen’s policy.  Press comment took a variety of forms. Newspapers such as the 
Blackburn Standard focused on the general benefits of peace: ‘A war between two 
such mighty nations must have brought ruin to one or the other, and probably to 
both.  In proportion, therefore, to the vast amount of desolation and misery spared, 
should be our gratitude and thanksgiving.’768  Elsewhere, appreciation of patient 
policy was framed in the context of the limited value of the land under dispute.769   
Other newspapers examined the nature of the treaty, echoing the Foreign 
Secretary’s assertions that it had been delayed by Polk but that it was honourable 
and Britain could be pleased with it.  The Bristol Mercury proclaimed that ‘the 
Oregon question is settled, and on terms which, under all the circumstances, may 
be regarded as satisfactory to both parties […] to the firmness and moderation of 
the British Government, and of the American Senate, is the settlement […] to be 
attributed.’770  The formerly agitated Belfast News-Letter, which had criticised 
America with venom, thought that, ‘peace, humanity, and the mutual interests of 
America and England have triumphed in the settlement of the Oregon question by 
an amicable and honourable treaty.’771  The Leeds Mercury reported that ‘we have 
scarcely ever felt higher satisfaction.’772 
Throughout negotiations there were also newspapers that agreed with 
Aberdeen’s resistance to the British ‘patriotic’ clamour stirred up by Polk’s sabre-
rattling and perceived the Americans’ fundamental desire for compromise.  It is 
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worth quoting two at length, given the contrast that these articles provide with 
historians who have described Britain’s actions as surrender.  The Leeds Journal 
wrote of America: 
 
The Government has now in its Treasury about 7 000 000 dollars, which, it is 
thought, will be exhausted when the Texas expenditures are paid.  In truth, if 
the Administration seriously intend [sic] immediate war on account of Oregon, 
they are not fanatics, but lunatics.  Mr. Polk may, and I believe does wish such 
a state of things, thinking it might promote his political views: but the people, 
the American people, neither wish [sic] nor anticipate war.  They will not 
sustain any Administration that prefers war to arbitration.773  
 
The Bradford Observer reflected on the folly of being drawn into the arguments of 
the minority of ‘incendiary’ patriots, a month before the settlement: 
 
When we reflect that there are nuisances miscalled statesmen in both 
countries, who, to serve an unholy, factious purpose, would readily plunge the 
two nations in the horrors of war, we would not absolutely affirm that the 
Oregon dispute will be settled peaceably.  We can only express our earnest 
hope that such incendiaries will be kept in check.774 
 
 The Bradford Observer also mentioned that public opinion favoured an 
equitable compromise along the lines that Aberdeen set out whilst the Preston 
Guardian awarded ‘high tribute to that public opinion which daily, more and more, 
tends to compel ministers to “Bear a temperate will, and keep the peace” but is a 
valuable testimony to the pacific and civilising influence of commerce.’775  The 
relationship of peace, commerce and prosperity with public favour was a strong 
one during Aberdeen’s time at the Foreign Office: at a time of economic deprivation 
it was almost impossible to satisfy these commodities whilst beating the nationalist 
drum.  This was a situation that well matched Aberdeen’s political inclinations.  
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Palmerston had carried the public with him in better times and he would win it back 
in the later 1840s and 1850s when revolution, French resurgence and the Crimean 
war engendered political upheaval, public concern about national security and the 
need for his brand of patriotic leadership.  For Aberdeen’s tenure, however, press 
coverage of the conclusion to the Oregon talks goes some way to showing that he 
held the greater share of popular approval, not that this was something Aberdeen 
would have celebrated, courted, or even considered in his policy-making.  
Parliament reflected the public support.  The government had backed Aberdeen 
throughout the crisis: Wellington felt no need to get involved as he did in the 
Webster-Ashburton negotiations; Stanley had poured water on Bagot’s repeated 
requests for extensive military preparations; and Peel voiced his opinion in the 
House of Commons, that a single month of Anglo-American war would have been 
‘more costly than the value of the whole territory.’776  The opposition was also as 
good as united in support of the treaty.  Russell came out in support of 
Conservative policy towards the end of 1845 and subsequent dissentient voices 
were few.777 
By the fall of the Conservative government, then, there had been a 
significant improvement to relations between Britain and America.  The 
Washington negotiations took on the character of later engagements with France: 
Aberdeen set out terms of negotiation that allowed for conciliation but set limits 
for Britain that could not be breached.  His choice of Lord Ashburton showed the 
potential smoothness of diplomacy when Aberdeen was able to choose his 
diplomats and when those of the other power were disposed to conciliation.  The 
type of problems that were experienced with Lyons and Bulwer in Greece and Spain 
were circumvented by the nature of Ashburton’s ‘special mission’.  Bypassing Fox, 
who was disliked almost as much by some British politicians as he was by the 
Americans, allowed Aberdeen to arrange the type of diplomatic relationship he 
shared with Guizot.  Ashburton and Webster were old friends who could be relied 
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upon to secure a settlement in which both sides made concessions to restore good 
feeling and open up new markets in a stable political environment. 
Palmerston deemed the arrangement part of ‘the system of purchasing 
temporary security by lasting sacrifices.’778  The first half of Palmerston’s 
proposition was disproved by the passage of time – British security in North 
America was secure in the long-term - while the second was only accurate insofar 
as Britain did not obtain all the territory under debate, but the military road had 
been secured.  Competing claims had been made since 1783 without achieving 
anything but acrimony and, whilst the conceded land might have proven valuable 
after development, it is hard to imagine that this value would have offset the costs 
of war or the lost benefits of trade that the settlement of the dispute engendered.  
It certainly would not have encouraged Guizot’s faith in a relationship with Britain 
to see war made over a peripheral issue.  It would also have been difficult to 
persuade the public of the merits of war over a small amount of land in a faraway 
boundary dispute when domestic social and economic issues required urgent 
attention.  Charles Greville noted the public mood when reflecting on the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty: ‘there is a very general feeling of satisfaction’.779  
  Besides protection of the Hudson’s Bay Company and the maintenance of 
free ports, the Oregon boundary dispute became much more a point of honour 
than a mission to protect wider strategic interests.  Aberdeen maintained a 
consistent position when the dispute began gathering momentum late in 1844 but 
in Polk he faced a challenge far greater than Tyler had presented: Polk’s blustering 
tone made it easy for conciliation to be interpreted as truckling.  Pakenham’s 
outright refusal of America’s move to conclude the issue hardened Polk’s resolve, 
which meant that Aberdeen’s usual reliance on gentlemanly persuasion and subtle 
intimations of the possible use of force needed reinforcement.  Messages were 
passed to McLane of British military preparations and ships were sent to America as 
a show of seriousness.  Together with a significant American domestic lobby, this 
encouraged Polk to compromise on the terms Aberdeen suggested. 
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The area between the 49th parallel and the Columbia River became part of 
the new Oregon and in some ways this represented a retreat from Britain’s position 
in 1842, but this had little to do with Polk’s brinksmanship.  Aberdeen decided that 
the area was inessential to British interest six months before Polk’s presidency 
began, in the era of the pacific Tyler, whom Aberdeen could probably have 
browbeaten if the determination had been there.  Historians have concentrated too 
much on this area of land in their narratives of ‘surrender’ without a wider 
consideration of British interest in the region.  The business interests of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company were protected by a change of headquarters and the legal 
protection of their property and activity in Oregon.  Britain’s commercial interests 
were protected by free access to Oregonian Pacific harbours and absorption of the 
best fur trading territory into British dominion.  This, together with the increasing 
trade that developed in the wake of the settlement, ensured the achievement of 
strategic consolidation and fiscal regeneration as the government intended. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
A more nuanced perspective is needed on the foreign policy of Lord 
Aberdeen and the Conservatives between 1841 and 1846, one where it is 
considered in relation to the Peel administration’s domestic objectives, and to the 
intellectual and practical matrices of Aberdeen’s policy-making.  Aberdeen’s career 
has not been entirely neglected – Iremonger and Chamberlain authored detailed 
biographies – but there is nonetheless a gap in the historiography for a study that 
looks beyond the diplomatic minutiae.780  Other authors have pointed out the need 
for Conservative foreign policy to be inexpensive, but this was only one of the 
facets of Aberdeen’s thinking, and behind that of wider Conservative policy in the 
nineteenth-century.  Without a full appreciation of Aberdeen and the Conservative 
party’s motivations, our understanding of the foreign policy of the Peel government 
remains restricted.   
By considering Aberdeen’s personal background – to garner more than the 
narrative details provided in previous biographies – this study has considered the 
nature of Aberdeen’s world view in the 1840s, and from whence it came.  The 
pursuit of an inexpensive foreign policy came largely from the need of the Peel 
government to finance its programme of domestic reform, although other 
considerations must be taken into account.  It would be the aristocratic Tories, for 
example, who would bear the substantial majority of the increased tax burden 
required to underwrite expensive foreign initiatives.  Some have suggested that 
Aberdeen’s prudence distorted his appreciation of domestic and international 
affairs, but this was hardly fair.  A reluctance to join calls for vast defensive 
improvements in 1845 was rational, and a survey of his foreign policy record has 
shown that when diplomatic avenues had been exhausted, moderate defence 
expenditure was justified in the name of British interests: projects such as the 
development of the Sandwich Islands demonstrated a natural desire to improve 
Britain’s international position. 
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Aberdeen and the Principles of Conservative Foreign Policy 
 
The principles with which the Conservatives approached foreign policy 
revolved around the protection and consolidation of British power, in keeping with 
their need to provide money for domestic regeneration, and with their inherent 
reluctance to engage in expensive foreign ventures.  Aberdeen’s aversion to radical 
change fitted into this model, rather than demonstrating an ideological inclination 
to reaction that stemmed from some fear of progress, or belying an aristocratic 
affiliation to European autocracy.  Short shrift was given to anything that risked 
undermining the balance of power, given that this balance helped to preserve 
British predominance, and that risk was a potentially expensive commodity.  This 
did not mean that the clock stopped in 1815 and Europe was frozen as it had been 
then, in favour of emperors and the forces of reaction, and to the detriment of the 
ruled.  Aberdeen regarded the balance of power (and the British state) as organic 
entities, for which measured and considered evolution was necessary.  Sudden 
and/or radical change was, however, viewed as dangerous.  It was not change itself 
that worried Conservatives, but its extent.    
A reluctance to intervene in the affairs of foreign states followed on from 
this conception of the balance of power, as Aberdeen was concerned that 
interference could prove a catalyst to greater trouble.  Intervention was, of course, 
necessary if British interests were deemed to be directly threatened, whilst 
peaceable diplomatic intercourse remained as a natural transaction of the state.  
Aberdeen and the Conservatives were prepared to work with any power to this 
end, regardless of its nature.  They did not share in the ideological revulsion at 
working with Europe’s autocrats, which existed in the calculations of some liberally 
inclined politicians.     
Many analyses have concluded that Aberdeen’s openness was synonymous 
with naivety or, even, stupidity.  Aberdeen’s willingness to work with European 
powers in an open and transparent fashion came rather more from the continental 
outlook of Aberdeen’s principal intellectual progenitors, Pitt the Younger and 
Castlereagh, which fused with his humanitarian distaste for war.  This approach was 
always backed up with private vigilance, however, and war remained as a strategic 
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option if diplomacy failed, as was seen clearly in the dispute with France over 
Morocco, and in the negotiations with America over Oregon.   
Aberdeen’s belief in the balance of power as set out at the Congress of 
Vienna complemented his inbuilt prudence and continental outlook to influence a 
conservative foreign policy, although not to the extent that it could be described as 
unthinkingly reactionary.  Aberdeen’s reluctance to countenance significant 
changes to the European equilibrium was not informed by any grand or doctrinaire 
world view, but by a considered interpretation of how best to protect British 
interests.  There was no room for the religious fervour and ideological 
interventionism associated with the continental conservatism of the Northern 
Courts: Aberdeen found his motivation to protect the European balance in the view 
that it maintained conditions by which British trading and general economic 
preponderance were insured. 
The importance of trade in the Conservatives’ conception of British power 
was apparent throughout Aberdeen’s tenure as Foreign Secretary.  Trade was 
important for any Foreign Secretary and, indeed, for any powerful state, but 
Aberdeen viewed mercantile predominance as the very currency of British power.  
This could be seen particularly in Greece, where Aberdeen refused to back Edmund 
Lyons’ attempts to restore Alexander Mavrocordato – regarded as the 
representative of local ‘English’ interest – principally because the ascendancy of the 
‘French’ Jean Coletti was deemed unthreatening to British trading dominance in the 
area.  Trade was also a central consideration in Spain, in the negotiations over the 
Maine-New Brunswick boundary, and elsewhere.  
Further evidence of the Conservatives’ priorities in foreign affairs could be 
seen in Aberdeen’s approach to the Ottoman Empire.  More liberal politicians such 
as Stratford Canning and Palmerston came to regard the Ottoman Empire as an 
institution whose longevity might be extended by remodelling it on British liberal 
values.  Just as the Conservatives eschewed campaigns driven by prestige, so did 
they view with suspicion such moves to reconstruct other nations upon British 
constitutional-liberal foundations.  Aberdeen’s distaste for the Islamism of the 
Turks was certainly important in his dim view of the Ottoman Empire, and this 
seems to explain why he thought the Porte should not have British capital invested 
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in its reformation.  There were also a number of practical reasons that 
demonstrated to Aberdeen and other Conservatives why the Ottoman Empire could 
not be reformed.  A recurring inability and/or unwillingness to instigate reforms 
that it had promised by treaty, such as those expected by Serbia from 1812 
onwards, pointed to an inherent lethargy onto which the religious prejudices of the 
day could be easily grafted.  Reforms introduced by the previous government, such 
as those of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838, had also met with 
limited success.  The geostrategic utility of the Ottoman Empire nonetheless 
dictated that its demise should not be catalysed, so a palliative approach was taken. 
The Peel administration showed scant interest in the promotion of 
particular regimes elsewhere, or in the wider internal affairs of others.  Whereas 
many liberals considered theirs a moral mission to spread liberalism and 
constitutionalism over Europe, at least partly because those sharing (what they 
perceived as) British values were deemed the best partners with whom to transact 
business, the Conservatives were reluctant to interfere in the affairs of a foreign 
power, particularly in the name of proselytising liberal values to which they did not 
subscribe.  This could be seen in Spain, for example, where the collapse of 
Espartero’s supposedly liberal administration elicited little reaction.  As long as 
trade continued uninterrupted, they saw little reason to protest. 
If a certain strand of liberal morality dictated that nations should be 
enlightened and emancipated by conversion to liberal values, most Conservative 
minds were inclined to think that interference was, in fact, the immoral course to 
pursue.  Lord Stanley spoke upon the issue in 1847, in relation to the affairs of 
Portugal, with reference to what he felt was Britain’s ideological intervention in 
Portugal on the part of John Russell’s liberal administration: 
 
I conceive that there is no principle more distinctly established or more 
universally recognised than this, that with respect to the purely internal and 
domestic concerns of any State, no other country has a right to interfere, but 
least of all to interfere by force of arms; and that the only possible 
qualification of this universal principle is, that the affairs so-called domestic 
and internal, are in their nature such as immediately and directly to endanger, 
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if not the institutions, at least the great loading interests of the country which 
claims a right to interfere.781 
 
The Conservatives’ ingrained aversion to interference was not based upon 
abstract isolationism, however, as has previously been contended.782  Their view 
was simply that the type of government in other states was not a ‘great loading 
interest’ for Britain.  In the debate on Portugal, furthermore, Stanley referred to the 
likelihood of interference leading ‘this country into a perpetual labyrinth of 
complications threatening the most serious embarrassments to our diplomatic and 
foreign relations.’783  This was, of course, related to the specifics of the Portuguese 
issue, but represented his wider practical concerns and those of Conservatives in 
general about poking sticks into continental hornets’ nests.  Support for non-
interventionism did not preclude action deemed necessary, however, for Stanley’s 
later governments or the Peel administration. 
 An intellectual investment in the overall benefits of non-interventionism 
was not the only connection of the government of 1841-46 with the Derbyite 
Conservatism of the decades to follow.  Along with a focus on conciliatory foreign 
policy – connected to the prioritisation of domestic economic recovery – a 
suspicion of that proselytising brand of liberalism in foreign policy associated with 
its leading practitioner, Palmerston, pointed to a consensus among most 
Conservatives regarding foreign affairs, if the issue of protection came to divide 
them on domestic concerns. 
 This was one of the reasons for which a study that assessed Aberdeen’s 
policy in the context of his personal outlook and contemporary Conservative 
objectives is necessary: the Palmerstonian terms on which debate has largely 
hitherto taken place distorted interpretations of an alternative approach to foreign 
policy.  The work of Angus Hawkins and the ‘Norwich School’ has helped to provide 
a more nuanced understanding of mid-nineteenth century Conservatism than that 
given by the ‘Whig’ historians of previous generations, or that offered within the 
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framework of Palmerstonian and Disraelian perspectives.  Aberdeen’s 
Conservatism, and its relation to that of the Peel government and to wider mid-
nineteenth century Conservatism, however, has until now remained underexplored. 
 
Reinterpreting Conservative Foreign Policy 
 
 Besides aiming to expand our understanding of Conservative foreign policy, 
this study has sought to challenge a number of longstanding yet questionable 
historiographical claims, which have clouded interpretations of Aberdeen’s policy-
making.  Most previous accounts have, for example, characterised the Peel-
Aberdeen relationship as quasi-filial, with Aberdeen steering the Foreign Office 
under Peel’s paternal supervision.  This study has contended that Aberdeen was in 
fact left to his own devices, working towards the objectives of the Conservative 
government on the same basis as the Prime Minister.  Peel needed to use stronger 
language in the House of Commons than Aberdeen did in the Lords, but this did not 
affect the autonomy of the Foreign Secretary, whose policy was challenged in the 
context of policy-making discussion, but not undermined or overridden.  The diarist 
Charles Greville, who could always be relied upon to attack any political 
arrangement he thought false, noted that Aberdeen’s and Peel’s was a symbiotic 
relationship with its origins in mutual respect and necessity, with Peel needing to 
concentrate on domestic issues.784  That Peel only once mentioned foreign affairs in 
his cabinet reports to the Crown suggested the nature and success of this 
arrangement.785 
 The historiography has also portrayed the cornerstone of Conservative 
policy, the Anglo-French entente, as either non-existent, a poor imitation of 
Palmerston’s Quadruple Alliance, or a well-meaning initiative that showed signs of 
promise but weakened under the weight of increasing rivalry and collapsed as the 
question of the ‘Spanish marriages’ developed.  The evidence has led this study to 
consider an entente that was flexible, morally binding, and durable. It arose from 
the Conservatives’ need to keep foreign policy inexpensive whilst maintaining 
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Britain’s international position – because Guizot could be relied upon to check the 
more radical elements of French expansionism – without alienating the Northern 
Courts by the formation of an exclusive alliance, which was never seriously 
entertained.  Such an arrangement with France was also symptomatic of 
Aberdeen’s approach to foreign policy, whereby personal diplomacy was the 
preferred method of achieving Britain’s goals.  Aberdeen’s continental contacts 
made this viable, and its intellectual origins might well be traced to Castlereagh.  
Critics of this style of diplomacy might suggest that the gentlemen’s agreements 
that resulted from it stored up problems for the future.  The agreement with 
Nesselrode in 1844 regarding the fate of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
understanding with Guizot over the issue of the ‘Spanish marriages’, serve as two 
such examples.  Although, as this study has shown, a closer analysis might suggest 
otherwise. 
 This study has also proposed a reinterpretation of that notorious aspect of 
Anglo-French relations, the marriages question.  Jones Parry’s seminal study 
remains the most thorough work on the topic, yet it contains a number of 
questionable assertions, some of which appear merely to reflect the prejudices of 
1936.  The Spanish Queen Dowager’s changeable political opinions were, for 
example, put down to being female.786  Analysis of Aberdeen’s foreign policy was 
also weakened by an ongoing focus upon perceived hypocrisy, where British 
diplomatic intercourse with France and Spain was deemed to breach a professed 
desire for Spain to reach its decisions independently.  Besides distracting from a 
broader analysis of Conservative foreign policy, these charges are wide of the mark.  
Britain certainly offered Spain diplomatic counsel, as was normal between friendly 
nations, but this was different from pressuring Spain into decisions or making overt 
threats.  Later studies enhanced understanding of British policy in Spain, but their 
inflated interpretations of the nature of the entente informed a tale of British 
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failure and muddle.787  This study has contended that when Aberdeen’s policy is 
considered in the light of Conservative aims, it appears rational. 
 Save for comment on the Nesselrode Memorandum, the Conservatives’ 
policy towards Russia and the Ottoman Empire has largely been ignored.  Anglo-
Russian relations nonetheless show the Conservatives’ consistent approach to 
affairs in the East.  The regeneration of the Ottoman Empire was not countenanced 
for intellectual, religious and practical reasons, but its existence was protected due 
to its geostrategic and geopolitical utility.  Aberdeen’s reluctance to intervene in 
internal Ottoman affairs, or to support the revolutions in Greece and Serbia, was 
bound up in the conviction that Turkish collapse would precipitate a power struggle 
that would not only derail immediate Conservative objectives, but also threaten the 
peace of Europe and the international order.  Tsar Nicholas and Nesselrode 
naturally placed Russian interests first but, similarly to Guizot, they were people 
with whom, cautiously, Aberdeen and the Conservatives could work.  This was not 
assumed on the basis of any ideological favour to Europe’s autocrats, but on 
personal experience and the practical evidence that Russia also wanted the 
Ottoman Empire to remain a part of the European order, at least in the shorter 
term. 
 The historiography of American affairs is much richer but remains subject to 
the problems identified elsewhere.  Early work and provincial journal articles were 
bogged down in diplomatic minutiae, or clouded by partisan loyalties.  Later studies 
expanded understanding of the period – that of Jones and Rakestraw remains the 
most thorough – but there remains room for a study that considered Conservative 
policy in light of the objectives of the Peel administration, and in the context of 
Aberdeen’s ‘mental map’.788  In settling the boundary between Maine and New 
Brunswick, Aberdeen managed to improve relations between Britain and America, 
which had all but broken down under the previous administration.  Britain’s local 
interests were preserved, contrary to beliefs of those such as Palmerston and, more 
importantly, negotiations about trade contracts replaced bickering over 
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boundaries.  Tensions resurfaced in the dispute over the boundary between British 
and American possessions in Oregon.  Calm but determined policy (eventually 
reinforced with inferred threats) was sufficient to face down President Polk in that 
dispute and secure British interests in the region.  The negotiations were not 
dominated by America, as has previously been assumed, and Anglo-American 
relations were left in a much better condition than in 1841.    
In exploring the different theatres of Conservative foreign policy, 
comparisons with Palmerston have inevitably been drawn in this study.  His 
historiographical and contemporaneous ubiquity cannot be ignored.  Palmerston 
was seen as representative of mid-Victorian success and, certainly to the 
generations of ‘Whig’ historians, as the personification of John Bull.  In 
concentrating upon the earlier 1840s, this study has noted how it was in fact 
Aberdeen who received the bulk of contemporary accolades for a more restrained 
approach.  Palmerston spent the duration of the Peel administration attacking its 
foreign policy, but Greville’s account of such criticism was revealing, if a touch 
exaggerated: ‘it all falls dead and flat, and nobody takes the slightest interest in his 
orations.’789  One of the main reasons why Palmerston’s volleys from the opposition 
benches failed to hit the mark was that they often appeared hypocritical: criticisms 
of the ‘Ashburton capitulation’ overlooked the fact that Britain had given away no 
more land than Palmerston himself had been prepared to concede in 1835, whilst 
his attacks over policy regarding French encroachment in Tahiti were undermined 
by a previous admission that the island was legally, practicably and strategically 
beyond British protection.790 
 Despite the obvious differences between Aberdeen and Palmerston’s 
diplomatic methods, it is possible to talk of foreign policy objectives that were not 
so vastly contrasting.  Palmerston recognised that peace and stability on the 
continent were desirable both because they provided the best conditions for trade 
and because Britain’s land army was insufficient to make a decisive impact in large 
conflicts, or in those out of its reach.  The Navy would always provide Britain with 
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security but the balance of power provided security for its interests and, despite his 
championship of liberalism, which derived from a mixture of genuine ideological 
commitment and domestic politicking, Palmerstonian actions and liberal ambition 
were also subjected to natural and practical restrictions.  The difference between 
Palmerston and Aberdeen was that the former would attempt to transcend 
limitations with rhetoric and bluff, whilst Aberdeen preferred to practise a more 
candid diplomacy.  Each approach carried its own benefits and dangers. 
 Where the Conservatism of Aberdeen really differed from the liberalism of 
Palmerston was not in levels of commitment to British interests, but in the way in 
which Aberdeen dealt with the limits to British power and influence.  Aberdeen 
preferred to use his continental contacts whereas, lacking these, Palmerston 
recognised that an alliance with public opinion was a useful means by which to 
strengthen his authority.  When revolution consumed Europe in 1848, for example, 
he lauded the efforts of Kossuth and the Magyars in Austria and hailed the 
challenge to reaction.  This message gratified the public and indicated to 
continental powers a strength of conviction which, driven by the force of public 
support, suggested powerful national resolution.  Palmerston regarded this as a 
deterrent to Britain’s enemies.  Similarly in the Don Pacifico case, when Greece was 
blockaded to extract recompense for the material damage inflicted upon that 
‘British’ citizen, the Civis Romanus Sum speech that followed was undertaken with a 
combination of personal justification, public gratification, and continental 
consumption in mind.  The Conservatives regarded this approach as unnecessarily 
risky. 
 
Reinterpreting Conservatism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
     
 From this study of Aberdeen’s foreign policy has emerged an alternative 
interpretation of the mechanics of the Peel administration.  Peel was undoubtedly a 
strong-minded leader with a clear conception of the direction in which he wanted 
to take the country.  His relationship with Aberdeen, however, suggested that the 
dictatorial leadership style of historiographical tradition needs to be challenged.  
Generations of historians have portrayed Peel as a marionettist whose ministers 
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operated under their master’s direction and control.791  In the case of Aberdeen at 
least, this idea does not stand up to close scrutiny.  Whilst Aberdeen was working 
towards the objectives of a Conservative government led by Peel, the relative 
autonomy with which the Foreign Secretary went about his business belied the idea 
of the quasi-filial relationship put forward by the historiography.  Richard Gaunt has 
suggested that other offices of government functioned with a similar degree of 
independence.792  Although further study is required in this area, it seems that 
there was a wider mandate for Peel’s approach to government than traditionally 
thought, as his ministers were working towards the same ends as their leader 
without the need for Peel’s frequent intervention and persuasion.  Perhaps it is no 
longer appropriate to conceptualise the mission to reform the state as the 
brainchild and ongoing project of the Prime Minister, rather that of a wider group 
of ministers, if not the Conservative party as a whole.  If this was the case then 
Conservatism in this era must be supposed a good deal more liberal than is 
traditionally thought.   
  This study has also considered how for this Conservative government at 
least, foreign policy in the nineteenth-century was not just a series of ad hoc 
measures that amounted to a block upon the more systematic liberals, and 
provided a barrier to the ostensibly progressive values that ‘Whig history’ 
celebrated.  Alongside a domestic programme that has been well documented, we 
have considered how Aberdeen’s role complemented regeneration on the home 
front.  The Conservatives had a clear agenda for government in which foreign policy 
was an arm of an overarching programme to restore Britain to social and financial 
health.  Recent scholarship has proposed a slightly different dynamic for the 
interrelationship between foreign and domestic policy in the Peel government and 
in wider British history, with foreign strategic concerns driving domestic policy.793  
Anthony Howe has stressed the influence on the Peel government of the collective 
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idea that international free trade would block the emerging economic competition 
from America and Germany, thereby freezing British dominance in place.794   
 Whatever one believes with regard to the relative balance of foreign and 
domestic priorities, it remains that these aspects of policy were inextricably linked, 
and that they were dominated by economic concerns.  This is what ultimately gave 
the Peel administration its coherence.  Aberdeen’s dealings were in part informed 
by the background influences investigated in Chapter Two, and in part by the 
practicalities of the international situation, but there was an overriding focus on 
economy, as evidenced by the ongoing preoccupation with the maintenance and 
extension of Britain’s mercantile intercourse.  It was the filter through which 
foreign policy was often viewed and this economic preponderance – as well as 
threading together the aims of the Peel government – also connected the 
Conservatism of the 1840s with that of the Derby governments in later decades.  
Conservative foreign policy in this era might have seemed directionless, lacking the 
moral and ideological mission that characterised liberal aspirations on the 
continent, but there was an overriding idea that British power could be 
consolidated and protected by preserving and extending Britain’s economic 
dominance, which was construed as the very currency of British power, rather than 
as a by-product of it.  This combined with the inherent prudence of Conservatives 
to unite the different elements of a government, as well as to form connections 
between Peelism and Derbyism.  It is, therefore, perhaps in this pervading 
economic focus that we find the very essence of mid-nineteenth century 
Conservatism, and of the rival tradition to the liberal movement that still dominates 
understanding of politics in that era.     
   
* * * 
 
 This study has sought to illuminate one of the more obscured phases of 
nineteenth-century Conservatism by considering the foreign policy of the Peel 
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administration through a contextualised study of its practitioner, Lord Aberdeen, 
and of the world in which he operated.  A rational, practical and successful 
politician has emerged, one who largely worked in harmony with the Prime 
Minister and with the overall support of his Party, delivering a foreign policy 
focused on the maintenance and extension of Britain’s mercantile predominance, 
applying non-interventionism to such an extent as was compatible with British 
interests, and using personal diplomacy to keep France close and to maintain 
working relationships with Europe’s other powers.  This approach helped to deliver 
the Conservatives’ international objectives and, thereby, their domestic objectives 
too.  The approach of the Peel administration and Aberdeen foreshadowed that of 
later Derbyite Conservatism and placed Aberdeen’s policy within that broader 
historical context. 
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